The Balkan States and Nations Between Great European Powers at the Eve of WWI

The German (Second) Empire’s “Drang nach Osten” Policy and South-East Europe Around 1900

The unified German (Second) Empire, proclaimed in Versailles in January 1871, contemplated balancing the division of the world’s colonies, the markets, and the sources of the world’s raw material.[1] Exceptionally, the pan-Germanic movement, established in 1891, propagated the making of a powerful German global empire. To do it, a new distribution of the world’s colonies was the first necessity.[2] The Balkans were one of the regions in the world that had to be “redistributed” in the German favor.[3] In the spirit of such a policy, the German Parliament (Reichstag) issued the law regarding the enlargement of the German navy in 1898 for the reason “to secure the maritime interests of Germany”. In the next year (1899), during the First International Conference in The Hague (dealing with global security-peace issues), the German Kaiser (Emperor) Wilhelm II Hohenzollern (1888−1918) openly stated that “the sharpened sword is the best guarantee for peace”.[4]

The pan-Germanic imperialism after the German unification in 1871 was primarily directed towards the East under the motto “Drang nach Osten”(“Penetration into the East”). One of the aims of this policy was to make the Ottoman Empire subservient in economic and political points of view and to exploit this multicontinental country’s natural potential. However, in order to do this, the French and the British influence in South-East Europe, Asia Minor (Anatolia) and the Middle East had to be diminished while, at the same time, the Russian penetration into the Balkans and the Straits should be made impossible by supporting the political status quo in the region. In the German concept of “Drang nach Osten” foreign policy, the Suez Canal was to be under Berlin’s domination for the purpose that Great Britain would be cut off from its overseas colonies in Asia, Africa, and the region of the Pacific Ocean. Around the year 1900, the German capital investment in the Ottoman Empire had already pressed back the French and the British. It was 45% of the German capital out of total foreign capital investment in the Ottoman Empire just before the Balkan Wars started in 1912.[5] The Ottoman trade was financed in the first place by the German Deutsche Orientbank.[6] The Ottoman army was provided with war material and techniques, especially artillery, from the German military factories (Krupp, Mauzer). The Ottoman army was restructured and modernized according to the German war strategy, primarily due to the German military mission in the Ottoman Empire led by General von der Goltz.

The German financial-political expansion in the Ottoman Empire reached its peak when the German companies got a concession to construct the Baghdad Railway (Konia-Baghdad-Basra) – the railway line which had an extremely significant economic and military-strategic importance for the Middle East. In this context, it is not so surprising that the German Middle East’s and Balkan policies were very close to each other. Namely, between Germany and the Ottoman Asia Minor was located the Balkan Peninsula, it was as plain as day clear to the German diplomats that South-East Europe might be under the German financial, economic, political, and even military domination and control. The creators and proponents of the “Drang nach Osten” policy saw the Balkan railways as the natural link between the railways in Mitteleuropa (Central Europe) under Germanic rule and those in Anatolia and further in the Persian Gulf.[7] Shortly, the railway network connecting Berlin and the Persian Gulf, running throughout South-East Europe (the Orient Express), should be financially dominated and controlled by German banks. For that reason, German foreign policy did not support any political changes in the Balkans, and, therefore, the Ottoman Empire should avoid the destiny of further disintegration after the 1878 Berlin Congress.[8] However, the Ottoman Empire would surely be dissipated by the creation and enlargement of the Christian Balkan states at the expense of the Ottoman Balkan territories.[9]

The projected German imperialism was directed towards the Middle East, but via Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. Practically, in order to realize the policy of “Drang nach Osten”, Berlin might put under its own control the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary and the rest of South-East Europe. Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, and Edirne were the main railway’s nodes on the path to Istanbul, Baghdad, and Basra, while Pola (Pula), Trieste, Dubrovnik (Ragusa), and Kotor (Cattaro) should be transformed into the chief German basis for Berlin’s domination over both the Adriatic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. It was exactly the Russian newspaper Новое время from April 29^th, 1898, which warned Russian diplomats that as a result of the German political-military-economic penetration into the Ottoman Empire, “Anatolia will become the German India”.[10]

The Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary was imagined as the forerunner of German interests in South-East Europe, and, in this respect, the Viennese imperialistic policy in the Balkans was welcomed and supported by Berlin and the pan-Germanic politicians in Potsdam.[11] The reason for the German political supervision of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary was a strong Austro-Hungarian economic and financial dependence on German capital and financial investments. Such Austro-Hungarian subjection to the German economic-financial control and, therefore, its inability to act politically as an independent state was seen from the fact that 50% of the Austro-Hungarian export was directed to the German market. Even before the Bosnian-Herzegovinian crisis in 1908−1909, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary was financially dependent on the German banks (the Dresdner Bank, the Deutsche Bank, the Darmschterer Bank, and the Diskontogezelschaft Bank). At the same time, the Balkan states were becoming gradually  more financially subjected to the control of the same German capital. For instance, the main German investor in Serbia was Berlin’s Trade Society (the Berliner Handelsgezelschaft), while Serbia’s export to Germany in 1910 reached 42%.[12] A similar situation, for instance, was with Bulgaria, too. Her import from Germany and Austria-Hungary was 45%, while 32% of Bulgaria’s total exports were directed toward Germany and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.[13]

The principal aim of such German financial-economic Balkan policy was to transform the Ottoman Empire into “its own India” and for that reason Berlin became the chief protagonist of the Balkan status quo policy, helping the ‘sick man on the Bosporus’ to redeem himself. Subsequently, Berlin and Vienna aimed to prevent the creation of an anti-Ottoman Balkan Alliance under the Russian umbrella.[14]

Nevertheless, there were two crucial points of the Austro-German disagreement in relation to their collective Balkan policy:

1. While the Habsburg Emperor-King wanted to see only Bulgaria as a new member state of the Central Powers, for the German Emperor, Serbia could be included in this political-military bloc, too. For Vienna, Serbia and Montenegro should be kept out of the Central Powers in order not to influence the Austrian South Slavic population against the Viennese court.
2. The German Kaiser was not willing to support the Austrian policy to enlarge Bulgaria at Greek and Romanian territorial expense because of the family links between Germany’s Hohenzollerns and Greece’s King George and King Constantine, Romania’s King Karol respectively.

However, despite these disputes, both Berlin and Vienna reached, for instance, a common agreement on the question of Albania: in the case of the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans, as a greater Albanian independent state was to be created and to exist under the Germanic protectorate and support (i.e., of Germany and Austria).[15] This happened in November 1912 when an independent Albania was proclaimed during the First Balkan War at the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.

The Austro-Hungarian Balkan course

After the unification of Italy (1859−1866), when the Austrian Empire lost all of its Italian provinces,[16] the focal sphere of interest of Viennese foreign policy became South-East Europe, especially its central and southern regions. Following the metamorphosis of the Austrian Empire and its transformation into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary in 1867 (the Aussgleich or the Agreement),[17] Vienna and Budapest directed their economic and political expansion in the first place toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sanjak (Raška), Kosovo- Metochia, Albania, and the bay of Thessaloniki in the Aegean Sea. For the Austro-Hungarian ruling establishment, this direction of Viennese-Budapest’s foreign policy was determined by both Austro-Hungary’s geographical position and the inner (ethnic) structure of the state, as the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Berthold clearly stated on May 2^nd, 1913.[18] In another word, it meant that the planners of the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy saw the Balkans as Habsburg’s colonial dominion with the city of Thessaloniki as a southern focal economic seaport of Austria-Hungary (Trieste was a northern focal economic seaport of the monarchy, while the Bay of Kotor was the main navy base of the Dual Monarchy). The Austrian interest in South-East Europe, principally in Central and South Balkans, arose simultaneously with the Italian intention to transform the Adriatic Sea into the Italian mare nostro and to control South Albania with the Strait of Otranto, likewise with the Russian intention to acquire Istanbul and the Straits. Threatened that Italy would close the Adriatic gate to the Austro-Hungarian overseas trade, the Viennese and Budapest’s politicians intended to transform the northern part of the Aegean Sea with the port of Thessaloniki into the principal Austro-Hungarian export-import seaport open to the world’s market. The prominence of the territory of present-day Albania for Rome and Vienna-Budapest must be seen in the context of the Italian-Austro-Hungarian conflict for dominance over the Adriatic Sea. Certainly, for both sides, it was apparent that who is governing Albania is at the same time controlling the Adriatic Sea.[19]

To implement a cardinal goal in its Balkan policy – to dominate over the Morava-Vardar’s valley and the bay of Thessaloniki, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary obtained significant concessions for the building of the Balkan-Ottoman railway lines. The first direct railway traffic on the line Vienna-Budapest-Thessaloniki-Istanbul started due to the Austro-Hungarian financial capital in 1888. Four years before the beginning of the Balkan Wars in 1912, the Ottoman import from the Austro-Hungarian market was extended to 22% of the total Ottoman import. As it was done with the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary was putting also the Balkan states under its financial and political dependence after the 1878 Berlin Congress. Thus, the Railway Convention with Serbia was signed in 1880, the Trade Contract with Serbia in 1881, the Secret Convention with Serbia’s Prince Milan Obrenović IV in June 1881, the Veterinary Convention with Serbia, the Trade (1875), and the Customs Union with Romania in 1883, etc.[20] For the matter of fact, just before the 1906‒1911 Custom War between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the Austro-Hungarian financial capital already had the leading role in and control of Serbia’s export trade. In addition, more than 85% of Serbia’s exports were directed to the Austrian-Hungarian market, while 90% of Serbia’s imports came from the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.[21]

For a better understanding of Serbia’s dependence on the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary after the 1878 Berlin Congress,[22] on the first place of importance, it should be shortly elaborated the 1881 Secret Convention signed between Serbia’s and Austria-Hungary’s monarchs. According to the Convention, the Principality (the Kingdom from 1882) of Serbia could not, without Vienna-Budapest’s approval, conclude any political agreement with foreign countries. In addition, Serbia gave up propaganda, political, and all other activities to liberate the Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sanjak and to annex these two provinces, in which at that time the majority of the population were the Serbs. In fact, according to the Convention, the westward (across the Drina River) territorial enlargement of Serbia was unable and for that reason in the coming decades Belgrade’s foreign policy was directed southward, or in another word, toward Kosovo-Metochia, Macedonia, and Albania with one of the main tasks to get direct exit to the sea. By giving up the idea of occupying Sanjak after 1878, Serbia at the same time rejected the option of Serbian-Montenegrin political unification. Such reality had a serious consequence for the upcoming Balkan Wars as the exit of Serbia to the Adriatic Sea by the unification with Montenegro was impossible, Belgrade intended to acquire the sea cost for continental Serbia by the occupation of present-day North Albania’s littoral on the Ionian Sea (at that time part of the Ottoman Empire). Simultaneously, Montenegro sought to occupy the city of Scutari (Skadar) on the eastern coast of the Lake of Scutari, mainly populated by the Albanians, as the city was in the 11^th century a capital of the Principality of Zeta (according to the Montenegrin historiography, that was the first national state of the Montenegrins).[23]

The highlight of the Austrian-Hungarian success in its Balkan policy against the Russian influence in the region was the decision by the Bulgarian Government to accept the Austro-Hungarian project of building the trans-Balkan railway line Vienna-Belgrade-Sofia-Istanbul at the expense of the Russian project to construct the railway line Ruse-Sofia. In fact, after this decision, Bulgaria was gradually becoming a part of the Habsburg’s sphere of interest in South-East Europe involving Bulgaria at the same time into the military alliance of the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy). Therefore, 50% of Bulgarian export-import was directed in 1910 toward Germany and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.[24] Finally, as a consequence, Bulgaria became a member-state of the Central Powers’ alliance in 1915.[25]

The trade contracts with Romania signed in 1875 and 1883 enabled Austria-Hungary to undertake the export of capital into this South-East European country.[26] Finally, the economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina (after 1878 under the Austro-Hungarian occupation and administration) was totally under Viennese-Budapest’s exploitation especially the wood’s and mine’s industries.[27]

The territory of present-day Albania and the lands inhabited by the Albanians have very significant value in the concept of Austria-Hungary’s Balkan policy. It was true primarily because of rich Albania’s natural resources and its tremendously important geopolitical and strategic position as the territory located at the very entrance to the Adriatic Sea. Therefore, the Austrian-Hungarian military establishment in Vienna-Budapest did not hide that Albania “must be in close economic, cultural and political relations with the Monarchy”.[28] The another reason for such “close” ties between Albania and Austro-Hungary was a plan by the Viennese Military Court Council to transfigure Albania into the chief barrier and counterbalance against both the Serbian-Montenegrin pretensions on the territories of Macedonia, North Albania, and Kosovo-Metochia and the Italian and the Greek aspirations on the present-day South Albania and the littoral of the Adriatic Sea. However, Italy, which after its national and political unification in 1859‒1866 was becoming very significant and respectful economic and political European player[29] was the principal and strongest political actor to oppose the Habsburgs to convert Albania into their own economic and political colony. At the turn of the 20^th century, Austria-Hungary and Italy became the only masters of the Albanian economic life. For instance, the main part of the export-import trade through the Ottoman-Albanian seaport of Valona was controlled by the Austrian-Hungarian financial capital. Similarly, the Austrian “Lloyd” and “The Fiume Oboti Company” self-possessed the chief portion of Albania’s overseas trade. Lloyd’s steamboats maintained in 1913 around 73% of the Albanian steamboat’s traffic. The most important mines and the best forests in Albania were under the Austro-Hungarian economic exploitation. However, the Austrian-Hungarian domination over the territory of Albania was tremendously challenged in 1913 when Italy in a clean manner disagreed with Vienna’s intention to get a concession to construct the first Albanian railway line from Scutari to Valona. Generally, just before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912, the territory of present-day Albania was economically much more depended on the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary than on the Ottoman Empire.[30]

The Austro-Hungarian policy of transforming South-East Europe into its own colonial possession allowed Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Romania to have their own Governments, rulers, diplomacy,[31] to use their national languages or to have a fictive autonomy within the Monarchy, but all of them at the same time have to be highly economically, politically, financially and military depended on Vienna-Budapest.[32] Probably the Kingdom of Serbia was the main spine in the Austrian-Hungarian eyes at the Balkans since the First Serbian Uprising against the Ottoman Empire in 1804−1813, when de facto independent state of Serbia under the Russian protection was established.[33]

The real reason for such Austro-Serbian antagonism, which finally led the world to the Great War of 1914−1918[34] was, on the one hand, the Viennese intention to dominate over the South Slavs in the Balkans and, on the other hand, Belgrade’s wish to include all Serbs from the Ottoman Empire and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary into a unified national state of the Serbs, respectively.[35] The most belligerent political factor in the Dual Monarchy, the Court War Council, was suggesting to the Emperor (Kaizer) Franc Joseph I Habsburg to resolve the Yugoslav Question by the military occupation of the small Kingdom of Serbia. A Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General-Staff, Conrad von Hezendorf, was calling for the Emperor’s attention that if the Austro-Hungarian army occupied the city of Niš in South Serbia, the South-East Balkans would be under the monopoly of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.[36] Nonetheless, the Emperor was not willing to accept such a policy, as 50% of the population of the Dual Monarchy was of Slavic origin. In other words, in the case of Serbia’s or both Serbia’s and Montenegro’s annexation by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Slavic element would prevail over the Germanic and Hungarian ones combined.

From 1878 onward, the Viennese policy toward only two free, sovereign, and independent Yugoslav states, Serbia and Montenegro, was focused on thwarting Belgrade to unite Serbia and Montenegro into a single national state. Subsequently, as the best instrument to keep Serbia and Montenegro in political separation, Austria-Hungary built the railway line from Sarajevo to Kosovska Mitrovica via Sanjak of Novi Pazar.[37] This railway line become a part of the Austro-Hungarian wider railway network, which connected Vienna and Budapest with Istanbul, Thessaloniki, and the Albanian seaport of Valona.[38]

Italy and the Balkans

After the unification of Italy from 1859 to 1866,[39] the Italian administration accepted the foreign policy of the creation of a greater Italian state which should resemble a certain extent on the ancient Roman Empire.[40] The project of a “New Roman Empire” was directed toward Italian direct control or territorial acquisitions of the parts of the Mediterranean Sea, the Adriatic Sea, the Tyrrhenian Sea, and certain territories in North Africa and Asia Minor. However, for the very reason that the Italian attempt to conquer African Ethiopia in the years 1886−1896 failed, the Italian pivotal aim of the foreign policy after the Ethiopian War was directed toward the Balkans.[41]

However, there were two most important focal points of the Italian interest in the region of South-East Europe: 1) Albania, and 2) the East Adriatic littoral. The press in Italy at the turn of the 20^th century (around 1900) openly called the whole Adriatic Sea the Italian Mare Nostrum (Our Sea). To be a master of the Adriatic Sea became the principal precondition for the Italian economic and political infiltration into the Balkan Peninsula. Special importance for the Italian Balkan policy was Albania and the Albanian populated Balkan lands for the very reason that the main direction of the Italian penetration into South-East Europe was seen to be via Valona, Elbasan, and Bitola, with the final destination at the Bay of Thessaloniki. The Italians followed the ancient Roman military road Via Egnatia, which connected Italy with the East (with Byzantium/Constantinople and further with Asia Minor).[42] By contrast, the Austro-Hungarians followed in their penetration into the Balkans a different but also the ancient Roman military road – Via Militaris, from Belgrade (Singidunum) via Sofia (Serdica), Plovdiv (Philippopolis), and Edirne (Adrianopolis) to Istanbul (Constantinople).[43]

The Italian project of the Trans-Balkan Railway-Line is the best illustration of the Italian Balkan plans and way of economic-political infiltration into South-East Europe’s hinterland. Rome, in order to be more active in Balkan affairs, required in 1902−1904 that the Italian police forces implement necessary reforms in the Ottoman Bitola (Monastir) Vilayet.[44] In the year 1911, when the 1911−1912 Italo-Ottoman War started,[45] the Italian trade and financial capital already prevailed over the Austrian-Hungarian one in the area of Albania’s littoral of both the Ionic and the Adriatic Sea. Regarding the whole territory of Ottoman Albania, as the focal Italian point of colonial expansion in South-East Europe, in the years of the 1912−1913 Balkan Wars, the presence of the Italian capital in the country reached the second place, just behind the Austrian-Hungarian one. The Italian trade companies mastered around 25% of the export-import trade from Scutari and 30% from South Albania. The total financial operations in the cities of Valona and Durazzo (Durrës) were done by the Italian banks, but primarily by the Society for the Trade with the East.

With the marriage of the Italian heir of the throne, Vittorio Emanuel Orlando, to the Montenegrin Princess Helen (Jelena), a daughter of the Montenegrin Prince Nikola I, in 1896, the door to Montenegro was open for the Italian capital and political influence. Up to 1912, the Italian capital was predominant in Montenegro’s economy. For instance, the concession to construct the first Montenegrin railway line (Bar-Virpazar) was given to the Banca Comerciale Italiana. The same bank started to exploit the steamboat traffic on the Lake of Scutari.[46]

The Italian intention to use Albania’s territory as the bridge for its penetration into South-East Europe, as well as to transform the Strait of Otranto into the Italian Gibraltar, followed by Rome’s wish to annex Alto Adige (Süd Tyrol), Istria, and Dalmatia led Italy to an open clash with Vienna-Budapest upon the lordship over the Adriatic Sea and the Balkan hinterland.[47] At that time, the Austro-Hungarian belligerent military and political circles created a motto: “Our future is in the Balkans, our stumbling block is Italy”. In order to dismiss the main obstacle to the Austrian-Hungarian predominance in Balkan affairs, the Chief of the Austrian-Hungarian General Headquarters, Conrad von Hötzendorf, advised the Emperor, “firstly to settle the affairs with Italy”.[48] Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, predicted in February 1913 in his conversation with Conrad von Hötzendorf that “our principal enemy is Italy and against Italy, we had to fight one day in order to regain Venice and Lombardy”.[49] (lost during the wars for Italian unification).

For the Italian Balkan policy, the most dangerous Austrian-Hungarian plan with regard to the region of South-East Europe was the design of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary to transform present-day North Albania into an Austrian-Hungarian foothold for the further advance towards the Balkan hinterland. For that reason, Italy made serious efforts to thwart the Austro-Hungarian intention to master the east-central portion of the Balkans, including the areas populated by the Albanian majority or minority as Albania proper, Kosovo-Metochia, East Montenegro, and West Macedonia. In other words, to keep Vienna-Budapest as far as from the Strait of Otranto became a crucial goal of the Italian policy in the Balkans around 1900. An additional problem for Italy was Serbia’s territorial pretension on present-day North Albania as well as the Greek wish to dominate over North Epirus (present-day South Albania).[50]

In order to obviate the Serbian-Greek division of Albania, Italy, in principle, did not support the creation of the Balkan League against the Ottoman Empire since the league would make both Serbia and Greece stronger. Rome showed its real attitude toward the Balkan League[51] when Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria proclaimed war against the Ottoman Empire in October 1912 as Italy, at the same moment, put an end to its military operations against the Ottoman Empire in Libya in order to improve better the Ottoman military position in the Balkans against the members of the Balkan League.[52] The Italian newspapers at that time were writing that “the Slavdom is coming via Montenegro to the Adriatic”; the Slavdom which was “just behind Albania” and in the following years and decades the Slavdom will require Bosnia-Herzegovina, Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia.[53] The Italian diplomatic representative in Vienna even tried to convince the Austrian-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs that, for the sake of the Italian geopolitical[54] and economic interests in the region, Serbia was more dangerous than the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.[55] Consequently, regardless of the whole spectrum of the Italian disputes with Austria-Hungary on supremacy over South-East Europe, the disintegration of the Balkan League was their joint interest. Their common goal was “to prevent Slavic domination over the Adriatic Sea”.[56]

Surely, the question of the division of the spheres of influence over the region of South-East Europe between the European Great Powers, including Italy as well as was one of the focal causes of friction which threatened to upset the peace of Europe at the turn of the 20^th century as they were:

• A naval rivalry between the United Kingdom and the German Empire.
• The French intention to return lost Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871 (as a consequence of the 1870‒1871 Franco-Prussian War).
• The German Empire accused the Triple Entente to “encircle” it but, in essence, the Germans were disappointed with the results of their imperialistic (Weltpolitik) policies after the German unification in 1871 as their overseas colonial empire was small in comparison with those of other European Great Powers – the same expansionistic syndrome that Italy had after its own political unification in the 1860s.
• Russia was suspicious of the ambitions of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary in South-East Europe and worried about the growing military and economic power of the German Empire.
• The Serbian nationalistic patriotism is based on the desire to liberate the Serb nation from control by other states, i.e., the Ottoman Empire and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, and, subsequently, to establish a Greater Serbia as a national state of all Serbs.
• The Austro-Hungarian desire to launch a “preventive war” to destroy and occupy the small Kingdom of Serbia before it became strong enough to provoke the breakup of the Dual Monarchy and, therefore, to prevent the transformation of Serbia into a Russian client state.[57]
• The Italian desire to get more overseas colonies and territories on the eastern littoral of the Adriatic Sea. In other words, the nations that have been historically divided, such as the Germans and the Italians, could only join in the imperial game when they had come together and formed a single military and financial political unit, i.e., the nation-state. And as soon as they did it, their first act on the international arena was to try to acquire overseas territories, i.e., colonies. But they were among the most brutal of the imperialists as they were late in comparison to the others.[58]
• The desire by the Triple Entente to keep the pre-war status quo in international relations.

Arising from all these resentments and tensions mentioned above came a series of political events which culminated in the outbreak of the Great War in the summer of 1914, in which Italy took active military participation from May 1915.[59] In the Great War, Italy was hoping to get the Italian-speaking provinces of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, followed by the territories along the eastern littoral of the Adriatic Sea. In order to realize its own war aims, Italy signed in April 1915 a secret London Treaty with the Cordiale Entente according to which, France, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Empire promised Italy Trentino, South Tyrol, Trieste, part of Dalmatia, Istria, Adalia, some islands in the Aegean Sea (the Dodecanese with Rhodes), and finally a protectorate over Albania. The member-states of Cordiale Entente hoped that by keeping part of the Austro-Hungarian troops occupied at the Italian front, the Italians would relieve pressure on the Russians which would have positive effects for France and the United Kingdom on the Western Front. However, in practice, the Italian army fighting in the Alps against the soldiers of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary made little headway, and their efforts were to no avail. As a consequence, the Russians were unable to progress at the Eastern Front against Austria-Hungary and Germany.

France’s Balkan policy of the status quo

The fundamental interest of France in the region of South-East Europe was of an economic nature, rather than a political one. The region was perceived by the French politicians as primarily significant in the following three points:

• As a well-suited area for the investment of French financial capital.
• As the region that was most appropriate for overland traffic, it bonded with the Ottoman Empire.
• As a foothold for the French economic domination over the East Mediterranean.[60]

In this respect, French economic penetration into the region, followed by an investment of French financial capital in all Balkan states, achieved notable success in the second half of the 19^th century. It is true particularly for Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The Kingdom of Serbia became, among all Balkan countries, the most dependent on French financial capital, especially after 1881 when the French company General Union provided the largest loan to date for the construction of Serbia’s first railway line (Belgrade−Niš). Serbia became more dependent on the French capital in 1910 when the French-Serbian Bank was established with the predominant French capital. Therefore, on the eve of the 1912−1913 Balkan Wars, the French investment capital dominated in Serbia. However, the French economic concessions were closely connected with the French policy in the region. As a result, the French Government, to a great extent, controlled Serbia’s foreign policy.

However, the principal object of the French financial subjugation inside the region of South-East Europe was, in fact, the Ottoman Empire. The French financiers and businessmen financed around 32% of the Baghdad Railway Company, while 63% of the Ottoman state’s loan was paid for by France. Nevertheless, what was most important, is a predominant number of shareholdings of the state’s Ottoman Bank belonged to France. Hence, the French entrepreneurs obtained very important concessions for the construction of the Ottoman railway lines in Anatolia, Armenia, and Syria. Subsequently, the designers of the French foreign policy in connection to the Balkans had to seriously take into consideration the economic interests of France’s financiers and business people. The French entrepreneurs, however, in order to make money inside the Ottoman Empire, realized that the Ottoman Empire must not be territorially and politically disintegrated or dismembered. Moreover, they supported the idea of Ottoman economic, institutional, and political reformation and prosperity. Shortly, the French financial capital and investments could earn a profit only in a reformed and prosperous Ottoman Empire, but not politically disintegrated one. This political economy’s fundamental principle became the leading standard in the French Balkan policy of the status quo.[61]

The French approach toward the Balkan League of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece, especially to the Serbian-Bulgarian accord, had a double standard. On one hand, Paris disagreed with the creation of such an alliance if it would be directed against the Ottoman territorial integrity. However, on the other hand, Paris supported the establishment of the alliance in the case that it would accept an anti-Austro-Hungarian political course but not an anti-Ottoman one. This was clearly pointed out by the French Government to the Bulgarian Premier Geshov: France’s aims in the East were to preserve both the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the political status quo in the Balkans.

It must be said that France’s policy of good and very friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire dated back even in 1535 when the French Government concluded the first bilateral arrangement with the Ottoman Sultan and Porte (government).[62] During the preparations for the 1912−1913 Balkan Wars, the French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré visited the Russian Emperor in St. Petersburg in August 1912, he remarked that the Balkan League of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece was not welcomed by France since it was designed as the anti-Ottoman military-political coalition.[63]

The main reason for the French animosity toward the Balkan League was the French apprehension that such kind of a military-political bloc would be under Russian political control and finally be used against French economic and political interests in the Balkans. Especially the article of the 1912 contract between Serbia and Bulgaria on the arbitrary role of the Russian Emperor Nicolas II in the case of the Serbian-Bulgarian controversy over the division of Macedonia made Paris suspicious of the conception of any form of the Balkan countries’ cooperation. In other words, the Balkan League of 1912 was seen by France as a military-political alliance under the Russian patronage, which would be used by the Russian Emperor to assist Russia in gaining the Straits and Constantinople. Therefore, the French administration did not give Bulgaria a state loan in the autumn of 1912, being afraid that this loan (180 million francs) would be used for the purpose of changing the Balkan status quo, i.e., for the war against the Ottoman Empire[64] that is unambiguously accented in the political-diplomatic memoirs of Raymond Poincaré.[65] The French press, like the Parisian Figaro, shared his opinion as well. However, when the Balkan countries had already defeated the Ottoman Empire in the spring of 1913, French diplomacy tried to cooperate with Russia in order to transform the alliance into a military bloc against the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.[66]

The British policy of the balance of power in Europe and the Balkans

The British Balkan policy, like the French one followed essentially its own economic interest in the region. The financial capital from the United Kingdom was present in each of the Balkan states, but was especially influential in the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the 20^th century, the British merchants controlled the biggest portion of the Ottoman export-import trade.[67] For instance, 35% of the total Ottoman imports came from the United Kingdom. The British entrepreneurs showed particular interest in dealing with the exploitation of the Ottoman oilfields in the Middle East. For example, the Anglo-Persian Company with the Shell company had around 75% of investment in the Turkish Petroleum Company which had a monopoly to exploit the petrol in the Ottoman Empire. A similar situation was in regard to the Ottoman cotton trade which was predominantly in British hands. Henceforth, the Persian Gulf was considered by British businessmen as the terrain of the first priority for Great Britain’s economic as well political strategy towards the Ottoman Empire. However, a similar interest in the Gulf showed, and Russia, which was a military-political ally of the United Kingdom. The Russian-British competitions over the Persian and the Ottoman oilfields and other natural wealth were temporarily settled by the agreement on spheres of influence between St. Petersburg and London in 1907. According to this agreement, the Persian territory was divided into the northern Russian and the south-eastern British spheres of economic and political influence. Nevertheless, the principal territory (central part of Persia) as an apple of discord between Russia and the United Kingdom, was left undivided. The Russian line of influence ran from the River Heri-Rud on the East to the city of Jäsd in the South and finally to the southern Kurdistan on the West. The British demarcation stripe of the sphere of influence in Persia ran from the town of Burudschänd on the North-East to the city of Kirman on the West and finished in the seaport of Bändär Abbas on the South.[68]

For the United Kingdom, the Persian Gulf had an additional point of importance, as in this region, the Baghdad-Basra railway line had to end. Thus, in order to enlarge its own territory of the protectorate in the area of the Persian Gulf, the British foreign policy endeavored to tear off the land of Kuwait from the Ottoman Empire and to create a semi-independent Kuwait state under British patronage. The first phase of this plan was successfully accomplished in 1899, while the second one was realized in 1913, i.e., during the Balkan Wars.[69] There are indications in historical sources that the Ottoman Empire was forced to hand over the territory of Kuwait in 1913 to Great Britain’s protectorate in order to obtain British support iregarding the question of Albania, a province of the Ottoman Empire which was at that time under Serbia’s and Greece’s military occupation. The British diplomatic strategy considered its influence in the Persian Gulf as a counterbalance to the Austro-Italian influence in Albania and the Otranto Strait. It is not out of the question that, in fact, the British ruling establishment required the London Conference of ambassadors upon Albania to obtain the British protectorate over Kuwait in exchange for the Austro-Hungarian and Italian protectorate over de iure Albanian independent state, which should be recognized after the 1912−1913 Balkan Wars.[70]

The political influence of British diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire was maintained through many British officers and representatives who worked in different sectors of the Ottoman state’s offices and organizations. The Bretons became in the first place influential in the Ottoman ministries and in the first place as employed advisors within the different sectors of the Government.

The British financial capital gradually became more and more present in the economic life of Serbia during and after the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian “Customs War” of 1906−1911. The British financiers were interested in the building of the projected Adriatic railway line to connect Belgrade with the Adriatic Sea. According to the construction scheme, its one branch would run via Serbia to the Danube and the Black Sea, while another one would connect Albania with Salonica and Istanbul. The crucial portion of the British trade with Albania, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro was held by the brothers Begston’s Balkan Committee. However, the policy of the Balkan Committee was to obtain an autonomous status for Macedonia and Albania inside the Ottoman Empire in order to provide better conditions for the investment of its capital in this area.[71]

The British foreign policy toward the Ottoman Empire and South-East Europe was incorporated into the general British policy toward European affairs. This policy supported the idea of maintaining the “European balance of powers”. Due to this policy, the Ottoman Empire was protecting its own territorial integrity for decades. Great Britain, likewise France, preferred to keep alive the “Sick Man on the Bosphorus” for the very reason not to allow Russia to take advantage of the Ottoman Empire’s disintegration and to establish its protectorate over the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.[72] Actually, the United Kingdom was the principal opponent to the Russian conception of creating one united great Slavic Balkan state under its patronage. However, after the 1908 pro-German Young Turk Revolution in Istanbul[73] and from the same year, the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina,[74] the Bretons started to closer co-operate with Russia and France in the Balkan affairs. The purpose of this partnership was to prevent further penetration of the Germanic “Drang nach Osten” in South-East Europe and the Near East. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Grey launched an idea of the Balkan coalition in the following years as a barrier to the Habsburg deeper penetration into the Balkans.[75] The British diplomacy worked to include Greece into the coalition in order to pursue its own influence on the Balkan League. At the same time, Greece would make the alliance which would be unable to become subjugated to the Russian Balkan policy.[76]

Russia’s drive towards the Straits

Russia’s financial influence in the economies of the Balkan states at the turn of the 20^th century, compared with the German, the Austrian-Hungarian, the Italian, the British, and the French influence, was notably lesser. Moreover, the Russian financial influence on the Ottoman economic life was almost non-existent. The trade exchange between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was underdeveloped. In addition, unlike the other members of the European Great Powers, Russia did not have a single concession for the construction of any railway line in the Ottoman Empire. However, the presence of Russian financial capital gradually increased in Bulgaria and Serbia after the 1878 Berlin Congress. However, the Russian entrepreneurs did not succeed in getting a very important railway building concession for the lines Sophia−Ruse and the River Danube to the Adriatic Sea. It was so far the most relevant indicator that Russia was losing its political-economic positions in South-East Europe, primarily on behalf of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.

The Russian capital set foot in Serbia in 1867 when Serbia’s government of Prince Mihailo (Michael) Obrenović took the first state loan from Russia. The loan was engaged in Serbia’s military preparation for the war against the Ottoman Empire. The principal nature of this loan was a political one but not an economic. This case with the Russian loan indicated that the Principality of Serbia at that time intended to tie its political destiny to the upcoming events with Russia.[77] It clearly shows two diplomatic missions by Serbia’s diplomats Jovan Marinović and Milan Petronijević in Moscow and St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1866 and spring 1867, respectively.[78] During his visit to Moscow in November 1866, J. Marinović promised the Russian government that the Russian Emperor would be informed of every diplomatic action of Serbia regarding the region of South-East Europe. In fact, Serbia’s obligation was the first condition under which the Russian imperial Government was willing to support Serbia and her foreign policy.[79] Second, Serbia’s loan from Russia was taken in 1876 again for the war preparation against the Ottoman Empire (at the time of the 1875−1878 Great Eastern Crisis). This Serbian political-economic linkage to Russia led Serbia’s Government to conclude the first trade contract with Russia in 1892.

Russia’s policy toward the Ottoman Empire was totally different in comparison with the British and French policies towards the same country. While London and Paris intended to prolong the territorial existence of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, St. Petersburg’s politicians aimed to create a new Balkan order but without the Ottoman presence in the region. In other words, according to the Russian conception of how to resolve the Balkan Question, the Ottoman Empire had to lose all of its European possessions alongside including the capital Istanbul and the Straits.[80] Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles, all of them the parts of the territory of the Ottoman Empire, were for the Russian trade and navy of the principal importance. Consequently, the first goal of the Russian foreign policy was to obtain control over these three geostrategic objects of interest. The Russians believed that this idea could be realized only in the case if Istanbul (Constantinople) and the Straits were under direct Russian administration or at least a protectorate. Shortly, according to the Russian concept of rearranged Balkan affairs, the place for the Ottoman Empire was reserved only in Asia Minor, but not in South-East Europe.[81] Control over the Straits with Constantinople became a real Russian historical myth.[82] The Russians were especially scared that Germany would occupy the Straits in the case of the Ottoman territorial disintegration. According to the Russian opinion, in this case, the entire economic life of South Russia would be tutored by Germany.[83] The Straits were important for the Russian economy because they connected the Russian Black Sea’s trade with the Mediterranean and the Far East’s markets. In addition, the Straits were the principal overseas ties between the Russian Baltic Sea’s possessions and the southern lands of the Russian Empire. Russia’s export of corn from the territory of present-day Ukraine and Russia’s oil from the Caucasus highly depended on the free passage through the Straits and the Sea of Marmara.[84]

The Russian diplomacy found that the best way to obtain Russia’s protectorate over the Straits and the Sea of Marmara was to support the liberation movement of the Balkan Orthodox Slavs against the Ottoman authority. Finally, independent Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, but under the Russian protectorate, should provide a Russian exit to the Mediterranean Sea.[85] This political task was hidden under the policy of pan-Slavic solidarity, as Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, pointed out in 1914.[86] Because of the meaningfulness of the Straits for the Russian economic and political strategy, the Balkans had the first importance in the Russian foreign policy. This region was considered more significant in comparison to the rest of Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. In addition, the Byzantine Constantinople (the Ottoman Istanbul) was considered by the Russian Emperors since the time of Ivan the Terrible (in power 1533−1584)[87] as a spiritual center of the Russian and the Orthodox culture and civilization (as the Third Rome).[88] The Bosphorus and Dardanelles were of the same importance for Russia as it was for Albania for Italy or the Persian Gulf for the United Kingdom.

The main Russian opponent in the Balkans was the Habsburg Monarchy (from 1867 the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary) since the first Russo-Ottoman War in 1677−1681. The struggle between these two European Great Powers over the spheres of influence in South-East Europe was only temporarily settled in 1782 when the Russian Empress Catherine the Great and the Austrian Emperor Joseph II divided the Balkans into the Russian and the Habsburg spheres of influence. The line of division, in this case, ran from Belgrade to the Adriatic Sea. The territories eastward from this line belonged to the Russian zone of the protectorate, while the lands westward from the line went to the Austrian area of patronage. In fact, the Serbian lands were shared between Russia and Austria, while present-day Albania was given to Russia. It was the first and the only example that Austria agreed to renounce the claim over the territory of Albania and to cede it to Russia. The Russian imperial navy started to implement this agreement by the occupation of the Ionian Islands in 1799. This military action was designed as an overture for the later Russian deeper penetration into the East Balkans, exactly via the territory of Albania.[89] However, during the whole 19^th century, the territory of Albania was under the Austrian sphere of interest but not the Russian one. Moreover, the Russian diplomacy signed two agreements with the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary regarding the Balkan status quo in 1897 and 1903. Accordingly, the territory of present-day Albania, with West Macedonia and Kosovo-Metochia, was recognized as the Austrian-Hungarian area of patronage.[90] The importance of Albania for the Russian foreign policy emerged again during the Serbian-Greek military occupation of the present-day territory of Albania in 1912−1913, as a part of the Ottoman Empire. At that time, only Russia supported Serbia and Greece in their policy against the independence of Albania, while all other members of the European Great Powers opposed the Russian plan to divide Albania into two parts. At the same time, during the Albanian crisis, a significant number of the Muslim inhabitants of Albania expressed their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. The Russian intention to divide Albania between Serbia and Greece in 1913 was, in fact, the compensation to Belgrade and Athens for Russia’s design to give to Bulgaria great territorial concessions in Macedonia and Thrace. Additionally, the Russian diplomacy had an idea in 1914−1915 to unite Serbia with Montenegro, Kosovo-Metochia, Dalmatia, North Albania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina into a single federal state of the Serbian nation.[91] This idea was alive during the time of the creation of the Balkan League in 1912 and its the main protagonist became the Russian ambassador to Serbia N. Hartvig.[92] However, during the 1912−1913 Balkan Wars, the ultimate Russian ceding of Albania to Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1913 occurred under the Emperor’s deep conviction that the Albanian Question would provoke the Third Balkan War, which, for Russia, was not prepared at that moment. Albania was seen in the conception of the Russian foreign policy in the Balkans as the territory which should thwart the Italian and the Habsburg penetration in the direction towards the Straits[93], and Constantinople, where “the keys of the Russian home had been.”[94]

Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirović

Ex-University Professor

Vilnius, Lithuania

Research Fellow at the Center for Geostrategic Studies

Belgrade, Serbia

www.geostrategy.rs

sotirovic1967@gmail.com

© Vladislav B. Sotirović 2025

References:

[1] On the German unification in 1871, see in [Darmstaedter F., Bismarck and the Creation of the Second German Reich, London, 1948; Pflanze O., Bismark and the Development of Germany. Volume I: The Period of Unification, 1815−1871, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962; Medlicott E., Bismarck and Modern Germany, Mystic, Conn., 1965; Pflanze O., (ed.), The Unification of Germany, 1848−1871, New York: University of Minnesota, 1969; Rodes J. E., The Quest for Unity. Modern Germany 1848−1970, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971; Michael J., The Unification of Germany, London−New York: Routledge, 1996; Williamson G. D., Bismarck and Germany, 1862−1890, New York: Routledge, 2011; Headlam J., Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire, Didactic Press, 2013].

[2] Paul Rorbach became the most influential German proponent of the creation of the great German overseas empire. He was writing that creation of a great German empire in the world cannot be fulfilled without the great world war, i.e. without “the blood and the lead”. About the concept and practice of colonialism, see in [Berger S., (ed.), A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe 1789‒1914, Malden, MA‒Oxford, UK‒Carlton, Australia: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, 432‒447].

[3] On the creation of the mass nationalism in Germany, see in [Mosse G. L, The Nationalization of the Masses: Political symbolism and mass movements in Germany from the Napoleonic wars through the Third Reich, Ithaca, NY: Cornel University Press, 1991].

[4] Kautsky K., Comment s’est déclanchée la guerre mondiale, Paris, 1921, 21. Attempts to reach disarmament by some kind of international agreement and/or treaty began at the Conferences of The Hague in 1899 and 1907. However, both of them ended without any significant result [Palmowski J., A Dictionary of Twentieth-Century World History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 171].

[5] On the foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire at the eve of the Great War in the context of political domination over the country, see in [Готлиб В. В., Тайная дипломатия во время первой мировой войны, Москва, 1960].

[6] On the penetration of the German financial capital in the Ottoman Balkans in the first decade of the 20^th century, see in [Вендел Х., Борба Југословена за слободу и јединство, Београд, 1925, 553−572].

[7] On the German geopolitical concept of Mitteleuropa, see in [Naumann F., Mitteleuropa, Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1915; Meyer C. H., Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815−1945, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955; Katzenstein J. P., Mitteleuropa: Between Europe and Germany, Berghahn Books, 1997; Lehmann G., Mitteleuropa, Mecklemburg: Mecklemburger Buchverlag, 2009].

[8] In 1878, the Berlin Congress, where the Great European Powers redraw the political map of South-East Europe after the Great Eastern Crisis and the 1877‒1878 Russo-Ottoman War, placed the Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the administration of Austria-Hungary (which annexed it in 1908) and recognized an independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro while tributary Principality of Bulgaria received an autonomous status. Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania got territorial enlargements at the expense of the Ottoman Empire [Ference C. G. (ed.), Chronology of 20^th-Century Eastern European History, Detroit‒Washington, D. C.‒London: Gale Research Inc., 1994, 393].

[9] Hobus G., Wirtschaft und Staat im südosteuropäischen Raum 1908−1914, München, 1934, 139−151.

[10] Архив Србије, Министарство Иностраних Дела Србије, Политичко Одељење, 1898, Ф-IV, Д-I, поверљиво, № 962, “Српско посланство у Петрограду – Ђорђевићу”, Петроград, April 18^th [old style], 1898.

[11] The German Prime Minister (Kanzellar) stated during the crisis upon the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 that the German Balkan policy will strictly follow the Austro-Hungarian interests in the region.

[12] Алексић-Пејковић Љ., Односи Србије са Француском и Енглеском 1903−1914, Београд, 1965, 35−42.

[13] Жебокрицкий В. А., Бьлгария накануне балканских войн 1912−1913 гг., Кийев 1960, 59−61.

[14] Huldermann V., La Vie d’Albert Ballin, Payot, Paris, 1923, 207−213; Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871−1914, Vol. XXXIV, № 13428, № 12926, Berlin, 1926. About the Serbian endeavor to create the Balkan Alliance in the mid-19^th century, see in [Пироћанац М. С., Међународни положај Србије, Београд, 1893; Пироћанац М. С., Кнез Михаило и заједнићка радња балканских народа, Београд, 1895].

[15] Pribram A. F., Die politischen Geheimverträge Österreich–Ungarns 1879−1914, Wien−Leipzig, 1920; Преписка о арбанаским насиљима, Службено издање, Београд, 1899; Documents diplomatiques français, Vol. II, Paris, 1931; Архив министарства иностраних дела, Извештај из Цариграда од 25.-ог септембра, 1902, Београд; Ilyrisch-albanische Forschungen, Vol. I, 1916, 380−390; Neue Freie Presse, 02−04−1903; British documents on the Origins of the War, 1899−1914, Vol. V, London, 68−72.  

[16] About the Italian unification and the Habsburg Monarchy, see in [Rene A. C., Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini, New York: Columbia University Press, 1962; Delzell C. F. (ed.), The Unification of Italy, 1859−1861. Cavour, Mazzini or Garibaldi?, New York, 1965; Beales D., The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy, London, 1981; Hearder H., Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1790−1870, London, 1983; Smith D. M., Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict, Cambridge, 1985; Coppa F., The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence, London, 1992; Smith D. M., Mazzini, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994; Lucy R., The Italian Risorgimento. State, Society and National Unification, London−New York: Routledge, 1994; Beales D., Biagini F. E., The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy, London-New York: Routledge, 2002; Riall L., Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero, New Haven−London: Yale University Press, 2008; Riall L., Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation State, New York−London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; Clark M., The Italian Risorgimento, London−New York: Routledge, 2013].

[17] Taylor J. P. A., Habsburgų monarchija 1809‒1918: Austrijos imperijos ir Austrijos-Vengrijos istorija, Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos institutas, 1999, 167‒181. Austria-Hungary was a dual monarchy from 1867 to 1918 composed by the Austrian part and the Hungarian part in which each of these two countries had complete control over their own internal affairs. However, they have been linked by a Council of Ministers responsible for common affairs, and by the ruling dynasty coming from the House of Habsburgs. A common ruler was at the same time both the Emperor of Austria and the King of Hungary [Palmowski J., A Dictionary of Contemporary World History from 1900 to the Present Day, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 40]. About the transition to constitutional Government of the Austrian Empire from 1860 to 1867, see in [Kann A. R., A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526−1918, Berkeley−Los Angeles−London: University of California Press, 1980, 326−342]. On Aussgleich, see in [Рокаи П. и други, Историја Мађара, Београд: CLIO, 2002, 460−471].

[18] Hobus G., Wirtschaft und Staat im südosteuropäischen Raum 1908−1914, München, 1934, 24−27. On this issue, see more in [Williamson R. S., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, Bedford−St Martins, 1991; Hanebrink P., Gero A., Gaspar Zs., The Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, 1867−1918, New Holland Publishers Uk Ltd, 2009]. 

[19] As a part of the policy of the Italian economic, financial, and political penetration into the Balkans, the Italian Government established in 1900 the Department of the Albanian Language and Literature in the Instituto Orientale (Oriental Institute) in Naples [Ference C. G. (ed.), Chronology of 20^th-Century Eastern European History, Detroit‒Washington, D. C.‒London: Gale Research Inc., 1994, 4].

[20] Стенографске белешке Народне скупштине Србије 1881; Јакшић Г., Из новије српске историје. Абдикација краља Милана и друге расправе, Београд, 1953, 70−142; Збирка закона, уговора и погодаба о српским зајмовима (од 9. авг. 1876. до 11. јан. 1899), Београд, 1899, 603−630; Карлсбадски аранжман и страна контрола у Србији, Београд, 1908; Недељковић М., Историја српских државних дугова, Београд, 1909, 157−172; Јовановић С., Влада Александра Обреновића I (1889−1897), Београд, 1929, 315−318.   

[21] British Documents on the Origins of the War. 1899−1914, Vol. V, 157−170; Стенографске белешке Народне скупштине Србије 1906, 250−270; Стенографске белешке Народне скупштине Србије 1905−1906, књ. III, 1350−1410; Jugoslaviens Entstehung, Amaltthea Verlag, 1929; Дело, XXXI, Београд, 1904. Аbout the Serbian trade dependence on the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, see more in [Ђорђевић Д., Царински рат између Србије и Аустро-Угарске 1906−1911, Београд, 1962]. On Serbia’s state’s loans, see more in [Недељковић М., Историја српских државних дугова, Београд, 1909].

[22] At the Berlin Congress (June 13^th,‒July 13^th, 1878) the representatives of the twelve European states tremendously redesigned the 1878 San Stefano Peace Treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire (March 3^rd) [Pasaulio istorijos atlasas: Mokymo priemonė, Vilnius: Naujoji Rosma, 2001, 190]. According to the Congress’ final accords, one can say that the main winner became the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, while the principal loser was Russia.

[23] The most important articles of the Secret Convention are № 2 and № 4. About the Convention, see in [Јакшић Г., “Историја једне конвенције”, Архив за правне и друштвене науке, Београд, 1924].

[24] About the Bulgarian history from the 1878 Berlin Congress to the end of WWI when Bulgaria was within the political, economic, and financial spheres of influence by Germany and Austria-Hungary, see in [Crampton J. R., A Concise History of Bulgaria, Second Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 85‒143].

[25] Živko Avramovski, Ratni ciljevi Bugarske i Centralne sile 1914−1918, Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1985, 99−172.

[26] About that time of Romania’s history, see in [Treptow W. K. (ed.), A History of Romania, Iaşi: The Center for Romanian Studies−The Romanian Cultural Foundation, 1996, 351−363].

[27] Вучо Н., Привредна историја народа ФНРЈ до првог светског рата, Београд, 1948, 260−271.

[28] Feldmarschall Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906−1918, Vol. III, Leipzig− München, 1922, 558.

[29] Di Scala M. S., Italija nuo revolucijos iki respublikos: Nuo 1700‒jų iki šių dienų, Vilnius: Tvermė, 1998, 167.

[30] About this period of Albanian history, see in [Frucht R. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Eastern Europe from the Congress of Vienna to the Fall of Communism, New York‒London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2000, 9‒11; Бартл П., Албанци од Средњег века до данас, Београд: CLIO, 2001, 92−161].

[31] About the concept, functioning models, and different types of diplomacy in international relations, see in [Chatterjee Ch., International Law and Diplomacy, London‒New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2007: Cooper F. A. et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2015].

[32] According to Berhard Singer, a member of Vienna’s trade chamber.

[33] On this issue, see in [Ђорђевић Р. М., Србија у устанку 1804−1813, Београд: Рад, 1979].

[34] About old and new controversies on the causes of WWI, see in [Бјелајац М., 1914−2014: Зашто ревизија? Старе и нове контроверзе о узроцима Првог светског рата, Београд: Медија центар „Одбрана“, 2014].

[35] Стефановић Караџић В., “Срби сви и свуда”, Ковчежић за историју, језик и обичаје Срба сва три закона, У штампарији Јерменског манастира, 1, Беч, 1849, 1−27; Гaрашанин И., Начертаније, Београд, 1844 (secret manuscript); Чубриловић В., Историја политичке мисли у Србији XIX века, Бeоград, 1958, 90−95. On this issue, see more in [Љушић Р., Књига о Начертанију. Национални и државни програм Кнежевине Србије (1844), Београд: БИГЗ, 1993; Sotirović B. V., Srpski komonvelt: Lingvistički model definisanja srpske nacije Vuka Stefanovića Karadžića i projekat Ilije Garašanina o stvaranju lingvistički određene države Srba, Viljnus: Štamparija Pedagoškog univerziteta u Viljnusu, 2011]. On the road to the First World War, see in [Clark Ch., The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2012; MacMillan M., The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914, New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 2013]. On Serbia’s war aims in 1914, see in [Екмечић М., Ратни циљеви Србије 1914, Београд: Просвета, 1990].

[36] Потемкин В. П. (уредник), Историја дипломатије, књ. 2, Београд, 1949, 163−164.

[37] Pribram A. F., Die politischen Geheimverträge Österreich-Ungarns 1879−1914, ester Band, Wien, 1920, 267−275.

[38] Архив српског посланства у Паризу, Извештај из Беча, 28. I 1914, број 19; Die Grosse Politik, XXXVII, 738−740; Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus, I, 95, II, 155−156, 257.

[39] On the unification of Italy, see in [Darby G., The Unification of Italy, Second Edition, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013]. The unification of Italy was a long and complex effort against the Habsburg occupiers, local Italian monarchs with the medieval origins (for instance, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies or the Duchy of Modena), and against the Vatican conservatism. The idea of unification was driven by a sense that Italy needed a modern, united democratic state in order to pull her into the modern Western world [Marr A., A History of the World, London: Macmillan, 2012, 404]. Italy was historically marked by fundamental regional divisions, tensions, conflicts, and wars. The political and economic tensions survived and after the unification in the 1960s now between the southern and the northern regions of Italy. North Italy, especially Lombardy, experienced strong industrialization after the unification which led this part of Italy to be the leading and wealthiest areas of the country and one of the wealthiest regions in Europe at the end of the last century. However, by contrast, South Italy was dominated by a share-cropping system that kept the majority of the population as landless workers who have been employed by a tiny number of large landowners. One of the central elements in the Italian politics from the unification to the conclusion of the Lateran Treaties in 1929 was the relationship between the secular authorities on one hand and the Roman Catholic Church (Vatican) on another. After the unification of Italy, in which the Vatican lost its own state and huge territories, the Pope forbade until 1918 all Roman Catholics to participate in the functioning of a new liberal Italian secular state [Palmowski J., A Dictionary of Twentieth-Century World History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 302‒303]. In essence, the Italians ultimately could not build Italianess identity based on the Roman Catholicism for the very reason that the Pope and Vatican were very hostile to the Italian national movement (Risorgimento). The fractured nature of the Italian society, the strong linguistic diversity and regionalist identities followed by massive social conflict, and a poor education system participated as the factors which made the Italian nation a rather volatile and problematic project to be realized even up today [Berger S., (ed.), A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe 1789‒1914, Malden, MA‒Oxford, UK‒Carlton, Australia: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, 179].

[40] On the history of Ancient Rome, see in [Zoch A. P., Ancient Rome: An Introductory History, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998; Gibbon E., The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, London: Penguin Books, 2001: Beard M., SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome, New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2015; Baker S., Ancient Rome: The Rise and Fall of an Empire, London: BBC Books, 2007].

[41] On the issue of the Italian colonialism and imperialism after the unification in 1861/1866, see in [Negash T., Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882−1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact, Coronet Books Inc, 1987; Ben-Ghiat R., Fuller M. (eds.), Italian Colonialism, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005; Duncan D, Andall J., Italian Colonialism: Legacy and Memory, Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 2005; Andall J., Duncan D., (eds.), Italian Colonialism: Legacy and Memory, Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 2005; Finaldi M. G., Italian National Identity in the Scramble for Africa: Italy’s African Wars in the Era of National-Building, 1870−1900, Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 2009; Finaldi M. G., A History of Italian Colonialism, 1860−1907: Europe’s Last Empire, London−New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2017].

[42] O’Sullivan F., The Egnatian Way, Stackpole Books, 1972.

[43] See the map in [Motta G. (Direzione cartografica), Atlante Storico, Novara, Instituto Geografico de Agostini, 1979, 28]. The another project of the railway-line in the Balkans was the Adriatic railway-road favored by Serbia but not supported either by Austria-Hungary or Italy and Bulgaria [Ратковић Б., Ђуришић М., Скоко С., Србија и Црна Гора у Балканским ратовима 1912−1913, Друго издање, Београд: БИГЗ, 1972, 19, Ћоровић В., Односи између Србије и Аустро-Угарске у XX веку, Београд: Библиотека града Београда, 1992, 108−141].

[44] Архив Министарства иностраних дела, Београд, Извештај из Рима, 14. мај 1903, п. бр. 46; Архив Министарства иностраних дела, Извештај из Скопља, 16. XII, 1904; Архив Министарства иностраних дела, Извештај из Рима, п. бр. 31, 101; Documenti diplomatici, Macedonia, Roma, 1906, 151−179, 280−292; Pavolni J. V., Le problème macédonien et sa solution, Paris, 1903, 42−45; British documents on the Origins of the War, 1899−1914, Vol. V, 71. 

[45] Beehler H. W. C., The History of the Italian-Turkish War: September 29, 1911 to October 18th, 1912, Annapolis, MD, 1913.

[46] Ђуришић М., Први балкански рат 1912−1913, том III, Београд, 8−9; Јовановић Ј. М., “На двору црногорском, поводом успомена барона Гизла”, Записи, бр. II/1, 10−13; Ракочевић Н., Политички односи Црне Горе и Србије 1903−1918, Цетиње, 1918.

[47] About the concept of irredentism and its role in European politics, see in [Kornprobst M., Irredentism in European Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008].

[48] Pribram A. F., Die politischen Geheimverträge Österreich–Ungarns 1879−1914, ester Band Wien, 1920, 267−268; Feldmarschall Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906−1918, Vol. III, Leipzig−München, 1922, 171.

[49] Дедијер В., Сарајево 1914, Београд, 1966, 245; Дипломатски архив, Пресбиро, Београд, италијанска штампа, јун 1913.

[50] The territory of North Epirus was a part of the project of a Great Idea – the creation of a unified national state of the Greeks. About nation building and the project of Great Idea, see in [Clogg R., A Concise History of Greece, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 47−99]. However, the Albanians as well as pretended on North Epirus as their ethnographic region that was for the first time clearly expressed by the First Prizren League in June 1878 when for the first time in the Albanian history the project of a Greater Albania was proclaimed [Бартл П., Албанци од Средњег века до данас, Београд: CLIO, 2001, 94−102].

[51] The Balkan League was formed in March 1912 when Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro signed bilateral agreements. Their first demand was far-reaching reforms for those territories still under the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and then, when these were not met, declared war [Pagden A., World at War: The 2,500-Year Struggle Between East and West, Oxford‒New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 390].

[52] Nevertheless, during the 1911‒1912 Italian-Ottoman War, Italy conquered north Tripoli and later by 1914 had occupied much of Libya, declaring it as an integral part of the country in 1939 [Isaacs A. et al. (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of World History, Oxford‒New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 317].

[53] Tribuna, June 1913.

[54] On geopolitics, see in [Dodds K., Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, Harlow, England: Pearson Education Limited, 2005].

[55] Готлиб В. В., Тайная дипломатия во время первой мировой войны, Москва, 1960, 214.

[56] Pribram A. F., Die politischen Geheimverträge Österreich–Ungarns 1879−1914, Wien−Leipzig, 1920, 292−293.

[57] Lowe N., Mastering Modern World History, Fourth Edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 5‒7.

[58] Marr A., A History of the World, London: Macmillan, 2012, 439. About the colonial expansion of West European states, see in [Del Testa W. D. et al. (ed.), Global History. Cultural Encounters from Antiquity to the Present: The Age of Discovery and Colonial Expansion 1400s to 1900s, Volume Three, New York: Sharpe Reference, 2004]. On the colonial terror and genocide, see in [Naimark M. N., Genocide: A World History, Oxford‒New York, Oxford University Press, 2017, 34‒85].

[59] On the Great War, see in [Hernández J., Pirmasis pasaulinis karas, Kaunas: Obuolys, 2011].

[60] Documents diplomatiques français 1871−1914, Vol. VI−VII, Paris, 1933.

[61] About this problem, see in [Georgeon F., “L’ économie politique selon Ahmed Midhat,” Edhem E. (ed.), Première rencontre internationale sur l’Empire ottoman et la Turque moderne, Istanbul, 1991, 464−479; Inalcik H., Quataert D. (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300−1914, Cambridge, 1994; Kunelarp S., “Les Ottomans à la découverte de l’Europe: Récits de voyageurs de la fin de l’Empire”, Etudes turques et ottomans: Documents de travail, theme issue on “Voyageurs et diplomates ottomans,” № 4, December 1995, 51−58].

[62] Поповић В., Источно питање, Беогрaд, 1928, 56.

[63] Renuvin P., Evropska kriza i prvi svetski rat, Zagreb, 1965, 144. See also [August T., The Selling of the Empire: British and French Imperialist Propaganda, 1890−1940, Westport, 1985].

[64] Балканската война или pуската оранжева книга, София, doc. № 11, 8 (The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ diplomatic documents about the Balkans from August 1912 to July 1913).

[65] Poincaré R., Les Balkans en feu, Paris, 1923, 33. About the same issue, see more in [Becker J. J., The Great War and the French People, Leamington Spa, 1985].

[66] Documents diplomatiques français, Vol. VI, doc. № 229. About this problem, see more in [Jelavich B., A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814−1914, Philadelphia, 1964; Thaden E., Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912, University Park Pennsylvania, 1965; Jelavich B., Russia’s Balkan Entanglement, 1806−1914, Cambridge, 1991; Геллер М., История Российской империи, Vol. III, Москва, 1997].

[67] Taylor A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1849−1918, Oxford, 1954, 504.

[68] Westermann Großer Atlas zur Weltgeschichte, Braunschweig, 1985, 134.

[69] Palmowski J., A Dictionary of Contemporary World History from 1900 to the Present Day, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 358.

[70] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangès, Corrèspondence politique, Turquie, Guerres balkaniques, Conférence de Londres; Decision of the Ambassadors’ Conference, Nov. 9, 1921, Simmonard A., Essai sur l’independence Albanaise, Paris, 1942; Commission Internationale de délimination des frontières de l’Albanie. Frontière Serbo-Croato-Slovene-Albanese. Protocole de delimitation, Florence, 1926. This question has been dealt more extensively, in [Puto A., Albanian Independence and the Diplomacy of the Great Powers 1912−1914, Tirana, 1978; Puto A., The Albanian Question in the International Acts of the Period of Imperialism, 1912−1918, Vol. I−II, Tirana, 1987].

[71] Балканската война или pуската оранжева книга, София, doc. № 11, 18−21 (The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ diplomatic documents about the Balkans from August 1912 to July 1913).

[72] Taylor A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1849−1918, Oxford, 1954, 504−506; Janković B., The Balkans in International Relations, Hong Kong, 1988, 89−119. About the same issue, see more in [Rossos A., Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy, 1908−1914, Toronto, 1981].

[73] On the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, see in [Lévt-Aksu N., Georgeon F., (eds.), The Young Turk Revolution and the Ottoman Empire: The Aftermath of 1908, London−New York: I.B.Tauras, 2017].

[74] On the British perspectives about the 1908−1909 Annexation Crisis, see in [Demirci S., British Public Opinion Towards the Ottoman Empire During the Two Crisis: Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908−1909) and the Balkan Wars (1912−1913), Gorgias Pr Llc, 2010].

[75] Thaden E., Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912, University Park Pennsylvania, 1965, 120. About the same issue, see in [Taylor A. J. P., The Habsburg Monarchy1809−1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary, London, 1990, 276−302, Seton-Watson R. W., Britain in Europe 1789−1914.

[76] British documents on the Origins of the War, 1899−1914, Vol. IX, doc. № 461; Drosos D., La Fondation de l’ Alliance Balkanique, Athenes, 1929.

[77] Миљковић Д., Прилози расветљавању привредних односа Србије и Русије у XIX  веку, Београд, 1956, 11−16 (documents).

[78] Дипломатски архив, Београд, Архива  Илије Гарашанина, Letter from Schtackelberg to Ignatiev, Wien, November 27, 1866. In this letter, there is a concept about the conversation between Marinović and Gorchakov; Ibid., Писмо Гарашанина Ристићу, Београд, 11. децембар, 1866; Ibid., Мариновић J., “Питање о градовима”; Haus-Hof und Staats-Archiv, Wien, Letter from Beist to Prokresch, Vienna, December 20, 1866; Ibid., Marinović’s papers, Letter from Prince Mihailo to Bismarck, Belgrade, October 24, 1866; Дипломатски архив, Београд, Архива Јована Ристића, Писмо Гарашанина Ристићу, Београд, фебруар 1867; Ibid., Писмо Гарашанина Ристићу, Београд, 11. мај 1867; Дипломатски архив, Београд, Архива  Илије Гарашанина, Писмо Гарашанина Ристићу, Београд, 11. мај 1867, концепт; Ibid., Писмо Гарашанина Петронијевићу, Београд, 20. мај, 1867, концепт; Дипломатски архив, Београд, Записник седница од 31. маја 1867; Ристић Ј., Последња година спољашње политике кнеза Михаила, Београд, 1895, (memoires), 15, 45; Ловчевић С. (уредник), Писма Илије Гарашанина Јовану Мариновићу, Зборник САНУ, том II, № XXII, Београд, 1931.

[79] Дипломатски архив, Београд, Политички односи, Писмо Мариновића Горчакову, Београд, 17. фебруар, 1867, концепт; Ibid., Letter from Stremoukov to Marinović, St. Petersburg, February 9, 1867; Дипломатски архив, Београд, Хартије Јована Мариновића, Letter from Shishkin to Marinović, Belgrade, March 1867.

[80] On this issue, see the conversation between the representative of the French ministry of foreign affairs, Maurice Paléologue, with the Russian ambassador to France, Izvolsky in [Taylor A. J. P., Taylor A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1849−1918, Oxford, 1954, 505; Paléologue M., An Ambassador’s Memoirs, London, 1923].

[81] About this issue, see more in [Taylor A. J. P., “The War Aims of the Allies in the First World War”, Pares R., Taylor A. J. P. (eds.), Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier, London, 1956; Balsover G. H., “Aspects of Russian Foreign Policy, 1815−1914”, Pares R., Taylor A. J. P. (eds.), Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier, London, 1956].

[82] Адамов Е. А., Константинополь и проливы по секретным документам б. Министерства иностранных дел, Москва, 1926.

[83] Report by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov to the Russian Emperor, Nicholas II, December 1913.

[84] The Russian economy enormously suffered when during the 1911−1912 Italo-Ottoman war the Ottoman authorities closed the Straits only for two weeks in April 1912.

[85] Gottlieb W. W., Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War, London, 1957, 148−162. On this issue, see more in [Дякин В. С., Русская буржуазия и царизм в годы первой мировой войны (1914−1917), Ленинград, 1967; Покровский М. Н., Царская Россия и война, Москва, 1924; “Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus”, II, 7 II, № 493]. Winston Churchill stated during the first months of the First World War that the Russian soldiers will fight bravely only if the Straits would be the task of their victory.

[86] Sazonov S., Les années fatales, Paris, 1927.

[87] On the reign of Ivan the Terrible, see in [Anisimov J., Rusijos istorija nuo Riuriko iki Putino: Žmonės. Įvykiai. Datos, Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos centras, 2014, 131−146].

[88] On this question, see in [Mango C., Byzantium and its Image, London, 1984; Mango C., Byzantium The Empire of New Rome, New York, 1982; Shevchenko I., Ideology, Letters and Culture in the Byzantine World, especially “Constantinople viewed from the eastern provinces” and “Byzantium and the eastern Slavs after 1453”, London, 1972; Johnson R. M., The Third Rome: Holy Russia, Tsarism and Orthodoxy, The Foundation for Economic Liberty, Inc., 2004].

[89] More about the Eastern Question in the 18^th century, see in [Sorel A., La question d’orient au XVIIIe siècle, Paris, 1889; Driault E., La question depuis ses origines jusqu’a nos jours, Paris, 1898]. About a geopolitical character of the Eastern Question and Russia, see in [Перишић С., Нова геополитика Русије, Београд: Медија центар Одбрана, 2015, 56−60].

[90] Хвостов В. М., История дипломатии, II, Москва, 1963, 345−351; Динев А., Илинденската епопеја, II, Скопје, 1949, 5−10.

[91] Дипломатски архив, Београд, Извештај министарства спољних послова Србије војној врховној команди, телеграф послат из Ваљева 3. октобра 1914. г., документ бр. 5714; Архив Југославије, Београд, Фонд Јоце Јовановића Пижона, Дневници Ј. Ј. Пижона, кутија бр. 54, документ бр. 247. On the Russian diplomacy during the First World War, see in [Трубецки Н. Г., Рат на Балкану 1914−1917. и руска дипломатија, Београд: Просвета, 1994 (memoires)].

[92] Международние отношения в епоху империализма. Документы из архивов царского и временого правителъства 1878−1917, том XX, Москва, 1938,  Report by the Russian representative in Belgrade from September 20, 1912; Балканската война или pуската оранжева книга, Софиа, doc. № 36, 19−20 (the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ diplomatic documents about the Balkans from August 1912 to July 1913).

[93] On this issue, see in [Проект захвата Босфора в 1896 г., Красный Архив, том IV−V, (XLVII–XLVIII), Москва−Ленинград, 1931; Хвостов В. М., История дипломатии, том II, Москва, 1963].

[94] Покровский М. Н., Царская Россия и война, Москва, 1924.