Let’s take off the rose-colored glasses and look at the world as it really is.

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First, I would like to share a few words. I am currently quite behind on what I want to write. I had planned to publish this post some time ago, but I work afull-time and spend nearly all my free time following events, which leaves me very little time for writing. I am also feeling tired and frustrated; I am trying to wake people up, but it doesn’t seem to be working.

I am not alone in this feeling, as seen in a recent video by Brian Berletic. In my view, John Helmer is the G.O.A.T. of geopolitical analysis, while Brian Berletic is the second best; they are the two people closest to my own views and analysis. Both of them, like me, strive to fight the “hopium” and over-hyping that result in poor analysis. Brian Berletic constantly criticizes these analytical failures, pointing out the shortcomings of the “Axis of Resistance” and warning us not to underestimate the Western Capitalist Empire of Evil. John Helmer presents the same critiques.

Here is what Brian Berletic said in a recent video:

Okay. And now what I’m going to do is show you a clip from this video that I posted not even 24 hours before the U.S. launched first its proxy war against Iran last year via Israel, and then its own direct war on Israel itself just several days later… I’m going to play a clip from this because I’m physically exhausted. My health is in decline, literally from constantly repeating myself. The frustration of repeating myself. And yes, some people are listening and absorbing my meaning, but so many more are not. So, for the sake of my own health, I’m just going to rerun this clip from last year.

The feeling Brian describes — of being physically exhausted and seeing one’s health decline from the frustration of constantly repeating oneself. I mentioned in a previous post that I struggled with depression because people weren’t taking my writing seriously. I don’t write for my own glorification; I write because if people do not understand these issues, we are all screwed.

People call me a narcissist, but I don’t give a damn about myself. If you want, you can spread my writing as your own analysis. I don’t care about personal recognition as long as people hear the truth. If they don’t, we are heading toward a horrible future. My only goal is for people to understand the reality of what is happening, as this is the only way to build a better world for future generations. The fact that I am failing in this mission is deeply frustrating.

As you can see, this frustration is shared by Brian Berletic, and John Helmer have expressed similar sentiments in his videos. I suspect that, like me, Brian and John don’t care about being praised; they simply care about spreading the truth because they see it as the only way to improve the world.

To quote the great Michael Parenti:

…people have those gripes and they have a semi-awareness of it, but the thing of putting it together and directing it toward actual issues… and being able to detect the lies they’re telling us and how they manipulate what are called cultural issues or identity issues to get you not to look at your own straight bread-and-butter economic issues. That’s a job that I try to do, which I don’t do very well because I write books about it. Well, who the hell in America reads books? It’s ridiculous.

I write posts, but who in the West reads anymore in the age of “TikTok brain-rot”? Nowadays, people have the attention spans of fruit flies. If you can’t say it in 60 seconds or write it in 250 characters, it requires too much effort for them to handle.

Again, I’ve gone on a bit of a rant. I apologize for the disorganized structure of my posts, but there is so much I want to say. I could turn any of these rants into twenty pages, and all these topics are interconnected. This is why I am saddened by the lack of questions in the comments; there is so much more I could explain if prompted. I would truly appreciate questions so I can expand on the details I often have to omit to keep my posts from becoming too long.

John Helmer: The G.O.A.T.-

This “rose-colored glasses” perspective and “hopium” infect most of the analysts I watch in alternative spaces, which is truly disheartening. It turns many analysts in the alternative media space into a mirror image of the mainstream media. Just as the mainstream overhypes the Western side — Ukraine, for example — many alternative analysts overhype the opposition in the exact same way. This lack of objectivity results in very poor analysis.

I am honestly surprised that grown adults can argue that Russia could beat the entirety of NATO, including America, with one hand tied behind its back. Or that BRICS is one big happy family holding hands and singing “Kumbaya.” Pretending the world is how we wish it were, rather than how it actually is, makes me sad. I wish those things were true, but I won’t pretend they are just because it feels good.

A prime example of this was The Duran’s stance toward Trump at the beginning of his candidacy. They viewed him as they wished him to be, rather than who he actually was. This caused a rift between Brian Berletic and The Duran because their views differed so significantly. I personally shared Brian’s view. I first discovered Brian through The Duran, where he was a frequent guest, but after Trump started his second candidacy, Brian stopped being invited on.

I give a lot of credit to The Duran for allowing me to share posts that criticized them and promoted Brian. I hoped they would eventually see through the “hopium” and invite him back. The day they finally did was a great day for me.

Now, I heard there is a divide between John Helmer and Alexander Mercouris, and that Alexander has blocked John. Again, I have to give props to The Duran; despite the friction between Alexander and John, they still allow me to post titles calling John the “G.O.A.T.” of geopolitical analysis. That shows integrity. Ironically, when I first started following The Duran, I watched every one of Alexander’s videos, and the first place I ever heard of John Helmer was on Alexander’s program, where he constantly praised John’s blog, “Dances With Bears.”

I would like to advocate for inviting John back to The Duran, just as I did for Brian Berletic. I truly hope Alexander and John can make amends. Perhaps one day they could even invite both John and Brian on at the same time — that would be a real treat.

I especially looked for old videos of John on “Dialogue Works.” He used to appear regularly with Ray McGovern, but after a specific episode, John began appearing solo I suspect due to a disagreement between them. That video is from seven months ago; now, with the benefit of hindsight, we can judge for ourselves who was right.

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40:46

John Helmer: There are factions that take all sorts of views in the Russian decision-making elite. And let’s be clear about how they work. In the first place, President Putin has paid a large number of compliments — they’re read as compliments — toward President Trump. Even after the attack on the Iranian sites, President Putin made some highly complimentary remarks about Trump.

It’s a mistake outside of Russia — certainly a mistake on the part of some podcasts in the United States — to see that as ingratiating. It’s not. What it is is a continuing reinforcement of the assumption that Trump will be rational toward Russia. And rational means he will not attempt first to develop a first-strike nuclear capability to attack Russia, something that arises out of the June 1 so-called Operation Spiderweb attack on the Russian bomber fleet as a signal, combined with — and we’ve talked about this before — Trump’s notion of building a Golden Dome.

There are serious warnings that Trump aims at a kind of level of superiority and a doctrine of total obliteration which may one day be directed at Russia. So when Putin pays a certain high degree of courtesy and respect, discussing how sincere he thinks Trump is, how brave he thinks Trump is, this is not to be understood as a personal compliment. It’s to be understood as part of the Russian strategy — a two-track strategy of maintaining confidence in the assumption that Trump will behave rationally and that therefore it’s possible to negotiate a reduction of tension before we escalate to nuclear warfare. That’s what Putin means.

…

There has never been any difference in Putin’s approach to President Biden. This is not a compliment to Trump as a person. It’s a respect for the office of the presidency of the United States—something that President Trump himself, as a person, doesn’t seem to understand. Respect for the presidency is something peculiarly Russian, but it’s being demonstrated characteristically by Putin.

When Putin was asked about President Biden at their last meeting — not their last, but their second-to-last meeting in Geneva in 2021 — he said, and I’m quoting roughly speaking, “What is being depicted about President Biden in the U.S. press is not the reality. What I saw was an alert, cheerful man suffering, as we all do, from jet lag, and he’s on top of his brief,” etc., etc.

Now, we all know that wasn’t true. We all know that what President Putin would have seen were the unmistakable symptoms of Lewy body dementia associated with Parkinson’s disease and many things. But he was showing respect for the presidency of the United States because that’s the basis on which civilized countries can negotiate short of war.

Ray McGovern: Yeah, let me just interrupt here, John. Finally, we come to a really neat point where we disagree completely. I don’t say that my interpretation is the only correct one. You may be right. But as you and I know, what you depend on first and foremost are public statements by Soviet and Russian leaders.

…

So what am I saying here? I’m saying that right after the U.S. became a co-belligerent in a war against Iran right on Russia’s doorstep, was there an Oreshnik moment? No. What happened? The president’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, was asked about this, and this is what he said. This is from TASS: “U.S. strikes on nuclear facilities in Iran will not affect — I repeat — will not affect the bilateral dialogue between Moscow and Washington, as these are independent processes.” In a comment to journalist Rubin, Peskov explained, “There are various areas. We have a partnership, a strategic partnership with Iran, but we’re also engaged in restoring our relations with the United States. Both are very important to us.” The day after the U.S. joined in a war of aggression against Iran, a virtual ally, certainly a most important country, almost as important as Ukraine to Russia.

…

And I think that’s going to work out in a very measured way, with Putin continuing to attrit the Ukrainian forces until Trump finally says, “Oh my god.” All right, let’s not give them any more weapons, which happened yesterday. And they’ll fall apart. Let’s, in the meantime, see if we can do some sort of face-saving deal so that we can maybe keep a Dnipro, for example, in Ukraine proper and do the kind of zone there, a buffer zone, that Putin says he requires. So I see movement on Ukraine, continued movement. It’s often disguised by propaganda, but look at the facts. Look what Peskov says.

John Helmer: I’m sorry, I mean, you’re not right, but to suggest, as evidence of how a country as complex as Russia makes decisions, by pulling out a piece of paper in which Dmitry Peskov repeats some such thing — that’s not evidence. That’s only evidence of one line intended to be listened to by the U.S. side, and that’s perfectly reasonable that he should do that. There are other sides, and many other sides, including the General Staff, the GRU. Why was the director of the GRU, the military intelligence agency advising the General Staff, sitting right next to President Putin when the foreign minister — well, let’s put it this way: Dmitry Peskov wasn’t in that meeting. He doesn’t count. He’s not a decision-maker. He’s a mouthpiece. A mouthpiece. Nothing wrong with being a mouthpiece. Nothing wrong with being a press secretary.

That is just one part of the exchange. However, with the benefit of hindsight — given that the video is now seven months old — we can clearly see who was right in that disagreement.

In the main video attached to this post, John Helmer discusses the internal divisions within Russia. He specifically analyzes what he calls “the Putin gambit”: an attempt to bolster the Russian economy by striking a deal with Trump. Helmer also highlights the fact that the Russian “deep state,” represented by Sergey Lavrov, opposes this move.

To provide further context, I would also like to share another video of John’s from a month ago.

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15:03

Nima: How do you evaluate, how do you assess the relationship between Kirill Dmitriev and Lavrov? 

John Helmer: We’ve tried to describe this since the beginning of last year. You’ll recall there was open hostility between the foreign minister and Dmitriev at the first meeting in Riyadh between the Russian side and the U.S. side. This hostility reflects an underlying view that Kirill Dmitriev does not negotiate for Russia’s underlying strategic interests. He negotiates for Russia’s oligarch business interests, which have comprised — and we won’t see Foreign Minister Lavrov saying this, but it’s well expressed in the State Duma and in the press — that the capital Dmitriev represents is a fifth column inside Russia that is pro-American, that wants a deal on any terms to stop the war, to reduce sanctions, to allow Russian capital to continue to flow out of the country. The absolute reverse of what a sovereign wealth fund is supposed to be doing.

So there are factional differences of strategic importance inside the Russian decision-making structure around President Putin in the Security Council. And Dmitriev in the Security Council is in a small minority. He’s not a minority in President Putin’s policymaking.

John said this months ago, long before Lavrov’s famous criticism of Putin — an event that The Duran recently mentioned and acknowledged. John was aware of these internal divisions well before they were publicly confirmed by Lavrov’s own words.

Once again, John was proven right, just as he was in the disagreement with Ray McGovern I mentioned earlier. This is precisely why I trust him so much. That said, I do disagree with him on certain points, just as I disagree with Brian Berletic at times. While I have immense respect for both of them and find their views to be the closest to my own, there are still areas where our perspectives differ.

“Rose-Colored Glasses” and Hopium

John Helmer, Brian Berletic, The Duran, and I all share the same goal: to fight against what I call “our Western Capitalist Empire of Evil” for a better world and to seek the truth. However, the difference is that John, Brian, and I see the problems exactly as they are. In contrast, The Duran — like much of the alternative media — tends to look at the world through rose-colored glasses, fueled by a “hopium” that overhypes the side they support.

I don’t mean to single out The Duran; this issue affects most alternative media. In my opinion, it is this same “hopium” that led The Duran to believe Trump was a “good guy” who would fix the world. Eventually, they saw the truth and recognized Trump for who he actually is. Yet, that same optimism now leads many commentators to believe the Russian military is unbeatable — capable of defeating all of NATO with one hand tied behind its back — or that BRICS nations are one big happy family, holding hands and singing “Kumbaya.”

While John and I wish those things were true, we acknowledge they are not. We want to make them true rather than sweeping the reality under the rug. For example, when Nima from Dialogue Works was in Iran, John urged him to advocate for closer cooperation with Russia. Similarly, John appeared on an Indian program to advocate for similar unity.

01:04:22

SHANKAR: “…the only relationship we can really depend on is with Russia. And as far as the USA is concerned, it’s completely transactional… and with China, I don’t see how you can leverage whatever they can give you… So we have to be completely transactional with the USA, and with China as well.”

These sentiments represent a segment of Indian society that makes cooperation between China and India difficult. John argues for closer cooperation between these powers, just as he did for Russia and Iran. While other commentators pretend BRICS is already a perfect union, John acknowledges the friction and tries to bridge the gap by advocating for trust. Since both John and The Duran are ultimately on the same side, I believe they should cooperate.

As I have written before, we must not overhype our side or underestimate our enemy. As Sun Tzu famously said, “There is no greater danger than underestimating your opponent.” Most people do precisely this by dismissing the West and over-glorifying the opposition. Just look at the situation in Venezuela, the internal divisions in Russia, or the “Prigozhin-style” scenarios playing out in China. There are real problems on the side we support. To fix them, we must first admit they exist instead of pretending they don’t.

BRICS Divisions

I just mentioned one of those divisions a moment ago, and I already wrote a post about it before, but I will mention them again.

China–Russia: China did not side with or support Russia from the beginning of the operations in Ukraine. They could have started building the Siberia pipeline as soon as Nord Stream was destroyed, which would have helped Russia, but they didn’t. They wanted to wait for Russia to become desperate in order to get a better price. China was playing a double game with Russia. They did not support Russia because they did not know whether Russia would survive; they didn’t want to back the losing side. China even created plans to take over eastern Russian lands in case Russia lost and collapsed, since China believes eastern Russian lands should be ruled by Asians, as they are populated by Asian people and should not be ruled by a white man in Moscow. They see the fact that a white man in Moscow rules over such vast lands populated by Asian people as a leftover of colonialism, and they believe they should rule over it.

Now, after Russia proved to China that it will not collapse, China has finally started to support Russia more — but still not fully. Now, if I know all that I wrote here about China’s stance toward Russia, do you think Putin and the Russians don’t know it? Putin and the Russians know all of this, and because of it, they don’t fully trust China.

India–China: As represented by this Indian man from the program with John, there is a large part of India that does not trust China. The problem is that both China and India want to be leading forces on the Asian continent. Currently, China is leading and does not want to give up its lead. China wants India to remain behind it and not challenge its dominance, while India wants to take over the lead and start to dominate.

In one of my recent posts, I described “America’s Energy Gambit Against China.” If I understand what is happening, real people in power in India also understand it, and they support it because the only way for India to catch up to — and possibly surpass — China and dominate the Asian continent is to throttle China’s economy, which is exactly what America’s Energy Gambit Against China aims to do. In the case of the West securing its cordon sanitaires which would block China’s land routes to the Middle East and enforcing sea blockades, China’s economy would be throttled. If India sides with the West, it would allow India access to energy, it would enable India to catch up to or even surpass China.

Basically, this is the only way India could catch up to or surpass China; otherwise, India will always play second fiddle to China and be dominated by it on the Asian continent. That’s why India plays both sides.

India–Russia: While India is close to Russia, as was also mentioned by the man from the program with John, at the same time India supports America’s Energy Gambit Against China, which requires India to stay close to the West — something that is problematic for Russia. India cannot fully side with Russia and abandon the West because, in the context of America’s Energy Gambit Against China, India itself could be deprived of energy. Since India sees this strategy as the only possible way to catch up to or surpass China, it must continue working with the West; otherwise, it will always play second fiddle to China and remain dominated by it on the Asian continent.

Iran–China: They have a very close relationship, similar to the India–Russia relationship. However, there are also problems — mainly China’s closeness to Israel and its relative silence regarding Israel’s actions. China needs Iran as a gateway to the Middle East and for its energy security, so Iran is very important to China. At the same time, Iran needs China’s help to survive, but it has a serious issue with the fact that China is not protesting Israel’s actions enough, which, with Western support, so genociding Palestinians — people Iranians see as their brothers.

So while their relationship is very close and they need each other greatly, there are still significant tensions.

India–Iran: There is not much to say here besides the fact that India is Islamophobic, which is problematic since Iran is an Islamic state. At the same time, the fact that India is playing a double game — working with the West and hoping for America’s Energy Gambit Against China — is also a problem, since part of this plan requires the destruction of Iran.

Iran–Russia: This is a very complex relationship due to a very complex history. There is also the issue of Russia’s ambiguous relationship with Israel, as Israel is genociding Palestinians whom Iranians see as their brothers — just as in the case of China. For example, the fact that Putin or Russia even considered joining Trump’s “board of peace,” whose role would supposedly be supervising the Palestinian genocide, is one example of this problem.

How can Iran trust and work with Russia if Russia would willing to join a board whose role would be to oversee the genocide of Iran’s brothers? There is also the fact that both Iran and Russia supply energy resources to China and therefore compete with each other in this field. The elimination of one would strengthen the other’s position and leverage against China.

I have written about this before. If Iran collapses and America’s Energy Gambit Against China is implemented, China would become desperate to keep Russia alive, since Russia would be almost the only place left that could supply China with energy resources. This would give Russia enormous leverage over China. So while the collapse of Iran would be problematic from the standpoint of Iran being part of the Eurasian continent, it would simultaneously force China to support Russia by any means necessary due to its energy dependence.

As you can see, there are many problems and divisions among the BRICS nations. I mentioned only the most important countries — Russia, China, India, and Iran — since they are the main players on the Eurasian continent. Indonesia is also quite important, but I don’t know enough about it, and Brazil, for example, is on the American continent, so it does not affect this analysis.

While I praise John’s recently coined phrase, “It’s money plus votes plus bullets equals power,” as being based on the realpolitik views with which I agree, I find his subsequent focus on the “hate” of Russia disappointing. In realpolitik, there is no room for love or hate; there is only power, leverage, and control. It is not about hating Russia, but simply about power dynamics.

If Russia would accept its place as a subordinate vassal — much like Europe has — it would be welcomed by the West. It is only considered an enemy because it holds “funny ideas” about independence, something the American hegemon does not allow. America doesn’t have allies; it only has vassals. We see this in the example of Europe: Angela Merkel had a plan to make Europe independent from America by allying with Russia and China. This alliance — combining Europe’s high-tech and luxury goods, Russia’s cheap natural resources, and China’s low-tech manufacturing and massive market—would have secured that independence.

I was entirely in favor of such an alliance. However, the problem arose when Germany became too greedy. Instead of building an independent Europe based on equality and solidarity, Germany sought to become the European hegemon, making the entire continent work for its sole benefit at cost to the rest of the continent. This was best represented by the treatment of Greece (a situation even touched upon in the Epstein files), where Greece was sacrificed for German interests. Similarly, Germany suppressed the Polish economy to maintain it as a source of cheap labor and pushed France aside, rendering it irrelevant.

Because of this greed, deep resentment grew within Europe against Germany — resentment the Americans eventually leveraged to destroy German plans. The centerpiece of this was the war in Ukraine, which severed Germany’s ability to cooperate with Russia. Without the power derived from that cooperation, Germany can no longer oppress the rest of Europe. European countries are no longer forced to work for Germany’s benefit at their own expense; by siding with America, they achieved exactly what they wanted.

I have explained all of this in my previous posts. To quote Brian Berletic: “…because I’m physically exhausted. My health is in decline, literally from constantly repeating myself.” However, since those seeing this post may not have read my earlier work, I find it necessary to repeat myself once more.

Putin’s Gambit toward America

This will be the final and shortest part, as this post is already quite long and is directly connected to the main video featuring John attached here.

So what we should focus on—what I know some of our audience find difficult to accept—is the enormous risk that President Putin is running now in the way he has divided these negotiations into the so-called economic cooperation team. That’s really Kirill Dmitriev. That’s a multi-point plan to give the United States pretty much everything they’ve sought for the return to Russia: oil and gas companies to come back, their so-called losses compensated. We can go through the terms, and I’ve published them. These not only appeared in Bloomberg last week; I’ve been publishing them for more than a year now. Bloomberg simply got a part of a memorandum of conversation that the Russian side does not deny is authentic, which reflects Dmitriev’s attempt to pacify the United States and put all trust in Trump to meet the promises he and his family have been bribed to accept, and he and his administration have been persuaded to accept as a new form of economic cooperation with Russia, including de-dollarization—which means the reversal of virtually all the major commitments that have been made to BRICS, to the Indian side, the Chinese side, and so on. That’s the economic part.

Now there’s been some controversy in the Russian press as to whether Kirill Dmitriev would be in the delegation in Geneva today. Late last week it was reported that he would be, then he wouldn’t be, and it’s been clarified that he is in Geneva and he is meeting with Witkoff, Kushner, and Greenblatt, but not at the table for the negotiations on the Ukraine war settlement. So essentially what has happened is a bifurcated set of negotiations. Leaving aside the Dmitriev group, there’s the main Russian delegation on the Ukraine war, and that’s been principally military and led by Istikov, the admiral in charge from the General Staff of Russian military intelligence. He was being accompanied in Abu Dhabi by two generals, General Zorin and General Formin. It’s unclear whether General Zorin and General Formin are in Geneva, but the Russian side has sent more than 20 delegates. The leader of the delegation is Vladimir Medinsky. Medinsky is a junior-ranking Kremlin assistant. Why does one send a junior-ranking assistant to lead after replacing the senior military intelligence officer in Russia? The answer is that Medinsky is taking his instructions from the president, and these instructions have been hotly discussed, debated, and disagreed with in Moscow, and we can see the evidence of that.

I know some in our audience don’t want to accept the evidence of this. They don’t even want to accept that Russia is a form of democracy in which the military can disagree with the commander-in-chief, in which the foreign minister can disagree with the president of the country, and so forth. But there’s no doubt that Sergey Lavrov, the foreign minister, has indicated a serious set of disagreements with the terms that President Putin has seemed to offer in the Dmitriev plan on the economic track. Why? Because Lavrov has said, and his deputy foreign minister Sergey Ryabkov repeated early this week, you can’t trust the Americans. They have, in fact, escalated since the Anchorage, Alaska summit meeting.

Now the way in which this argument has been conducted in Moscow is through code words. The code words are “Anchorage formula” or “Anchorage understandings.” Each of the factions in Moscow say and believe different understandings were reached between Putin and Trump at their summit meeting in Anchorage last August. So each side says, yes, the Anchorage understandings, the Anchorage formula, is the basis. But each side means different things for addressing the military terms of settlement, the long-term security of Russia after the ceasefire, the terms of settlement, the long-term future of Ukraine as a state and as an army, the forms of enforcing security so that the war will not be continued from whatever base is left of the Ukrainian regime. These are all terms that are yet unclear.

And the way this is debated with code words is either “the Anchorage understandings have been violated by Trump himself but not by Russia” or “the Dmitriev plan.” The Dmitriev plan is the other code word representing President Putin’s short-term gambit. Some bankers I know have told me they think Putin is making a short-term bet that if he can bring the Americans back into Russia, re-dollarize, save Russian oil and gas exports, he can reduce inflation, increase investment bonuses, and boost the Russian economy from minus to plus. And the other evidence of how serious the internal situation is doesn’t come from American podcasters who walk around Moscow saying how terrific things look to them. Just have a look at the Central Bank of Russia’s analysis: its baseline scenario, its risk scenario, its projection of growth rates, both positive and negative. At best, the Central Bank of Russia says — and it too walks around Moscow and it too buys at expensive shops — the Central Bank thinks the best growth rate could be this year between 1% and 2%. But the risk is minus 5 to minus 7%. The risks are spelled out by Elvira Nabiullina on paper in speeches. It’s very clear. They believe that a short-term fix with the Americans can save the Russian economy this year as it goes into its, as it were, midterm crisis. That’s the parliamentary elections coming on September 20.

So summing up what’s happening in Geneva: what’s happening is a bifurcation of the Russian negotiating team. Second, a different set of instructions for Dmitriev opposed by the instructions that have gone to the foreign ministry and the general staff negotiators. And we’ve got a president betting that he can somehow reach accommodations that depend on a level of trust no official in the Russian government except Elvira Nabiullina and Kirill Dmitriev believe in. That’s where we are. So it’s very high risk. It’s a gambit. It can be argued as sensible, but it’s a bet, a wager. And what’s it a wager on? Trust in Trump. And who trusts in Trump these days?

…

Let’s take the question in several parts separately. First of all, it’s very clear what Russian public opinion is on this point. Russian public opinion influences the Kremlin. It also reflects the messages the Kremlin makes to the Russian people in justification not only of the war but of the serious casualties and losses that Russia has suffered. Russian public opinion believed that the Trump second term represented a positive opportunity to reach a peace agreement on the terms that Russia was fighting for in Ukraine. That optimism has been lost.

Russian public opinion — and I’m looking to my left to see the opinion polls; I can show it as a kind of line. I don’t know if you can see it very well. I’ll put it in Dances with Bears later so that folks can look at it. It’s an up-and-down line reflecting the way in which the Trump regime has first offered opportunity to Russia to come to a peaceful settlement and then escalated sanctions, going up and down from hostility to peaceability. Russians do not trust the Trump regime any longer. The negative attitude toward the United States is now 45%. 33% still have some hope the U.S. will negotiate in good faith and can be relied on to honor their agreements. 22% say they don’t know how to answer. Now that’s an interesting number itself. If one in four Russian public thinks they don’t know what the U.S. is going to do and whether it can be trusted, why should we be any more certain and any more confident?

So Russian public opinion is deeply distrustful of the United States, and that’s a significant control or brake, if you like, on anything President Putin will try to reach an agreement with now, as we go into parliamentary elections next September. So fundamentally, that’s the situation as Russians see it, not me — Russian public opinion as measured reliably.

Publicly, the Russian official line has been the Anchorage formula. That is to say, last August everybody agrees that President Putin and President Trump reached understandings. What exactly they are has never been made clear. Therefore, the foreign ministry says those understandings mean the resolution of the deep sources of conflict because we believe Trump offered a significant set of concessions which the Biden administration refused to accept. And second, why are we not yet signed? Because the Europeans have continually revived Zelenskyy’s determination to go on fighting. So there is a line in Moscow that says, as you explained it, Neil, the Europeans are to blame for sabotaging a good deal the United States was agreeing with Russia to do as of last August — the so-called Anchorage formula. That is a public line.

Is it true? That’s what you ask me. Is it true that the reason we aren’t at a peace agreement with all the Russian terms agreed is because the Europeans keep stimulating Zelenskyy to say no? Is it because the Europeans keep lobbying the Trump administration to tighten and escalate the campaign against Russia in trade, at sea, and so forth? In my view, there’s no doubt the Europeans are part and parcel of a consensus. I don’t see the Trump administration deviating very far from the European consensus on fighting Russia in the future. There’s no change in U.S. military policy. In fact, U.S. military policy is escalating at sea. The war against Russia at sea is escalating with Washington in the lead. The British have played second fiddle, or the French have played second fiddle, to the war at sea. If we take that as an example, it’s not the Europeans resisting a peace initiative on the American side. Not at all. Not at all.

So what to make of these differences of signals now that we’re talking about them? Well, we have to say there are factions in the Washington establishment too. The Trump administration faces potential loss of Congress in its midterm election coming up November 3. In that domestic political context, we’ve explained before, the Trump administration must not appear to have lost the war in Ukraine. Must not appear to have triggered a war with Iran that causes massive inflation of the oil price. Must not appear to have been defeated in battle. We’ve explained this a number of times before. So these domestic forces in the U.S. lead the U.S. to put out multiple signals, some of which are long-term hostile to Russia, and not at all likely to lead to peace on the Ukrainian battlefield—or at least if they lead to a pause on the Ukrainian battlefield, they don’t lead to any relief at sea, in Poland, in the Baltic states, in Finland, across the Arctic, and certainly not any relief in strategic arms limitations, starting with the installation of the Golden Dome in Greenland and what have you.

So to answer your question, to summarize, I do not believe that blaming the Europeans for sabotaging peace in Ukraine is accurate. The fact of the matter is, the European governments believe, NATO believes, the U.S. commanders of NATO believe that the battle has been lost in Ukraine, but not the war against Russia. Now that’s a distinction they don’t make in public, but their policies indicate that’s their policy toward Russia. So their problem is how to go on fighting Russia because they believe the Russian economy is vulnerable — that if the economy can be re-inflated by war at sea and other means (we can get into that), President Putin will be seriously damaged internally and become even more vulnerable. That’s what the Europeans think. That’s what General Grinkevich, the head U.S. general in charge of NATO, thinks. But subject to the limitation that they’re losing on this battlefield, they’ve got to find a way of tactical operational withdrawal while maintaining strategic dominance and escalation control. Combine the two: don’t lose on the battlefield; maximize escalation everywhere else.

Does that sound like a peace framework to you? It doesn’t sound like it to me. And it does sound to me as if all the so-called European outliers are entirely in accord with the U.S. on that strategic issue. But obviously each of them has a problem with Trump domestically. Trump’s tariff measures affect France, England, Italy — all of them differently. Trump’s attempts to interfere with the European trade agreement with India is  an example. You’ve got economic warfare from Trump which affects each of the European states quite differently. So they’ve got an individual state and a collective union problem with Trump, which is different from the question you raised for me.

Once again, I know many will disagree, assuming Russia’s economy is flawless — just as they believe Russia could defeat the entirety of NATO with one hand tied behind its back, or that BRICS is one big happy family singing “Kumbaya.” Don’t get me wrong: the Russian army is formidable. In terms of cost-efficiency, it is perhaps ten or twenty times more effective than Western armies. However, the collective West is still larger and wealthier.

Similarly, the Russian economy is performing admirably considering it is under attack by the world’s greatest economic powers. Russia has been preparing for this for nearly twenty years, and what they have achieved is worthy of admiration — but that does not mean their economy is untouchable. While I don’t claim to know the absolute truth, I trust John’s track record. He is cautious; for instance, he avoids commenting on the European political situation because he is a Russian correspondent and refuses to speak on matters outside his expertise.

John notes that while the West has likely been in a recession for several years, Russia is only now facing the threat of one. He isn’t suggesting the West is thriving while Russia struggles; in fact, he argues Russia is in a much better position than Europe. However, “better” does not mean “perfect.” If there is a genuine threat to the Russian economy, it would make sense for Putin to seek a short-term deal with Trump for relief, even while knowing that, in the long term, Russia remains a Western target.

This is exactly what the Russian “deep state,” represented by Sergey Lavrov, opposes. This tension explains Lavrov’s recent comments and why he was reportedly excluded from certain negotiations. From what I gather, John distrusts Trump and dislikes Putin’s “short-term gambit,” siding with Lavrov on the matter. John predicted this internal division early on, and Lavrov’s recent statement confirms the theory. While I am not 100% certain of this, it explains many “strange things” I’ve observed, making it highly probable.

To even consider this theory, one must admit that Russia could face economic hurdles — something most alternative media analysts refuse to do. They often view the situation through rose-colored glasses, fueled by “hopium,” seeing the world as they wish it to be rather than as it is. This explains John’s frustration which he expresses by saying “American podcasters who walk around Moscow saying how terrific things look.” Although John supports Russia, he insists on looking at the situation objectively.

I will end it here. Please feel free to ask questions in the comments; I’ve had to leave out a great deal to keep this post from becoming even longer. Thanks to everyone who stuck with me until the end. And, as always…

“Knowledge will make you be free.”

― Socrates

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“Knowledge isn’t free. You have to pay attention.”

― Richard P. Feynman

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“Freedom is not free, you need to pay attention.”

― Grzegorz Ochman

“All tribal and national hatred is foreign to us. The fighters for freedom of all countries and nations are our brothers. We know how to pay tribute to every great thought, in whatever language it was born; we know how to honor every poet and thinker, whatever nation brought him forth.”

― Józef Piłsudski / Source: On the Occasion of the Pushkin Jubilee, “Robotnik” No. 31, June 4, 1899.

“There is no better breeding ground for the bacteria of falsehoods and legends than the fear of truth and a lack of will.”

― Józef Piłsudski / Source: The Year 1863, Introduction, 1924.