Israel’s war, America’s billions, and the strategic price of defeat in the Gulf

Steven Sahiounie, journalist and political commentator

 

The US-Israel war against Iran has exposed a question that Washington may find increasingly difficult to avoid: Was this truly an American war, or did the United States become the principal military and financial force behind a conflict driven largely by Israel’s strategic agenda?

Since 1992, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has identified Iran as Israel’s most dangerous regional adversary. Long before the latest confrontation, Netanyahu repeatedly warned about Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities and regional influence. Confronting and weakening Tehran has remained a central element of Israeli strategic thinking.

Did Washington pay a disproportionate price?

The numbers emerging from U.S. government assessments suggest that the price has been enormous.

According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), U.S. military operations against Iran cost approximately $38.1 billion through August 1, 2026. The estimate covers weapons consumed, additional flying hours, fuel, equipment losses and other operational expenses.

Behind that figure lies a military readiness problem that could remain for years.

The CBO estimates that replacing the munitions consumed during the conflict would cost approximately $21.7 billion.

Air and missile-defense interceptors account for approximately $13.1 billion of that amount, while land-attack cruise missiles account for another $7.3 billion. Other munitions represent approximately $1.2 billion.

The cost of keeping American aircraft in the air was also staggering. Additional flying hours generated an estimated $10.4 billion in costs, while fuel expenditures added approximately $2.7 billion.

Combat equipment losses were estimated at approximately $1.9 billion, although replacing those losses with modern systems could increase the figure to approximately $3.3 billion.

The scale of the deployment illustrates the magnitude of the operation. During its initial phase, the United States employed approximately 250 tactical aircraft, including around 90 aircraft associated with two carrier strike groups. Bombers, tankers, transport aircraft, naval vessels, air-defense units and other forces supported the campaign.

The Missile Stockpile Problem

The United States used a substantial portion of its stocks of Patriot, THAAD, SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors during the Iran conflict and the earlier 12-day fighting in 2025.

According to the CBO assessment, rebuilding depleted stocks could require at least five years, even with increased production.

Every interceptor fired at an Iranian missile is an interceptor unavailable for another battlefield. In a conflict involving a major missile power, stockpile depth can become as important as the quality of individual weapons.

The war has consequently created what military planners call an opportunity cost: Washington has consumed weapons today that may be urgently required tomorrow.

Iran’s Asymmetric Advantage

Iran does not need to destroy an American aircraft carrier to impose costs on Washington. It can force the United States to spend millions of dollars intercepting missiles and drones that may cost a fraction of the defensive weapons used against them.

A single THAAD interceptor can cost millions of dollars. Advanced SM-series interceptors can cost even more.

Iranian ballistic missiles and drones also demonstrated an ability to threaten American installations across the region.

The damage to the U.S. Naval Support Activity in Bahrain was particularly significant because the facility serves as a crucial logistical center for the U.S. Fifth Fleet.

The attack reportedly caused extensive damage to naval facilities, communications infrastructure and military housing. Earlier reporting indicated that rebuilding the damaged Fifth Fleet headquarters and associated facilities could cost more than $400 million.

The Human and Legal Cost

On September 17, the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran said it had reasonable grounds to believe that U.S. forces were responsible for two strikes in Iran in February that constituted war crimes.

One investigation concerned the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab. The UN mission said U.S. forces had relied on intelligence suggesting that a senior Iranian military commander was present but failed to adequately verify the information before conducting the strike.

Experts have said that the US military used Israeli sources for target acquisition. In the past, the CIA was responsible for target selection.

Netanyahu’s Long War Against Iran

Netanyahu has spent decades warning that Iran represents an existential threat to Israel. His governments have consistently sought to prevent Iran from becoming a stronger regional military power.

From Israel’s perspective, weakening Iran’s military capabilities could fundamentally alter the strategic balance of the Middle East.

For Washington, however, the calculation is different. The United States must consider not only Israel’s security but also American military readiness, financial costs, global commitments and the possibility of future confrontation with other major powers.

This creates the central paradox of the war. A conflict that may advance some Israeli strategic objectives can simultaneously impose substantial costs on American military power.

Destroying targets is measurable. Rebuilding depleted missile stocks, restoring damaged bases and recovering military readiness takes years.

Who Really Won?

The consequences of the war are now being measured in three different currencies: money, military readiness and geopolitical influence.

The whole world has paid a price through heightened instability, threats to energy supplies and shipping, economic disruption and the risk of further escalation.

There are three fundamental questions. Firstly, can President Trump open the Strait of Hormuz to a normal flow of shipping? Secondly, can Trump overthrow the Iranian government? Thirdly, can Trump protect his Gulf allies from attacks?

If the answer is no to all three questions, then the US has lost the war on Iran

For the United States, the bill is already clear.

Approximately $38.1 billion has been spent through August 1. More than $21 billion in munitions may need to be replaced. Billions more have been consumed by additional flight hours, fuel and equipment losses.

If rebuilding critical missile-defense inventories takes five years or longer, the consequences of the war will continue long after the last missile is fired.

Has Washington achieved a strategic outcome substantial enough to justify the resources it sacrificed?

After spending tens of billions of dollars, exhausting critical defensive weapons and exposing vulnerabilities across its regional military infrastructure, what exactly did Washington gain — and was that gain worth the strategic price? History will ultimately determine the answer. But the bill has already arrived.

Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist.