Greece rushed to welcome the overthrow of Assad

The overthrow of Assad in Syria is part of the war in Palestine and, after the war in Lebanon, constitutes the long-awaited escalation and regionalization of the war in the Middle East with the creation of an independent Palestinian State at stake. It is also part of the effort of Israel and the US to halt the advance of the Axis of Resistance with surgical strikes on the leadership structure of the countries and organizations of the Axis of Resistance. In this light, the overthrow of Assad is a link in the chain of strikes against Nasrallah, Haniyeh, Sinwar, etc. The difference, however, in Assad’s case is that there was a total overthrow of the secular, pro-Western but anti-American regime that ruled Syria for fifty-four years, with Assad remaining alive and in exile. The overthrow of Assad is comparable in magnitude to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003.

A product of the Turkish-Israeli partnership in post-Assad Syria is the division of the country into three main zones of influence: a) the Turkish zone in the north centered on Aleppo next to the Turkish-occupied Syrian province of Idlib, b) the American-Israeli zone in central-southern Syria along with the northeastern Kurdish region, and c) the Alawite and Christian zone in the west where Assad and the Resistance Axis militias are currently in a state of hypnosis. The meeting point of these zones is central Syria, where the north-south and east-west axis is at stake, with the province of Deir Ezzor being equally as regionally crucial as the tri-nation Syria-Iraq-Jordan and its wealth-producing sources for all the powers involved.

More out of allied lust and less out of a logical contemplation of reality, Athens rushed to welcome the fall of Assad and the change of regime in Syria. Like Hafez al-Assad, his son, Bashar, protected the Christians of Syria, the Greek community there, and maintained the unity and stability of the country with an iron fist for 54 years at the expense of the American-backed anti-regime elements of the Sunni majority of Syria. At the same time, the Assads pursued a pro-Hellenic policy during periods of Greek-Turkish tension, such as in 1987 during the Seismic Crisis, when Hafez al-Assad placed the military bases and territory of Syria at the disposal of the Greek armed forces.

The consequences for Greece are ominous: oppression and persecution of Christians, Greeks and other minorities, increased refugee flows to Greece and, above all, increased tension in Greek-Turkish relations as a consequence of Turkey’s geopolitical influence and negotiating power, e.g. on the issue of the EEZ. In Athens they selectively forget that the increase in Turkey’s geopolitical influence in Syria is the product of a transaction between Ankara and the USA, i.e. the “allies” in whom the hopes of the current Greek government have been exclusively and unashamedly placed.

Now the Western character of the Syrian state is in doubt. Syria’s future looks dangerously uncertain and unstable: a resurgence of the pre-Assad civil war scene of foreign occupation, division and instability (1917-1970). As the mosaic of religions and ethnicities has not changed in combination with the divisive policy of the US, civil war between Kurds and Sunni Arabs, Shiites, Christians is likely. The situation is exacerbated by the regional instability of the Palestinian-Israeli war. The biennial coups of the pre-Assad past are expected to return with political instability. In any case, the coup against Assad will not be the last…