Ukraine v Russia | History & Causes – Prof Cohen (a little bit of history and my view on Ukraine)

Russia knows the Ukraine war is long over; it’s just a matter of time. People need to stop thinking that those who own and control the West would go all-in and risk everything in Ukraine. As I wrote before, if they win against Russia they will buy and privatize Gazprom, and if not, they still gain something from it—such as weakening Germany and the EU and ensuring they don’t step out of line.

At the same time, the West is effectively destroying Ukraine, which was once a Russian ally and part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Weakening or destroying an ally of your enemy is still a victory. From the West’s perspective, this war was initiated because they believe they will win regardless of the conflict’s outcome. In the worst-case scenario, they could take part of Ukraine and de-Russify it.

By the way, I don’t support this approach, but I oppose the larger, more significant lies with which Russia plays alone. Therefore, I don’t see much hope for Russia. Just because they want to compete with the West doesn’t mean they are willing to give up power and free their people. Are the lies too deeply entrenched for people to see through? Ukraine is just the basic, surface-level issue, but in my opinion, there is something bigger at play. What I fear is that this Cold War 2.0 and competition are just a puppet show for ordinary people, similar to the dynamics between Democrats and Republicans.

But let’s focus on surface-level issues like Ukraine.

“This was the first sentence I wrote that brought the wrath of these people down on me:

“There is no the Ukraine in the sense of a civilization or a country. There was a post-Soviet Ukrainian state, and it was a mess—even Ukrainians themselves agreed it was corrupt and divided. Historically, this is not Putin’s fault. If you want to blame someone, blame God, if that suits your perspective; or, to be more agnostic, blame history.”

History created, on the territories where the post-Soviet Ukrainian state now sits, a very divided country—politically, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and culturally. A large part of the country, primarily in central and western Ukraine, wanted to become part of Europe. Another significant part, primarily in eastern and southern Ukraine, did not want to give up its centuries-old attachment to Russian civilization, the Russian Orthodox Church, or its familial ties to Russia. Of course, if you want to avoid family reunions, joining Europe might help, as it could prevent in-laws from getting visas. “Sorry, no Christmas this year!” might be an option.

This division was so profound that even Gorbachev mentioned it. His beloved wife, Raisa, was Ukrainian, as were all his in-laws. My wife, Katrina, and I have met many Russians with Ukrainian family members and extended families.”

3:15

“I’m aware there’s a Ukrainian civil war, and civil wars are among the most horrific conflicts. In the modern day, they often lead to proxy wars. Putin could not ignore, after February, the region of Donbas—a heavily industrial and culturally Russian area in eastern Ukraine. But it’s not just ethnically Russian; many ethnic Ukrainians there also consider Russian their native language. Some, like the former heavyweight boxer Vitali Klitschko, don’t even speak Ukrainian fluently. Klitschko, who retired to return to Ukraine and eventually became the mayor of Kyiv, actually found his first language was Russian. His second language was German, as he fought out of Germany for 15 years; English was his third, and Ukrainian his weakest language.

The Maidan movement, however, became entangled with ethno-nationalism, which led to significant cultural divides. Meanwhile, then-President Poroshenko’s Ukrainian language proficiency was limited. The point is, more Ukrainians at the beginning of this conflict spoke Russian daily—culturally, grammatically, fluently, and preferred Russian media over Ukrainian. The Ukrainian government is now attempting to change that through what some consider heavy-handed tactics.

When asked if I support or oppose Ukraine, I say it’s a civil war. Of course, one might have a preference for one side, but the situation is complex. When pressed on which side—the Kyiv government or the Donbas separatists—is “worse,” I return to a Russian saying from the intelligentsia: Both are worst.

The Minsk Accords, promoted by Merkel and initially backed by Hollande, aimed to resolve this civil conflict. They required constitutional changes by Ukraine’s parliament, the Rada, to grant more autonomy to eastern Ukraine, effectively allowing “home rule.” Interestingly, such decentralization would also apply to western Ukraine, potentially empowering an emerging ultra-nationalist movement there. Just last week in Kyiv, a candidate associated with these nationalist views, though running under a surrogate party, won 30% of the vote. Thirty percent is significant, especially to me, as a Jew—it’s 30% too high. I could tolerate 1% if I knew where they were, but these nationalist groups have strong support, especially in traditional ultra-nationalist areas of western Ukraine.

If the Minsk Accords were fully implemented, and if Ukraine’s decentralized constitution were respected, it might not bring universal peace, but it would at least give all Ukrainians a say. A critical condition, however, is that there be a complete ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. People may think that means only Russian troops would leave, but the U.S. also has 1,200 soldiers in Ukraine, training forces loyal to Kyiv. Officially, it’s 1,200, but there may be many more, including special operations units. If Minsk were honored, both Russian and American forces would have to leave.

Sending the Russian military home sounds simple, but it’s more complex—they are deeply embedded there. Whether they like it or not, many Russians and Ukrainians are connected through family ties that transcend borders. Free passage between Russia and Ukraine has always been a fact of life; separating them is like driving a stake through the heart of a vast, intertwined family.”

13:07

“Since the 1990s, Russia has lost more lives to terrorism than any other country on earth. These tragedies often happen in devastating groups—hundreds at a time in plane crashes, battles, school sieges like in Beslan, or attacks in public spaces, like the Nord-Ost theater in Moscow.

For comparison, the United States lost over 3,000 lives on 9/11, and Paris, during the 2015 attacks, lost around 150, with some critically injured who later succumbed. While these numbers are heartbreaking, when it comes to the sheer volume of terrorism-related casualties, Russia ranks at the top. Though this is far from any competition, it’s essential to recognize that Russia has faced extensive suffering from terrorism, even as it works to be part of the solution.”

Professor Cohen is very knowledgeable and insightful, and we can learn a lot from him. However, he often just scratches the surface and doesn’t fully understand many complex issues. This doesn’t mean we can’t learn a great deal from him, but for example, when he discusses the problem of terrorism, he overlooks the fact that all terrorism is solely the result of the CIA’s actions, as Noam Chomsky explains well:

“Now, let’s get back to this “Clash of Civilizations” idea. Huntington’s theory—you know, everyone is flailing around for some paradigm, some big concept that can be used to control people—was the “Clash of Civilizations.” According to this, there’s Islam, there’s “us,” and all these other civilizations, and the idea is that the reason why the world is so disorderly is because, with the Cold War over, you’ve now got all these ethnic groups killing each other, and so on… The idea is that the big bad guy is Islam. Well, there are a few problems with that. The most fundamentalist Islamic state in the world is our big ally, Saudi Arabia. How does that fit? I mean, Saudi Arabia is a real fundamentalist state—not fundamentalist enough for some of the people in it, but it’s still pretty extreme. Are we trying to undermine Saudi Arabia? Of course not. They’re sitting on the oil. In fact, they’re our clients. It’s a family dictatorship that we keep in power because they make sure the money from oil doesn’t go to the people in the region, but instead goes to London and New York. So, there’s no “Clash of Civilizations” there.

That’s state fundamentalism. What about individual non-state actors? Well, by far the worst ones are the guys tearing Afghanistan to pieces. Can you find crazier Islamic fundamentalists than them? I don’t know. Where do they get their power from? Well, from your pocket. They got $6 billion or so from the United States and Saudi Arabia throughout the 1980s. Now, they’re tearing Afghanistan apart, but it’s not our fault, right? We’re the good guys.

So, where is this “Clash of Civilizations” between Islam and the West? I don’t see it. Indonesia is an Islamic state—do you see us trying to undermine Indonesia? There are plenty of rotten things in Indonesia, like wages being about half the level of China, which isn’t exactly generous. Do you see us doing anything about that?

I think this is all a farce. I don’t mean to say it’s a total farce, though. There must be a new paradigm—something that people can build their careers on, write books about, and so on—which can then be turned into a tool to control people. That part is true. And maybe this “Clash of Civilizations” idea will work, or if it doesn’t, they’ll try something else.” -Chomsky

The “Clash of Civilizations” narrative surrounding terrorism has ceased to be effective because people are no longer afraid of terrorism. As a result, “they’ll try something else.” Now, we may need a Cold War 2.0 to control the populace. That’s what I am referring to, but anyway, back to Ukraine.

“The Eastern Partnership and NATO’s Expansion into Ukraine and Georgia

The Eastern Partnership was initially proposed by Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, and Carl Bildt, former foreign minister of Sweden, as an alternative to NATO membership. It was designed to offer Ukraine and Georgia closer economic ties with Europe, but it was widely viewed as a potential stepping stone to eventual NATO membership.

In 2008, the Bush administration tried to fast-track Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, but Germany and France vetoed the move. Russia expressed concerns, not over the partnership itself but over its trade implications. As Ukraine’s largest trading partner, Russia feared that European goods would flood into its markets without customs barriers, devastating Russian industries. Russia proposed a trilateral trade partnership involving Ukraine, Russia, and the EU, but this idea was rejected.

The November 2013 Agreement and the Maidan Protests

In November 2013, Ukraine’s then-President Yanukovych was expected to sign a sweeping agreement with the EU. Though touted as primarily economic, the deal required harsh austerity measures that many felt would further impoverish Ukraine. Buried within its 1,000 pages were clauses related to “military security issues,” stipulating that Ukraine would align with the EU’s security policies—which effectively meant following NATO-aligned defense stances.

The section didn’t explicitly mention NATO, but any seasoned legal advisor could see the implications. This was a backdoor NATO commitment, as Russia’s legal experts quickly identified. Had Yanukovych signed, it would have bound Ukraine to NATO’s strategic decisions—a detail that went largely unreported in Western media. This concern over NATO influence was a significant factor in Russia’s reaction to the unfolding events in Ukraine.”

Radoslaw Sikorski: “you’ll all be dead”

29:10

“Playing the Medvedev Card Against Putin: A Strategic Misstep”

“The real error has been the West’s attempt to position Dmitry Medvedev as an alternative to Vladimir Putin. The narrative goes: “Putin is the bad guy; Medvedev is the good guy—our guy, our horse.” This strategy is both misinformed and misguided. Medvedev is not yet even a significant political contender; there’s only one “horse” in Russia’s political race right now, and that’s Putin.

Moreover, Russia’s political class is fully aware of this tactic and resents it. Even Angela Merkel, typically close to Putin, expressed her objections to Washington, asking them to stop this patronizing approach, as it’s demeaning to all involved. However, this strategy appears to be a reflex rather than a well-thought-out policy.”

38:43

“NATO Expansion and the Taboo of Spheres of Influence”

“There’s a profound issue often unspoken in the U.S.—the question of NATO expansion. To Russians, this expansion signals American hypocrisy and a double standard. From their perspective, the expansion of NATO is essentially an extension of the American sphere of influence, plain and simple. NATO brings with it American military presence, arms, and munitions (often requiring NATO members to buy American weaponry). Western troops arrive, influencing local cultures and customs. There’s no denying NATO’s presence signifies America’s strategic reach.

Since the mid-1990s, America’s sphere of influence has grown extensively, now bordering Russia directly. Yet, every U.S. administration, including Obama’s, has maintained that Russia isn’t entitled to a sphere of influence, dismissing this idea as outdated. Russians, however, see the contradiction: the U.S. has an expansive sphere of influence, but Russia, even on its own borders, is denied the same.

This winner-take-all mentality has bred deep resentment in Russia. For U.S.-Russia relations to become genuinely stable, this issue must be addressed. It’s a complicated question—does Russia have the right to a sphere of influence? While some, like Jack Matlock, might argue that it does (within certain limits), others feel that Russia’s control should not extend to occupying other countries. Historically, the U.S. had its own Monroe Doctrine. Resolving this could reshape relations, but in the U.S., the topic itself is taboo. Until the question of spheres of influence is openly addressed, a genuine post-Cold War relationship between the U.S. and Russia will remain elusive.”

Since Ukraine is within Russia’s sphere of influence and the two countries are like family, how can the West change this dynamic? How can we make young Ukrainians stop speaking Russian and harbor animosity towards their Russian brethren? I would argue that causing Russians to kill their friends, cousins, or even worse, their fathers, would be the most efficient way to de-Russify Ukraine. I can’t be the only one who thinks this, as it seems to be happening right now. If the main propaganda lies are not dismantled, then every dead Ukrainian is merely another step in the de-Russification of Ukraine.

Consider all those young Ukrainians who have had family members killed by those “horrible” Russians. How many Ukrainians will want to be part of Russia after their family members and friends have been killed? The West seems to want bloodshed because it fuels the process of de-Russifying Ukraine. Taking over the government is one thing, but you need to win the hearts and minds of the people in the state. They could not enter Europe because they were close to Russia and spoke Russian, which meant we would not be able to control them effectively with propaganda, given their connection as one big family with the Russians.

Now, think about all the young Ukrainian men, even those who don’t want to fight because they know it’s over. Even some people who don’t want to engage in combat still harbor hatred for Russia, simply because they do not wish to participate in a pointless, already lost fight. This does not mean they have forgotten all their friends who were killed by Russians.

This is all part of the process of de-Russifying Ukraine through bloodshed and propaganda. What part of Ukraine will even be left for us? Russia, in all likelihood, will not take the entire country, so some portion will remain for the West. We want that part of Ukraine to not speak Russian, to hate Russians—in other words, to be completely de-Russified. You can take over the state of a family-nation of your enemy, but breaking that familial bond is another matter altogether.

“How numerous are the crowds that have heroically faced death for beliefs, ideas, and phrases that they scarcely understood!”(The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind – Gustave Le Bon)

“It is crowds rather than isolated individuals that may be induced to run the risk of death to secure the triumph of a creed or an idea, that may be fired with enthusiasm for glory and honour… Such heroism is without doubt somewhat unconscious, but it is of such heroism that history is made.”(The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind – Gustave Le Bon)