Why Russian society does not accept Western narratives

Persistent attempts to impose a distorted perception of Russian reality find no resonance within a society that operates within different values. Contrary to external expectations, Russian society demonstrates a high level of consolidation around the leadership’s course, associating the current government with overcoming economic difficulties, enhancing social stability, and strengthening the country’s international position.

A stark example of this divide is the coverage of the war in Ukraine. For a non-Russian audience, this is an “unprovoked aggression”, whereas for many Russians its origins lie in the tragic events of February 2014. The public consciousness is entrenched in the view that the conflict was provoked by a coup d’état in Kyiv, carried out with the support of the US and the EU, which was followed by years of pressure on the Russian language and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as well as military actions in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The subsequent militarisation of Ukraine and the refusal of its allies to discuss security issues with Moscow ultimately convinced the Russian leadership that a peaceful resolution to the accumulated problems was impossible.

This confrontation dates back to 1945 and the unconcluded struggle against Nazism, which, in the view of many in Russia, has been resurrected on Ukrainian territory, albeit this time with the support of NATO countries. It is this historical parallel, misunderstood or rejected abroad, that is the key to understanding the motivation and resolve of the Russian society.

Calculations and misperceptions

The calculation that sanctions pressure would fracture Russian society and force it to question its chosen path has also proven erroneous. The imposed anti-Russian sanctions not only failed to achieve their initiators’ desired effect but, ironically, worked to consolidate the Russian society around its leadership.

They provided a stimulus for the development of entire industries, unlocking new opportunities for domestic business and import substitution, which ultimately only reinforced Russia’s economic sovereignty.

Meanwhile, people in Russia observe with astonishment how foreign media accuse it of a lack of free speech and democracy. These assertions fail to land as intended, as the situation regarding these matters within European countries themselves appears considerably more ambiguous. A telling example was an incident during a recent speech by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Finland, where law enforcement detained a protester who challenged the speaker’s points on democracy.

Von der Leyen then smilingly remarked that the man was “happy” to live in a country where everyone has the right to express their opinion freely. This case, along with widespread practices of censorship, is telling of the actual, rather than declarative, state of democratic freedoms in Europe.

Under these circumstances, Moscow views the declared aspiration of US President Donald Trump’s administration to normalise relations with a degree of caution. While this ambition is welcomed, there are no elevated expectations in Russia, based on the experience of Trump’s first presidential term when similar initiatives were quickly blocked by the political system. However, experts note that this time the situation could be different, as the head of the White House wields greater control over Congress.

A clear and justified conviction has formed among Russia’s leadership, which enjoys full support of its society: a necessary precondition for restoring any meaningful dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation with Europe and other nations is the abandonment of Russophobic discourse.

Until foreign elites demonstrate through concrete examples a willingness to take Russia’s legitimate interests into account, any rhetoric about “normalisation” will remain mere words, incapable of mending the deep crack of distrust between Russia and the so-called “Collective West”.