Eric Zuesse
The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of this site. This site does not give financial, investment or medical advice.
22 June 2026, by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)
The following is from the lone neutralist website in the Ukrainian language, strana.ua, which is blocked in both Ukraine and Russia, but is nonetheless either #1 or #2 as the most frequently visited online news website by Ukrainians:
https://stranaua.media/news/507688-itohi-1580-dnja-vojny-v-ukraine.html
“The Day at the Front: Russians in Konstantinovka”
22 June 2026
We analyze the results of the 1580th day of the war in Ukraine.
Russian troops advanced in the direction of Dobropolsk – in the area of the village of Nikanorovka, the military publication Deep State reports. Also, the “gray zone” approached the village of Novy Donbass (the Russian Federation had previously declared its seizure).
We have already reported that the Russian Federation has recently intensified its offensive towards Dobropol, which is of great importance in the battle for the Donetsk region, as it poses the threat of retreating Ukrainian troops in Slavyansk, Kramatorsk and Druzhkovka.
The Russian army advanced on the eastern approaches to Konstantinovka, according to the Deep State map.
Advancement in the area of the village of Novodmitrovka includes both the capture of territories and the expansion of the combat zone.
The Russian Ministry of Defense announced today that Russian troops are controlling Preobrazhenskaya Street in the northern part of the city and published a video with the flag from there.
The British “BBC” writes that the Russian military has already infiltrated all districts of Konstantinovka and even appeared on the northern outskirts, on the way to Druzhkovka. As the soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported, the city has completely moved into the gray zone, which is not controlled by any of the parties.
Inside Konstantinovka remain Ukrainian cleaning groups, infantry and teams of unmanned systems. But their positions are calculated more and more often and they try to knock them out.
Due to limited resources, including human resources, Ukrainian groups of unmanned systems cannot systematically search for Russian crews hunting for them. Therefore, Russian drone pilots can fly uninterrupted and calmly, calculate the positions of Ukrainian crews and strike them.
K shelling. Yesterday, the Russians bombed the Kharkiv thermal power plant. In the local publications they write that there were direct flights of several KABov at the CHP-5.
The Ukrainian division of “Kraken” announced that the Russians, after a long hiatus, have again started massive strikes with anti-aircraft missiles on Kharkiv. They recalled that earlier the Russian air force had used KABs in the city almost unhindered, but then the Ukrainian forces managed to find countermeasures, due to which the effectiveness of such strikes decreased sharply.
According to the unit’s assessment, now Russian troops have adapted to these measures and are once again increasing the use of aerial bombs against Kharkov. “The enemy has once again adapted and is starting to increase its fire impact on the city again,” the public writes.
Also, the day before yesterday, the Russian troops carried out massive air defense missile strikes on Zaporozhye. According to media reports, the bridge over Khortytsa and the DniproHES power plant were hit.
In the Black Sea that night, drones attacked three merchant ships that were heading to Odessa ports. A large-scale fire broke out on a dry cargo ship under the flag of Panama, the cook, a citizen of Egypt, died. We note that recently the Russians have activated attacks both on Ukrainian ports and on ships that go to (or from) the bottom. That is, apparently, they will try to block shipping to Ukraine.
Former People’s Deputy and commander of the drone company Igor Lutsenko writes that Russia is trying to renew the naval blockade of Ukraine.
“Signals have been sent that the “window” through the Black Sea, cut in 2023 by the efforts of the Defense Forces of Ukraine, can now be closed again. Russia is striving to renew the naval blockade of Ukraine. Now it does not need the Snake Island for this. The development of drone technology makes it possible to deliver pinpoint strikes on vulnerable places of civilian vessels coming to our ports,” Lutsenko writes.
He predicts that with the strengthening of the strikes, shipowners may refuse to enter Ukrainian ports. And he calls on Ukraine to build an air defense system against drones not only on land, but also at sea.
Also, near Odesa, a pumping station was attacked at night, the shift chief, a machinist, was killed. The workers say that the ambulance and firemen did not arrive for more than an hour, and the man died without waiting for help.
Also, yesterday evening in the Odesa region, an enterprise was hit by an “Iskander”.
В Одесской области предприятие было атаковано баллистикой, сообщила ОВА.
Загорелись автомобили и емкости с топливом, уничтожено складское помещение. Один человек погиб, еще трое получили ранения.
The Russian Ministry of Defense today announced an attack on the energy sector in Kyiv, Sumy and Chernihiv regions. There were power outages in Kyiv today – as reported, due to an accident.
The Ukrainian drone manufacturer “General Chereshnya” reported a blow to the company’s ego. According to his data, there are no victims. At the same time, the manufacturer made it clear that the equipment could suffer. “Iron and technology are a renewable resource,” the company said.
On the weekend, the Russians also attacked enterprises in the Poltava region and Pavlograd.
Ukraine launched a missile attack on Voronezh today – the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces announced the defeat by missiles of an air base of a missile production enterprise. The Ukrainian public writes that the Sborka semi-conductor equipment plant was hit.
In Russia, they said that the production facilities of one of the enterprises were damaged by a missile attack, but did not specify which one.
Yesterday, Ukraine struck the area of the Kerch Strait. According to Ukrainian data, objects on both sides of the Crimean bridge were attacked: maritime logistics (ferry) for the transportation of oil in the Krasnodar region, the port of “Kavkaz” and the oil depot in Kerch.
After that, they again stopped selling fuel in Crimea, even by coupons. And in Sevastopol, restrictions were imposed on mass events and the work of establishments – apparently, due to the threat of raids. On the way out of Crimea through the Kerch bridge, large queues have accumulated. Also, after the shelling, power and water cuts began in a number of areas of the peninsula.
In addition, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces announced new strikes on railway bridges in Crimea – the bridge over the Severo-Krymsky Canal in the Razdolny district, in the Petershagen district in the Zaporozhye region, and across the Sivash Bay in the Chongara district. The general staff announced the strikes on railway bridges in the Razdolny region on Friday.
Zelensky yesterday announced an attack on the refinery in Tyumen – at a distance of more than 2,000 km from the Ukrainian border. The Ukrainian General Staff also announced it. At the same time, the Russian authorities also confirmed the attack on the Tyumen Refinery, but said that it had been repulsed and the plant had not been confirmed.
На выезд из Крыма через Керченский мост скопились масштабные очереди.
Официальные паблики пишут, что перед мостом сейчас около 600 автомобилей.
Публикуются видео очередей на фоне горящей в Керчи нефтебазы после
Крым и подступы к нему в последние дни подвергаются массированным ударам по мостам и железным дорогам, сегодня на полуострове заявили о полном прекращении продажи топлива.
What do the strikes of the Armed Forces change in war and what will be the Kremlin’s response?
Last week was marked by strong and highly resonant blows to the Russian fuel and industrial infrastructure. The Moscow Refinery was hit twice at once. Moreover, almost all requests for Ukrainian drones to fly to him were unsuccessful. But, in the end, we managed to break through.
Yesterday, fuel storage in Kerch, ferries across the Kerch Strait and the port “Kavkaz” burned, after which the sale of fuel was completely stopped on the peninsula. Also, after drone strikes, electricity and water were lost in a number of districts of the peninsula.
Restrictions on the sale of gasoline are also being introduced in a number of Russian regions. Today, a factory in Voronezh was hit by a missile.
Against this background, an extremely stingy reaction to what is happening on the part of the Russian authorities is striking.
Only Peskov briefly commented on the strikes on Moscow, stating that Putin is being informed about the situation, and the Russian army is carrying out powerful “retaliatory strikes”. The situation with a shortage of gasoline is mainly commented on by local authorities or the manufacturers themselves.
It is indicative that the major federal channels practically did not mention the attack on Moscow on June 18 in the news. On that day, Putin spoke at the Russia-ASEAN forum in Kazan and also did not comment on the attack. Also, however, as well as later.
In yesterday’s more than 2-hour episode of “News of the Week” with Dmitry Kiselev on “Russia-1”, about 5 minutes of air time were devoted to the strikes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and Crimea, even at the very beginning of the program. The main theses: “with strikes on Russia, Kyiv strives to create a false impression that the initiative in hostilities has passed to it, but this is not true – the Russian army is advancing on all fronts”, “damaged Russian objects are quickly restored”, “Ukrainian strikes on the Russian Federation are terrorist attacks with the aim of encouraging the Russian authorities to accept Kiev’s conditions and conclude a truce on the front line, as it desperately needs a breather, but we will not give it and victory will be for by us”.
Such informational disregard has already given rise to various versions. Among Putin’s opponents, the most popular point of view is that he is completely unaware of what is happening, has lost touch with reality and is confident that “everything is fine”, simply not noticing the growing problems.
On the other hand, this is contradicted by the fact that the authorities in the same Crimea officially announced the cessation of fuel sales and other strict restrictive measures. And this would hardly have been possible without coordination with the Kremlin. Yes, it is difficult to imagine that Putin is not aware of the problems of the largest fuel companies, which are headed by his closest associates Sechin and Miller.
Then there is another version, according to which the Kremlin, on the one hand, strives to prevent the growth of panic among the population, showing that everything is under control and “we are going to victory”, on the other hand, it does not want to promise a quick solution to the problems, suggesting that everyone prepare for “hard trials for the sake of victory.”
It is not by chance that the strikes of the Armed Forces in Moscow are constantly called “terrorist attacks”, as if drawing analogies with the terrorist attacks by Chechen separatists in the 2000s, which also happened regularly, but the Kremlin did not make concessions and, in the end, the Northern Caucasus “pacified” (and at the same time used the terrorist attacks as a reason to tighten the internal regime). And now the Russian society is being offered the same scenario – just survive a difficult period and “win”. Also, this situation can be used to adopt some harsh measures. Both in terms of introducing restrictions and strengthening control, and in terms of a possible new mobilization and “belt tightening” of the population and, in general, the civil sector, if a decision is made about it. Analogies are drawn with Ukraine – if it is shelled much more heavily than the Russian Federation (especially the regions close to the front), but life continues there, there are no riots and destabilization, then why should it be different in Russia?
However, in the current situation, this approach carries obvious risks for the Kremlin in two ways.
First, in terms of public opinion.
First of all, there is a big difference in the perception of the war in Ukraine and in Russia. Even if we take into account the fact that the war started due to the attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine, and not the other way around, that is, on the initiative of the Russian leadership (let’s say that the majority of Russians still believe that the decision about the “SVO” was correct – not a fact that this is the case in reality, but let’s say), several points make the situation, to put it mildly, not very similar.
At the moment, Russia has not lost its territories, but has conquered part of the regions of Ukraine. And the war is being fought on the territory of a neighboring state, not the Russian Federation. That immediately raises questions among some Russians – why can’t you just stop on the front line and record Russia’s victory in this way? What is the point of fighting for Kramatorsk and Slavyansk and even for all of Ukraine, if it will cost many victims?
Since the spring of last year, in the public sphere, the situation looks like Ukraine is in favor of an early ceasefire and a ceasefire along the front line, while Russia is against it. We have already written that in reality the Ukrainian authorities would not really like such an option (because, as noted above, it would secure a military victory for Russia), and then they are offering it in anticipation of the fact that the Kremlin will refuse. But if he agrees, it will be difficult for Kyiv to avoid the truce. Therefore, Russians may also have a question: “Why don’t we agree to stop the war, if the enemy agrees?”
Unlike Russia, Ukraine does not have nuclear weapons. Therefore, after the next Russian shelling, no one in Kyiv asks the country’s military-political leadership: “Why haven’t we terrorized Moscow with nuclear weapons yet?” And in the Russian Federation, such questions are regularly raised after each shelling. At the same time, as we wrote, the use of nuclear weapons carries great risks for Russia itself. But in certain circles, this idea is popular, and demands to “drop atomic bombs on Ukraine” are constantly heard.
Therefore, if the burdens of wartime for Russians will increase and, even more so, if mobilization and belt-tightening begin, then all the above-mentioned questions will begin to be asked even more often and louder. Part of society will ask why they do not conclude a truce. The second is why nuclear weapons have not been used so far, and whether the Kremlin at all understands how to fight further in order to “achieve victory.”
There is also a difference in how the Ukrainian and Russian authorities react to the shelling.
After each shelling, Zelensky promises retribution, and rockets with drones fly across the Russian Federation, after which many impressive photos and videos of burning refineries, ports, factories and other objects appear.
The Russian authorities also promise retribution. However, after the Russian strikes, due to the fact that, in contrast to Russia, in Ukraine in March 2022, criminal liability was introduced for the publication of the results of the flights, the same bright content as after the strikes on the Russian Federation appears much less (although, perhaps, the objects are really affected on a large scale).
And the massive strikes on Kyiv, which were announced in Moscow as “retribution” for the shelling of the college dormitory in Starobelsk, take place over long periods of time and, moreover, do not differ greatly in their nature from the numerous strikes that have been carried out on Kyiv since the beginning of the war.
That is, the “picture of otvetok” is incomparable.
This is superimposed on the stingy comments of the Russian authorities regarding shelling, gasoline shortages and other consequences of the Ukrainian strikes, as well as, what is even more important, the lack of explanations as to how the authorities intend to solve these problems in principle.
This may raise questions in society about how adequately the situation is perceived in the Kremlin and whether they even know what to do next.
However, it is not a fact that these questions will be asked too persistently and will lead to any serious fermentation in Russian society, which in recent years has demonstrated high resistance to various stresses and challenges.
But there is a second problem caused by the Ukrainian shelling, which is potentially even more dangerous for the Kremlin than public sentiment. We are talking about direct economic damage to Russia. Note that it is difficult to estimate this damage yet. As for the fuel shortage, the situation differs greatly from region to region. It is also unclear how quickly they will be able to eliminate the destruction of the refinery. The degree of damage to many objects is unknown.
But, in any case, these attacks do not pass without a trace. And here we again return to the fundamental difference between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in terms of the influence of enemy strikes on the rear on the ability to continue the war.
Russia is fighting on its own money. Therefore, the economic damage inflicted by attacks on the infrastructure directly affects the fullness of the budget and, accordingly, the military effort. Especially since the infrastructure that brings in the most money (oil and gas) is very vulnerable to even drone attacks.
Ukraine is fighting for European money. Therefore, no matter how much the Russians attack industrial enterprises and infrastructure, as long as there is a financial flow from the West, it does not critically affect Kiev’s ability to wage war. The exception is a long-term blackout across the country. But it is not known whether it is possible to achieve ego in principle. Also, nuclear strikes can cause critical damage if they are massed (more on that below). In the rest, strikes can certainly lead to very serious damage, but as long as the main financing center is abroad and a significant part of the military production sites is located there, Kyiv can continue the war without radical problems. Of course, dependence on foreign aid carries strategic risks for Ukraine. Since at some point this assistance may be sharply reduced for one reason or another (which cannot be ruled out due to the growing economic problems in Europe and, in general, in the West). But as long as the money and weapons are flowing, this ensures the stability of Ukraine.
There would be a similar situation in Russia if China were to pursue the same policy in relation to the Russian Federation as Europe is currently pursuing in relation to Ukraine. That is, he would close any holes in the budget with direct financing, he would supply the missing goods in the necessary volume (“we took out the refinery? No problem, we will ship as much fuel as we need”), he would produce weapons for the needs of the Russian army on a large scale at his factories.
But China does not directly support Moscow in the war. Therefore, the minimization of damage from Ukrainian strikes, both in terms of direct budgetary and economic damage, and in terms of influencing public sentiment and the disorganization of social and economic life, is now becoming the number one priority for the Kremlin.
As we have already written, the Russian Federation can solve this problem in three ways.
The first is to find a military-technical way to cut damage from hits, which raised the rate of downed UAVs to almost 100%. Apparently, the Russians are now following this path, increasing the use of interceptor drones, among other things. But it is unknown whether it is possible to achieve such a result in principle. Ukraine also does not shoot down 100% of the drones that occasionally fly to western Ukraine. In addition, ballistic missiles may soon appear in Ukraine. Although, on the other hand, it is not known how many missiles there will be and whether the Ukrainian Armed Forces have stocks of long-range drones to increase the intensity of attacks.
The second is to go for a sharp escalation: the use of nuclear weapons on Ukraine or strikes on Europe to force the EU to refuse to support Kiev. That is, relatively speaking, after each strike on Russian refineries and ports, European refineries and berths for the transshipment of oil and LNG are taken out. The latter option, however, also implies the readiness of the Russian Federation to use nuclear weapons if the Europeans, unlike the countries of the Persian Gulf, which did not respond to Iran’s strikes, decide to “retaliate” and start striking Russia or launch a ground attack on Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. In that case, the only option for Russia, almost the entire army of which is now deployed in Ukraine, will be the use of nuclear weapons. We have already written many times about whether this scenario is likely. In short, there are very serious deterrents to the use of nukes in the Russian Federation. However, this option cannot be ruled out if the Russian leadership comes to the conclusion that the situation is becoming critical for it.
But there is a third way that will avoid a catastrophic “nuclear” development of events – an agreement on the earliest end of the war.
They can be of two types.
First, if Trump still puts pressure on Zelenskyi and forces him to withdraw his troops from Donbass, he will have fulfilled the Anchorage conditions agreed upon with Putin. However, we note that even earlier it looked unrealistic, and now even more so against the background of the active efforts of Zelensky and the Europeans to convince Trump that the war is about to turn in favor of Ukraine. Secondly, if Putin agrees to stop the war along the front line, as we have already written more than once, this would be the fixation of Russia’s military victory (control over the captured part of Ukraine is preserved, it is possible to exchange the agreement to stop the war for major concessions from Trump in terms of the lifting of sanctions, etc.).
But Putin is not going for it yet. Also, take your time to escalate the situation.
Apparently, he remains in the logic of the first path – to minimize the damage from Ukrainian strikes, while not resorting to weapons of mass destruction, but also not ending hostilities, but continuing the war of attrition. But for this, it is necessary that attacks on Russian rear lines do not destabilize the budget, the Russian economy and society as a whole.
Whether the Russian Federation will be able to achieve this is an open question.
If the situation worsens, there will be a choice between two alternative options. At the same time, as practice shows, this choice can take a long time in the Kremlin. But decisions can then be taken that are abrupt and, for many, unexpected. Like, for example, the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 or the announcement of mobilization in September 2022.
Actually, the coming months will be decisive from the point of view of the further development of the event. Will the Russian Federation be able to stop the Ukrainian strikes, which will allow the continuation of the “war of attrition” strategy? Will Trump put pressure on Zelenskyi to fulfill the terms of Anchorage? And if neither one nor the other happens, what path will Putin choose – escalation or a truce along the front line?
Zelensky’s threats to Belarus
On Friday, Zelensky demanded that Belarus dismantle repeaters for Russian drones within a week, otherwise he threatened to strike. “If Lukashenko does not remove the repeaters within a week, Ukraine will remove them itself,” the president said.
Later, he repeated this idea several times, essentially hinting at strikes on Belarusian territory. He also expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Belarus supplies fuel from its refinery to Russia.
We note that this statement is of a fundamentally different nature than the ones that sounded before. Earlier, Zelenskyy always emphasized that Belarus was preparing to attack Ukraine. And now he himself threatens to strike first.
It is also important that this statement was made against the background of growing tension in the relations between Kyiv and Minsk. The other day, a drone struck a bus with Belarusian children in the Bryansk region, as a result of which several people were injured and a female coach was killed. Russia blamed the Armed Forces of Ukraine for this, Lukashenko said that the drone “was definitely Ukrainian”. Minsk has already declared the “right to retaliatory actions against Ukraine.” Kyiv denies that it was the one who struck and declares a possible provocation by the Russian Federation.
And in such an environment, Zelensky’s new threats were sounded.
It is not known whether Belarus really has the repeaters he is talking about, or whether this is just an excuse to make threatening statements against Lukashenko. As for fuel supplies from the Belarusian refinery to Russia, this is a well-known fact. And perhaps blocking this flow is the most important for Zelensky in the context of threats.
In any case, now there are two possible scenarios of the development of events.
First – Zelensky does not intend to implement his threats, but makes these statements in the hope that Lukashenko will be frightened and stop, for example, supplying gasoline to Russia (that is, roughly speaking, “takes it for granted”). And if he doesn’t get scared and doesn’t stop, then it will still be possible to declare “victory”, declaring that “my threats worked and the Belarusians took down the repeaters” (even if they weren’t there).
Second – Zelensky is really planning an attack on Belarus for both strategic and tactical reasons. The strategic goal is the overthrow of Lukashenko. It has never been removed from the agenda since the 2020 mass protests in Minsk and was supported by both the Ukrainian authorities and Europe. And if there is an opportunity to implement this by military means (or, at least, if Kiev will think that such an opportunity has arisen), the demand can be taken. The tactical goal is the “elimination” of Russia’s most important ally in the war, which supplies the Russian Federation with fuel and military equipment.
True, at first glance, opening another front for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is disastrous, given the lack of forces on the main front against the Russian Federation. However, if we are talking about an exclusively air war – about drone strikes on oil refineries and other Belarusian enterprises, then a strong stretching of forces is not allowed, in the hope that the Belarusian army, due to its small number, will not be able to launch a large-scale invasion of Ukraine in response or cause any other troubles.
Taking into account the fact that Zelensky, after the spectacular strikes on Russian refineries, ports and Crimea, as well as having the support of the Europeans and hopes for a change in Trump’s position, is now clearly “on courage”, it cannot be ruled out that he is capable of drastic moves, including an attack on Belarus.
All the more so that the day before, the Ukrainian mass media actively dispersed individual moments from Lukashenko’s recent interview, where he seemed to apologize to Zelensky. Although in general the context of the ego declared in relation to Zelensky is rather derogatory. But mass publications in the context of “Lukashenko is apologizing and afraid” could also give the president of Ukraine excitement on the principle of “look, Lukashenko is apologizing, it means he is scared, and then we still need to push him!”.
That is, let’s repeat, preparation of a military scenario against Belarus by Kiev cannot be 100% excluded. In such a situation, Lukashenko faces a choice of two options.
First, fulfill Zelensky’s demands and stop fuel supplies to the Russian Federation and other cooperation. The path for Lukashenko is extremely unrealistic in view of its extreme danger for him. Both in terms of the fact that ties with the Russian Federation are too close to be severed without serious consequences, and in terms of the fact that any concessions will only stimulate further pressure on Lukashenko from the side of Zelensky and Europe, in view of the fact that, as was written above, their strategic goal is the overthrow of the current Belarusian president.
The second option is to start preparing for war in order to prevent it. That is, to demonstrate to Zelensky that the damage from the attack on Belarus will be much greater for him than the possible benefit. If Lukashenko decides to follow this path, what can he theoretically do?
The first is the call-up of tens of thousands of reservists. If Kyiv will understand that in response to drone strikes on Belarus, there is a threat of a land invasion by large forces, to contain which the deficit reserves of the Armed Forces will have to be transferred, then this may become an argument for not launching an attack against Belarus.
The second is a demonstrative transfer of attack drones and missile systems from the Russian Federation to Belarus, with a direct hint that, in the event of an attack on Belarus, everything possible will be flown to Kiev and western Ukraine with minimal flight time. In addition to the fact that Kyiv will become much more difficult to defend, strikes from Belarus can regularly “take out” border crossings and customs points on the western border of Ukraine, completely paralyzing traffic there. In addition, the Kyiv-Kovel strategic route in some places is less than 40 kilometers from the Belarusian border, which allows it to be shot even from MLRS systems (from the Belarusian “Polonezovs”, for example). This can also be a deterrent.
The third is an agreement with China on direct military support for Minsk in the event of an attack from Ukraine. Including in the form of deliveries of ballistic missiles and thousands of drones of various types.
The fourth is the agreement with North Korea on the transfer of North Korean troops to the border with Ukraine.
The fifth is a joint statement with the Russian Federation that, in the event of an attack on Belarus, nuclear weapons will be used on the attacking side.
True, each of these actions will require Lukashenko to abandon the current cautious line, which does not imply an increase in confrontation with Kyiv. Judging by his statements, he doesn’t want to go yet. Yes, and in general, Lukashenko is now building the image of a leader who “saves Belarus from war” and comes out of this image by announcing, for example, that he will hardly be comfortable with the call-up of reservists. Including from the point of view of public opinion in Belarus itself.
But if he feels that the threat of an attack from Ukraine is real, none of the above can be excluded. During his more than 30-year reign, he has repeatedly shown the ability to take drastic measures.
And for this reason, despite all the temptation for the Ukrainian authorities to “solve the Belarusian problem” by military means, this path is fraught with huge risks for Kyiv, which can completely cancel the possible effect of strikes on Belarus.
New exacerbation from Poland
On Friday, the President of Poland Nawrotsky, as promised, deprived Zelensky of the Order of the White Eagle – Poland’s highest award.
He said that Zelensky, when he awarded the unit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the title “Hero of the UPA” “crossed the threshold of pain” for Polish society.
“We know what war is, we know what the struggle for independence is, we know what the post-Soviet threat is, and today is the Russian threat. But we are a proud Polish nation and we have our own threshold of pain in matters that concern us and our allies. And this threshold of pain was exceeded, so I left the president of the Zelensky Order of the White Eagle,” the Polish president said.
In response, Zelensky sent him this “New Mail” order. Also, all ex-presidents of Ukraine refused a similar Polish award (as it turned out, Poland awarded them all with this order).
After that, the Ukrainian president accused the Polish president of provoking “anti-Ukrainian people” and suggested that it would “end badly” for Navrotsky. “He is doing the same thing as Orban. Only Orban has been doing it for a long time. I think it will end badly for him,” the Ukrainian president said.
“I see this as an exclusively electoral process. President Karol Navrotsky is fighting for the premiership of his party against Prime Minister Tusk. We are not involved here, this is their internal issue,” added Zelensky.
He also spoke directly and said that the name “Karol” is not connected with a monarchical title. “Karol is not his title, this is his name. He does not have a monarchy, but a democracy, so it is necessary to build relations with Ukraine, which today protects Europe, including Poland,” Zelensky said.
He also wondered why this award was left to Mussolini, Catherine II and Gerhard Schroeder.
Minister of the Office of the President Agnieszka Enjak said in X that this order is not taken away posthumously, and the ex-chancellor of Germany, who is friends with Putin, “never insulted Poland as openly as Zelensky”, and under him, in Germany, Bundeswehr units were not named after “SS heroes”.
The formal occasion that caused the scandal is well known. This is Zelensky’s awarding of one of the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the name “heroes of the UPA”. The UPA in Warsaw is considered the organization responsible for the genocide of Poles during the Volyn massacre in 1943, and later the President of Poland, Nawrotsky, demanded that the decision be reversed. Even his political opponent, Prime Minister Tusk, supported him in this. Zelensky refused, after which he was deprived of the award.
Commentators now, as a rule, reduce the conflict almost exclusively to a historical dispute between the two countries about the role of the UPA and the OUN, which is stimulated by the desire of politicians to score points within the country on the topic of “protection of historical memory.” That’s why such a fierce heat of passion seems incomprehensible to many. You can often hear complaints along the lines of “Guys, what are you arguing about at all! We found something to do during the war. Your conflict only suits Putin.”
However, we have already written that the real reasons for the growing disagreements between Warsaw and Kyiv are much broader and deeper than just a dispute about the UPA and even than the desire of politicians and officials to promote themselves on it.
The main root of the contradictions is that Poland and Kyiv, if you look at their relations in the intra-European context (taking into account the prospects of Ukraine joining the EU), are not considered allies, but direct rivals and competitors.
Over the past 20 years, Warsaw has worked hard to establish itself as an undisputed regional leader among the Eastern European countries of the EU. And, based on this status, it will become one of the key states of the European Union.
In addition, Poland’s rapid economic development and industrial growth have given rise to even greater ambitions in Warsaw – it will challenge the role of Germany as the locomotive and the main industrial base of the EU. Hence, by the way, the rather strained relations between the Poles and the Germans, which were especially evident during the rule of Kaczyński’s Law and Justice party, but even now they cannot be called simple.
In the context of such ambitious goals, the Poles also considered the European integration of Ukraine, which Poland saw as its “ward” – a supplier of labor and a market that was supposed to strengthen the position of the Poles in intra-European schedules.
However, for quite some time now, Poland has become convinced that Kyiv sees its role in Europe quite differently. The Ukrainian authorities communicated directly with Berlin, London and Paris, building relations with them “over the head” of Warsaw. This process was especially accelerated during the war. The increased importance of Ukraine for Europe, in turn, has given rise to Zelensky’s big ambitions regarding Kyiv’s place in the EU as the new regional leader of Eastern Europe. Moreover, in close cooperation with Germany and France, in which the Poles would find themselves somewhere on the sidelines of the process. Tusk’s recent indignation at the fact that Poland was not invited by Ukraine, Germany, France and Britain to develop a strategy for ending the war and negotiations with the Russian Federation is indicative in this regard. “Poland will not accept any agreements that are developed without its participation,” the Polish Prime Minister said in a sharp manner that was unexpected for many (but quite understandable from the context described above).
All this created a basis for the exacerbation of contradictions. The first bell was the conflict in 2023-2024 over the supply of Ukrainian agricultural products, which Polish farmers demanded to be banned.
Among other things, he showed that, in the event of the end of the war and entry into the EU, Ukraine can become the main competitor of the Poles in many positions at once – both in agriculture, and in terms of attracting investments, and in terms of subsidies from the far from bottomless budget of the European Union, and even in terms of labor force.
And the current scandal with the UPA is from the same series. Warsaw is trying to show that “in the district” (that is, in the Eastern European part of the EU) – it is “central”. And for the Ukrainian authorities to accept it.
However, in contrast to the previous escalations, when Kyiv tried to “smooth the corners” and not go into a direct conflict with Warsaw, here there was already a “reversal”. The Ukrainian authorities decided this time to show that they can also be tough with the Poles and respond with demarche after demarche. And, at the moment, the conflict is growing.
What will it lead to?
So far, it seems unlikely that the situation will worsen to the point that Poland will turn into the “second Hungary” of Orban’s time in relation to Ukraine – that is, it will begin to block all military and economic support of Kyiv. At least, while the government is controlled by liberal Tusk, it is not very realistic. With the exception of the reduction of some programs supporting Ukraine (for example, the training of the Ukrainian military).
Although, of course, nothing can be ruled out. Some alarming signals for Kyiv in this regard are already coming from Warsaw. For example, it was recently reported that Poland wanted to block the allocation of funds to Ukraine for the purchase of weapons from the Peace Fund until it was compensated for the already rendered military assistance to the Ukrainian army.
But here’s what exactly the problems will get worse with – it’s with the negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Just here, Warsaw will be able to insert the maximum amount of “sticks in the wheels”, putting forward extremely tough demands for economic and other concessions in order to prevent Ukraine from turning into a dangerous competitor. At the same time, the question of the OUN-UPA will certainly be raised. Navrotskyi has already indicated his position: “with Bandera and the UPA, Ukraine will not enter the EU.”
Kyiv, most likely, will somehow respond to this by launching an anti-Polish campaign. It is clear that while the war is going on, the main attention of the Ukrainian authorities is focused on other issues. But as soon as it ends, the topic of the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation may become one of the main ones on the European agenda.
Starmer resigned. How will it affect Ukraine?
British Prime Minister Starmer announced his resignation today.
This was predicted earlier by the British mass media. The pressure on Starmer within the Labor Party increased sharply after the victory of his political rival Andy Burnham in the parliamentary by-elections. Most likely, Andy Burnham will now become the new prime minister.
Starmer, like his Eurotroika colleagues – Macron and Mertz – are key allies of Kyiv in its confrontation with Russia. And it is not only the British prime minister who is shaking his chair now.
Therefore, in Russia, when it comes to foreign political activity, including in Ukraine, Starmer, Macron and Mertz often appeal to their domestic political problems. They say, why listen to them at all and what do they agree on, if all three are “lame ducks”.
Macron will leave his post next spring. Among the potential candidates, the representative of the right-wing “National Front” Bardell has the highest rating. Macron’s “successors” from among the centrists are still lagging behind, and it is not yet clear which of them will go to the elections.
Mertz is quickly losing popularity, and his party is losing in the ratings to Alternative for Germany, which advocates dialogue with the Russian Federation and opposes aid to Ukraine. That is, the internal political positions of all three are really the same.
However, there is a counterthesis to the thesis “then why listen to them at all and what do they agree on?” It consists in the fact that the course of European countries and the EU as a whole is determined not by individual personalities, but by a general consensus among elites. This consensus promotes the current policy on the war in Ukraine. As an example, the situation in Britain is cited, where the number of governments that have been dismissed since 2022 has been lost, but the vector in relation to Kyiv and Moscow has not changed in any way.
It is difficult to argue with this. However, the internal political problems faced by the “consensus of the European elites” do not pass without a trace for their policy in relation to Ukraine.
First, the popularity of the leaders of Britain, France, and Germany is falling not because the population demands more aid to Ukraine and puts more pressure on Russia. This issue is not at all in the top of public interests in the EU. Europeans are concerned, first of all, about migration, socio-economic problems, which are the main complaints of the population to their governments, which drags the ratings down. And just at the last moment, the question of assistance to Ukraine and confrontation with Russia is connected. Since both are additional expenses of European taxpayers: to support Kyiv and to increase military spending. And since this is happening against the background of the general crisis of the economic model of Europe, the political forces that call for less money to be spent on Ukraine and the military industry, and more on social needs and economic development, are gaining popularity. And the European elites cannot ignore this, which is a strong restraining factor both for the further increase of aid to Kyiv and for the growth of military expenditures. This can be seen on the example of Britain, where the defense minister recently resigned in protest against Starmer’s refusal to increase military spending.
Secondly, low government support makes it difficult to take some drastic steps, such as, for example, the introduction of troops into Ukraine and other measures that could lead to a war with the Russian Federation. In order to send your country to such a war, fraught with a nuclear catastrophe, you need to have a very strong support in society, which the current European elites do not have. Let’s agree – we are not talking about a situation when Russia will be the first to attack Europe: then the Europeans will be forced to fight in any case. We are talking about, for example, sending peacekeepers to Ukraine, if Moscow does not agree to that. There are very few Europeans willing to get involved in the war with Russia on their own initiative (and not as a response to the Russian Federation’s attack on Europe). At least until the Kremlin has the largest nuclear arsenal.
Therefore, all conversations in the EU about “preparation for war with Russia” and about “sending peacekeepers to Ukraine” are of an exclusively informational nature. On the one hand, with the aim of getting society to agree to an increase in military spending (it’s still getting squeaky). On the other hand, to give a pass to those forces in the Russian Federation who dissuade Putin from ending the war on the front line, because “if he declares a ceasefire, the Europeans will definitely send their troops into Ukraine.” We wrote more about this strategy here .
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Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.
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