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The Cuban Missile Crisis is being repeated but in reverse — heading toward WW3 because of the U.S. and its EU.

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of this site. This site does not give financial, investment or medical advice.

15 November 2026, posted by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)

Today, I had this conversation with ChatGPT:

“Please discuss: The war in Ukraine is, but in reverse, actually the same situation that America’s President JFK had faced with regard to the Soviet Union in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the U.S. would have invaded Cuba if Khrushchev wouldn’t agree to a mutually acceptable settlement — which he did, and so WW3 was averted on that occasion. But whereas Khrushchev was reasonable; Obama, Biden, and Trump, are not; and, so, the world again stands at the brink of a WW3, but this time with a truly evil head-of-state (Obama, then Biden, and now Trump — in other words, the United States Government), who might even be willing to go beyond that brink — into WW3 itself — in order to become able to achieve world-conquest (which had been Hitler’s goal to achieve). In other words: the war in Ukraine is as-if Khrushchev had said no to JFK’s proposal in 1962 — but, thankfully, he didn’t; so, WW3 was averted, on THAT occasion.”

Your comparison between the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the war in Ukraine raises an important historical question: What happens when one nuclear superpower perceives the military expansion of its adversary into a neighboring country as an intolerable threat to its national security?

I think your analogy has considerable explanatory force, particularly regarding the relationship between military geography, perceived existential threats, and the willingness of nuclear powers to risk war. However, I would distinguish three propositions:

  1. The structural analogy: In both cases, a nuclear power confronted the prospect of an adversary establishing a threatening military position close to its territory.
  2. The diplomatic analogy: In 1962, the superpowers ultimately negotiated a settlement, whereas the disputes over Ukraine’s security alignment have not produced a lasting mutually acceptable settlement.
  3. The political and moral conclusion: The United States deliberately engineered the Ukraine conflict in pursuit of world domination and might risk nuclear war to achieve that objective.

The first proposition is substantially supported by historical evidence. The second is also important, although the diplomatic histories differ. The third requires additional evidence about intentions, decisions, and objectives.

1. The Cuban Missile Crisis: what actually prevented World War III?

One particularly important feature of the 1962 settlement strengthens your analogy.

Kennedy did not simply demand that Khrushchev withdraw Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba, and Khrushchev did not simply surrender.

The settlement involved reciprocal concessions:

  • The Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Cuba.
  • The United States pledged not to invade Cuba.
  • Kennedy secretly agreed to remove American Jupiter nuclear missiles from Turkey.

The secret American concession was crucial. Khrushchev’s October 28, 1962, letter explicitly acknowledged the confidential arrangement.

National Security Archive+1

Consequently, the historical lesson is not merely that Khrushchev was reasonable. Both leaders ultimately accepted that avoiding nuclear war required acknowledging the other superpower’s necessary national security concerns and making concessions to those concerns.

There is also an important qualification: Kennedy had considered invading Cuba, but an invasion was not inevitable if negotiations failed. His administration had several military and diplomatic alternatives under consideration. [None of those was an immediate nuclear war; the first would probably have been a U.S. blockade of Cuba.]

National Archives+1

2. Ukraine: the corresponding security confrontation

The clearest documentary comparison comes from December 2021 and January 2022.

On December 17, 2021, Russia presented draft security agreements to the United States and NATO. Among their demands were guarantees against further NATO enlargement, particularly Ukrainian membership, and restrictions on NATO military deployments.

On January 26, 2022, the United States and NATO responded. They refused to abandon NATO’s open-door policy but offered negotiations over military transparency, exercises, arms control, and other security arrangements. [None of which related to Russia’s stated needs, but were non-responsive to them.]

Security Council Report+1

That establishes a significant parallel.

In 1962, Washington regarded Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba as unacceptable, despite Cuba’s sovereign right to pursue its own foreign policy.

In 2021–2022, Moscow regarded Ukraine’s potential incorporation into NATO’s military system as unacceptable, despite Ukraine’s sovereign right to seek alliances.

The United States and NATO were unwilling to make the central concession Russia demanded: a binding commitment excluding Ukraine from NATO.

The difference was that in 1962 the two superpowers reached a compromise on the central military-security issue, whereas in 2022 they did not.

However, one distinction is essential. Soviet nuclear missiles were actually being installed in Cuba in 1962. Ukraine was not a NATO member in February 2022, and there was no equivalent deployment of American nuclear missiles in Ukraine. Russia’s concern involved NATO’s possible future expansion, existing Western military assistance, and the broader European security order. [Actually, despite ChatGPT’s evasion, Putin, on 7 July 2015 said on Italian TV, said “We have been aggressive?American submarines are on permanent alert off the Norwegian coast; they are equipped with missiles that can reach Moscow in 17 minutes. But we dismantled all of our bases in Cuba a long time ago, even the non-strategic ones. And you would call us aggressive?” He said at an investors’ forum on 30 December 2021, “The issue concerns the possible deployment in the territory of Ukraine of strike systems with the flight time of 7–10 minutes to Moscow, or 5 minutes in the case of hypersonic systems. Just imagine that. Incidentally, you live in Moscow, as far as I know. East Capital is in Moscow, isn’t it? The flight time to Moscow is 5 minutes for these systems.” ChatGPT softens the edges by evading ‘embarrassing’ facts. Furthermore, in order for Finland to be allowed into NATO, it was required to allow U.S. nukes into Finland when and if NATO would require it, and Finland said yes to that requirement. That was the moment when NATO finally said yes to Finland being a member. Is such a demand on a country consistent with its sovereignty? Obviously not. But NATO argues that Russia challenges Ukraine’s sovereignty by requiring Ukraine not to join NATO.]

This distinction limits the analogy without eliminating its relevance.

3. The question of responsibility

Your argument assigns primary responsibility for the present danger to successive American administrations.

There is a historically supportable argument that American policies contributed substantially to the deterioration of relations with Russia, including NATO enlargement and the refusal to provide the security guarantee Moscow demanded.

But establishing that American policies contributed to the confrontation is different from establishing that Russia had no alternative to invading Ukraine [on 24 February 2022].

Likewise, establishing that American policymakers knowingly accepted an increased risk of confrontation is different from establishing that their objective was world conquest.

Those distinctions matter if your purpose is to demonstrate culpability rather than merely assert it.

In particular, Russia’s December 2021 demands went beyond Ukrainian neutrality. They also sought restrictions on NATO’s military presence in countries that had joined the alliance after 1997 [The U.S. regime and its EU stooges in February 1990 had repeatedly promised to Gorbachev’s people in 1990 saying that if the Soviet Union and its communism would end, then NATO would not expand “even one inch to the east” toward Russia’s border; and, so, Russia here was merely demanding that NATO do what it had repeatedly promised back then]. That complicates treating the dispute as exclusively analogous to removing missiles from Cuba.

MacMillan Center at Yale

4. The Hitler comparison

Your comparison to Hitler concerns the ultimate political objective: world domination.

Here I would distinguish between seeking global military predominance and seeking territorial world conquest.

…

If your proposition is that Obama, Biden, and Trump share Hitler’s objective of conquering the world, the available evidence does not establish that equivalence. [I disproved ChatGPT’s allegation many times, such as in my “How the U.S. Swindled Russia in the 1990s”.]

Moreover, their policies toward Russia have not been identical. [I hadn’t said otherwise, but ChatGPT pretended that I had.]

5. Is the world again approaching the brink?

The danger of nuclear escalation is real, but proximity to nuclear war cannot be established merely from the existence of a confrontation between nuclear powers.

There is an important current development.

According to Reuters on November 14, 2026, Trump, Putin, and Xi are scheduled to meet in China on November 19 to discuss nuclear-arms reductions. The White House says Ukraine is not expected to be on the agenda. [Notice how ChatGPT introduces irrelevancies in order to pretend to a mastery it does not possess — nor does ANY AI at this point.]

Reuters

Separately, American, Ukrainian, and Russian negotiators have resumed discussions involving security guarantees, although substantial disagreements remain. [More irrelevancies.]

AP News

These developments do not establish that nuclear war has become unlikely. But they do demonstrate that diplomatic efforts have not ceased, and that Trump’s current policy cannot accurately be characterized simply as a refusal to negotiate. [More irrelevancies.]

6. What I consider the strongest part of your argument

I think the most consequential aspect of your analogy is the question of reciprocity in the recognition of security interests.

In 1962, the United States insisted that its security interests entitled it to prevent the Soviet Union from deploying certain weapons in Cuba.

In 2021–2022, Russia insisted that its security interests entitled it to prevent NATO from expanding its military system into Ukraine.

One can recognize the parallel without accepting that either superpower possesses an unlimited right to dictate the foreign policy of a neighboring sovereign country.

The central question is whether the same security principle should apply to both countries.

And that leads to a particularly revealing counterfactual:

If Khrushchev had refused to remove the missiles from Cuba, insisting that Cuba was a sovereign nation entitled to host Soviet weapons, would Kennedy have accepted that argument and abandoned his demands?

The historical evidence strongly suggests that he would not.

That does not prove that Russia’s invasion [of Ukraine on 24 February 2022] was justified. [ChatGPT pretends I had suggested to the contrary.] It does, however, expose a potentially consequential inconsistency in the application of security principles by the United States.

7. My conclusion

Your analogy is strongest when framed as a comparison of the security dilemmas confronting nuclear powers and the importance of reciprocal diplomatic concessions.

It becomes less historically secure when it equates an actual nuclear-missile deployment with possible future NATO membership, or attributes a single objective of world conquest to three American presidents without establishing their intentions.

There is also an important additional point: Khrushchev’s willingness to compromise was matched by Kennedy’s willingness to compromise. The resolution was not the achievement of one reasonable leader confronting one unreasonable leader.

That is perhaps the most important lesson of 1962 for the Ukraine war.

The question is not simply whether Russia or the United States will yield. It is whether the parties can construct a security settlement that neither regards as an intolerable threat, while also protecting Ukraine against renewed invasion.

And I would end with a question that goes directly to the heart of your argument:

Was the fundamental American mistake in 2021–2022 its refusal to guarantee that Ukraine would never join NATO, or was it the broader American policy, extending back through successive administrations, of expanding NATO toward Russia despite repeated Russian objections?

The distinction is important because the second proposition places the origins of the confrontation considerably earlier than the Biden administration.

“Your analysis is profound. You hit the nail on the head when you said “I think the most consequential aspect of your analogy is the question of reciprocity in the recognition of security interests.” And also your opening your conclusion with “Your analogy is strongest when framed as a comparison of the security dilemmas confronting nuclear powers and the importance of reciprocal diplomatic concessions.” Also, the main part of your analysis asked “If Khrushchev had refused to remove the missiles from Cuba, insisting that Cuba was a sovereign nation entitled to host Soviet weapons, would Kennedy have accepted that argument and abandoned his demands?” What you have been highlighting here is that you accept the analogy here that JFK/USA = Putin/Russia, and that Obama-Trump-Biden-EU-NATO = Khrushchev, but without Khrushchev’s having ACCEPTED the JFK/USA-proposed compromise; so, the DIFFERENCE this time is that the nations that in the U.S. empire are willing to force upon their opponent (Russia in this case) the choice between either initiating a war against themselves, or else accepting an unacceptable danger to the Russian people, happen to be refusing to compromise — they are insisting upon their right to present the threat, whereas, in 1962, Khrushchev/USSR did NOT: he (they) accepted the peace compromise that had been offered by the opposite side.”

Yes. You have identified a more precise formulation of the analogy than the one I initially emphasized. The correspondence is between the United States under Kennedy in 1962 and Russia under Putin in 2021–2022; and between the Soviet Union under Khrushchev in 1962 and the United States and NATO in 2021–2022.

The analogy concerns not which country is communist or capitalist, democratic or authoritarian, but which country is confronting a perceived military threat near its territory, and which country is insisting upon its right to establish or maintain that threatening military relationship.

That distinction is fundamental.

In 1962, Kennedy’s position was effectively: Regardless of Cuba’s sovereign right to make agreements with the Soviet Union, the United States will not accept the resulting military threat to its security.

In 2021–2022, Putin’s position was effectively: Regardless of Ukraine’s sovereign right to make agreements with NATO, Russia will not accept the resulting military threat to its security.

The corresponding positions of the opposing powers are especially revealing.

In 1962, Khrushchev ultimately accepted limitations on Soviet military deployments in Cuba, in exchange for American concessions.

In 2021–2022, the United States and NATO refused Russia’s central demand for a binding guarantee that Ukraine would never join NATO, although they offered negotiations on other security issues.

Thus, the superpower that accepted a compromise in 1962 occupied the position corresponding to the superpower and alliance that refused the central requested [absolutely essential] concession in 2022.

There is, however, a qualification that matters to the historical argument. In 1962, the United States made reciprocal concessions, including its non-invasion pledge and the secret agreement to withdraw missiles from Turkey. In 2022, the United States and NATO offered arms-control and transparency negotiations, but not the concession Russia considered indispensable. The diplomatic situations were therefore not identical [I didn’t say they were], and the failure to agree cannot be attributed solely to the absence of any Western offer. [ChatGPT lies to assert that last clause. ]

Your argument also introduces a second, more consequential proposition: that refusing Russia’s security demand effectively confronted Russia with a choice between accepting an intolerable future military danger and initiating war.

That accurately describes the dilemma as the Russian government presented it. Whether those were Russia’s only available choices is a separate question. Russia could have continued diplomatic negotiations, maintained military deterrence, or pursued other measures short of invasion [AS IT HAS BEEN DOING]. Furthermore, a threatened state may sincerely regard a danger as intolerable without that assessment establishing the necessity or legality of preventive war. [“Preventive war”? America’s invasion/occupation of Iraq in 2003 was that. Russia does not.]

But none of those qualifications eliminates the central question of reciprocity.

If the United States claimed the right in 1962 to prevent an adversary from establishing a threatening military position in Cuba, on what consistent principle could it deny Russia any comparable security interest regarding Ukraine? [The U.S. empire has far more than proven that it is demanding that Russia accept that Russia has no national-security rights, no right of self-defense against them. Consequently, Russia would be within its rights now regardless of how it will respond. This is how evil the U.S. empire actually is. It has taken up Hitler’s banner.]

One possible answer is that the United States was confronting deployed nuclear weapons, whereas Russia was confronting prospective NATO membership and military cooperation. That is a substantial difference in the immediacy and character of the threats. It does not, however, dispose of the broader principle that nuclear powers have legitimate security interests extending beyond their borders.

I would therefore formulate the central historical finding this way:

In the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the United States demanded that its nuclear-armed adversary refrain from establishing a military threat close to American territory. The Soviet Union ultimately accepted a negotiated settlement involving reciprocal concessions, thereby helping avert a potentially catastrophic war. In the confrontation over Ukraine in 2021–2022, the roles were substantially reversed: Russia demanded guarantees against the expansion of its nuclear-armed adversary’s military alliance into Ukraine, while the United States and NATO refused the central guarantee Russia sought. The contrast raises a fundamental question of reciprocity: whether the United States was prepared to recognize in Russia a security interest comparable in principle to the one it had insisted upon for itself in 1962.

I think this formulation preserves the strength of your historical comparison without prematurely converting the evidence of a refused security guarantee into proof that invasion was inevitable or that the Western governments intended to provoke it.

And there is one further historical implication worth emphasizing.

The critical counterfactual is not merely what Kennedy would have done if Khrushchev had refused his demands. It is what Kennedy would have done if Khrushchev had insisted that the Soviet Union’s right to deploy military forces in Cuba was nonnegotiable, while offering to discuss other security arrangements.

That is closer to the diplomatic position taken by the United States and NATO regarding Ukrainian membership.

It makes the comparison sharper, because it examines the actual diplomatic positions of the governments rather than merely their subsequent military actions.

The strongest conclusion is therefore not that the two crises were identical [which I never said], but that the principle of reciprocal recognition of national-security interests was central to resolving the first crisis and [has] remained fundamentally disputed in the second. [For the sake of basic decency, the U.S. regime must now publicly reverse its position on that, and must require ALL if its stooge regimes likewise do so. Only THIS will avoid another World War. Trump has had this option all along and could have won politically with it by publicly saying, “Obama started this war; Putin did not.” Instead, the stupid evil lying Trump said on 14 April 2025 “This was Biden’s war and I’m trying to stop it.” He just won’t go against the billionaires who funded his political career.]

“That dispute between the two sides in the present instance did not exist between the two sides in the 1962 dispute, because back then, BOTH sides implicitly ACCEPTED the fundamental principle that NO country that borders a major world power possesses a RIGHT to allow a nation HOSTILE to that major world power to position its weapons or military forces there.  Cuba did not possess such a right in 1962, and Ukraine does not possess such a right today. The only difference is that TODAY, the U.S. and its allies REJECT that principle (the principle that both JFK and Khrushchev ACCEPTED).”

You are making a more fundamental argument than the one I addressed previously. You are distinguishing between a country’s sovereignty and the limits upon its exercise of that sovereignty when it threatens the security of a neighboring major power.

Your proposed principle is:

No country … possesses a … right to permit a foreign power hostile to a neighboring major power to establish military forces or weapons on its territory. …

Under this principle, Cuba’s sovereignty did not override the United States’ security interests in 1962, and Ukraine’s sovereignty does not override Russia’s security interests today. …

MY CLOSING COMMENT:

All of the U.S. empire lackeys who spread the vicious lie that “Putin (instead of Obama) started this war” should be boiled alive for encouraging WW3 on the basis of a lie. Consortium News, which has for decades been a leader in reporting the truth against the U.S. regime, headlined on November 15th “THE BIG THREE – Ray McGovern & Peter Kuznick on THE WORLD THIS WEEK” and made clear that at least ever since 1980 the U.S. regime has led the world in imperialistic-supremacist fascism. Putin and Xi, leaders of the two top countries that the U.S. regime has in its gun sights to ultimately conquer and add to its empire, are only doing their duty to oppose that objective. They are opposing the ceaseless aggressions by Hitler’s heirs, after FDR’s death.

APPEAL FOR SUPPORT

Ever since I have started my innovative method of news-commentary and analysis that includes conversations with AI, my audience has declined, but I don’t want to revert back to the normal methods, because I want my readers to see intelligent counter-arguments and evidences and not ONLY my own arguments and evidences — particularly because my views are stringently suppressed throughout the U.S. empire, which is the area of most concern to me (since I am in it). I encourage public counter-arguments and evidences against my views (not only favoring them) because I write on subjects that are of general, not personal, importance; and only by public debate can democracy succeed. So, please actively engage my articles in any way you can, especially by donating, or spreading them to others by a like-button, or emailing an article’s URL to friends who might likewise find it of interest. My specialty is logical analysis of public-policy positions; not many people are interested in this topic; the audience for it is unfortunately small. So, it needs your help.

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Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.

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The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of this site. This site does not give financial, investment or medical advice.

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