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From Beethoven to Rammstein: How Germany fell out of love with optimism

The German state was built on optimism. Today it is consumed with pessimism and by extrapolation, all of Europe is also.




A region’s most powerful country generally shapes the entire region’s culture. In the age of hegemonic American globalism, this has generally tended to mean that much of the world has become Americanised. These trends however are slowly being scaled back as multi-polarity is allowing the renewed super-powers as well as important regional powers to put their stamp on the identities of their respective spheres of influence.

Typically a country must form before it is able to identify, solidify and export its culture (whether by force or by broad influence). This has certainly been the case with America.

But 19th century Europe was a different story. At the dawn of the 19th century, France was the most powerful European state militarily *, yet a new rising culture was coming to dominate Europe, although for most of the 19th century, it was not represented by a united state.

German culture throughout the 19th century became Europe’s unquestionably dominant political force. German culture was teeming with a particularly Germanic brand of optimism for much of the century.

Beethoven’s 9th Symphony proclaimed a brotherhood of man, set to music wherein Germany helped stake its claim as the culture that would create the ‘new sound’ of European music.

Fichte, Hegel and later Marx, each spoke of an optimistic push for a better world if only certain steps could be taken.

That is indeed the essence of German optimism, the idea that one must diagnose the reason for social, spiritual, intellectual or wider cultural malaise, thereafter solving it by presenting a template which if followed will result in an improvement of conditions.

This is distinct from Anglo-Saxon optimism which is more of a straight forward push towards a supposed ideal of individual freedom, as distinct from a collective push towards striving for an objectively noble and ‘correct goal’. In the Anglo-Saxon world, even the Protestant search for God is highly individuated.

It is also different from the Russian spirit of pious consistency which values tradition and the continuity of community as the best possible means to achieve peace and security.

Put simply, Anglo-Saxon thinkers found freedom in individual sovereignty, Germans found it in state sovereignty, Russians found it in the sovereignty of traditions which were bigger than the individual or any political/philosophical apparatus.

It is this spirit that has allowed Russia to endure in spite of centuries of being attacked in war, it is this spirit which has made the English speaking world so adept at capitalism and it is what has made Germany a nation that represents a series of Hegelian dialectics in geo-politics. A kind of ‘trial and error’ has dominated German thinking for much of Germany’s modern existence. The question is, has this now change and if so how?

The spirit of optimism which guided the great thinkers of late 18th to late 19th century German culture helped give German leaders the impetus to finally forged a united German state (with the exception of German speaking Austria-Hungary) by 1871.

Yet it was at this time that many German thinkers witnessed the triumphalism of German statehood and wondered ‘where do we go from here’. Panic and malaise set into the Germanic mind.

The fraternal, almost lay secular optimism of Beethoven had given way to the stagnation of Wagner’s late works whose triumph was in past glories. Once Germany achieved its present, Wagner came to represent an artist looking to a mythical past.

While vulgar political figures looked to a combination of nationalism, hyper-industrialism and increased state control over the lives of individuals, Germany’s great late 19th and early 20th century thinkers began to witness new problems with this reality.

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche like their predecessors, diagnosed modernity’s problems through the prism of modern Germany, but their solutions reflected deeply un-optimistic and therefore un-Germanic conclusions.

In their own way Schopenhauer and Nietzsche found that modern society had become vulgar, populist and overly legalistic. Their solution was not for a new revolution which could right these wrongs, but rather for a combination of sublimation and revelation.

Schopenhauer recommended music and meditation as a means to escape the violence of the modern world without succumbing to it while Nietzsche recommended living an isolated life of a philosopher king, detached from the politics and ideally the body-politic of society. Attempts to vulgarise Nietzsche after his death, tend to distort Nietzsche’s utter disdain for any kind of popular political movement, such as the fascism that rose after his death.

But for a German state founded on the iron-clad optimism of Fichte, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s solution of withdrawal was simply too spiritual and not analytical enough for the German political programme.

The rusty optimism of Wagnerianism would continue until 1918, a spirit of modern means to communicate the ancient ideas of Empire. It was tired rather than vibrant Germanic optimism.

History proved that the Wagnerian medicine to the initial diagnosis of Fiche failed. 1920s Weimar Germany was consequently a long period of self-diagnosis with competing doctors each offering a cure.

Spengler and Freud offered the option of balance as defined both in Spengler’s geo-political model based on deterministic trends and Freud’s notion of the pleasure principle, a kind of conservative yet modern optimism.

Liberals offered the option of becoming Anglo-Saxon in respect of lurid individualism.

Old conservatives offered the corpse of Wagner and Hitler offered a strange combination of a Wagnerian mythological past combined with a Marxist-industrialist futurism that was exorcised of both the spiritual tendencies of Russianness (as best defined by Pushkin and Dostoevsky) and the individualism of Anglo-Saxon liberalism.

Hitler’s catch all failed miserably when his mythology combined with futurism came in contact with a Russian spirit which in spite of its political adoption of Marxist-Leninism, was still greatly governed by the spirit of actual tradition and an aversion to wild mythology as well as futuristic histrionics.

In spite of Russia’s military victory, the Russians did not become anything else after the war, they remained Russian. America by contrast was ready to adopt elements of Germany. America’s Operation Paperclip which saw some of Germany’s top Nazi minds move to the states after a pseudo-rehabilitation, was perhaps the most famous example of capitalistic reverse engineering in modern history.

Post-1945 Germany was a great deal like post-1918 Germany with one exception. Self-examination through anger and resentment became self-examination through contrition and attempts at atonement.

West Germany adopted liberalism in order to become more Anglo-Saxon and consequently atone for its Nazi sins whilst East Germany adopted Marxist-Leninism as a sign of contrition which amounted to, ‘since our attempts at choosing our own destiny failed, we shall become loyalists in the cause of a Germanic philosophy as adopted by a Russian Soviet Union. This was German optimism through collective psycho-analysis.

When Germany reunited in the 1990s, there was a brief moment of new-old optimism that resembled the spirit of the pre-1871 Germanic lands. Beethoven was back, Wagner was a relic, Richard Strauss who represented both the early triumphs and ultimate failures of self-examination was pushed to the side.

The political manifestation of this was the Maastricht Treaty creating the modern European Union, complete with Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ from the 9th symphony as its anthem.

But then something happened. The 1990s was an era when all of Europe fell totally under America’s hegemonic rule. Germany dominated Europe once again, but only as a geo-political tributary of America. The only exceptions to this have generally been the Hellenic, Southern Slavic and Turkic parts of Europe which have never truly been part of a ‘central European mindset’.

Germany today finds herself caught between the resurgent Orthodox Russia whose unbreakable tradition remains a guiding force. Likewise, America’s individualism has become so great that it leaves little room for German collectivism to have its own individual voice (however ironically).

Today, Germany and consequently Europe is struggling. East Germany could take solace in the fact that Russia had adopted Marxism which is a thoroughly Germanic ideology and then reintroduced it back to Germany. West Germany, was too busy atoning for its sins to notice creeping Americanism.

Now though that Americanism is in Germany and Europe with a vengeance, many Germans are finding themselves doing one thing they hadn’t ever done: succumbing to complete pessimism.

To borrow terms from Spengler, Germany has gone from culture to civilisation with one of the shortest interim summers in all of history. Europe is now the grey shadow of America sitting beside the timeless Orthodox spirit of Russia that is as foreign to Europe as obedience is to Americans.

Russia maintains its stability, America maintains its hyper-individualism that the rest of the English speaking world has adopted without question and with total ease. German dominated Europe has lost its ability to be optimistic. They are simply second class Americans.

This is one of the reasons why a German dominated Europe has now welcomed the anti-Russian rhetoric that was once largely confined to Poland and the Baltic states. Latent anti-Orthodox sentiments have become a catalyst for Europe to try and bring Russia to its knees. Russia, however can not be brought to the same post-modern levels of nihilism  as Europe without first breaking the indelible link between Orthodoxy and the Russian national spirit, something which is nearly impossible as history has shown.

America has given Europe the tools of ideological warfare with which to voice age old hatreds.

In an age of pragmatism, waging war on Orthodoxy would be unacceptable. In an ago of ideology, it is perfectly acceptable so long as the war on Orthodoxy is defined as a war for liberalism rather than a war against  Orthodoxy. That’s the American opportunism doing the talking for the silent minds of Europe.

As such Raamstein’s bleak post-industrial sound is the new ‘sound of Germany’ a country whose open borders represent something other than a failed policy. It represents a political manifestation of a nation and region that is no longer aware of how to exist. It is pessimism as policy.


* For the purposes of this discussion and more generally Russia is considered Eurasian and Britain considered outside of continental Europe’s political and cultural influence.



“I’m Not A Racist, But I’m A Nationalist”: Why Sweden Faces A Historic Election Upset

Sweden is set to have a political earthquake in September.



Via Zerohedge

“Trains and hospitals don’t work, but immigration continues,” Roger Mathson, a retired vegetable oil factory worker in Sweden, told Bloomberg on the same day as the violent, coordinated rampage by masked gangs of youths across five Swedish cities.

We noted earlier that Swedish politicians were quick to react with anti-immigrant party ‘Sweden Democrats’ seeing a surge in the polls ahead of the September 9th election.

“I’m not a racist, but I’m a nationalist,” Mathson said. “I don’t like seeing the town square full of Niqab-clad ladies and people fighting with each other.”

Is Sweden set to have its own political earthquake in September, where general elections could end a century of Social Democratic dominance and bring to power a little known (on the world stage), but the now hugely popular nationalist party often dubbed far-right and right-wing populist, called Sweden Democrats?

Sweden, a historically largely homogeneous population of 10 million, took in an astounding 600,000 refugees over the past five years, and after Swedes across various cities looked out their windows Tuesday to see cars exploding, smoke filling the skies, and possibly armed masked men hurling explosives around busy parking lots, it appears they’ve had enough.

Over the past years of their rise as a political force in Swedish politics, the country’s media have routinely labelled the Sweden Democrats as “racists” and “Nazis” due to their seemingly single issue focus of anti-immigration and strong Euroscepticism.

A poll at the start of this week indicated the Sweden Democrats slid back to third place after topping three previous polls as the September election nears; however, Tuesday’s national crisis and what could legitimately be dubbed a serious domestic terror threat is likely to boost their popularity.

Bloomberg’s profile of their leader, Jimmie Akesson, echoes the tone of establishment Swedish media in the way they commonly cast the movement, beginning as follows:

Viking rock music and whole pigs roasting on spits drew thousands of Swedes to a festival hosted by nationalists poised to deliver their country’s biggest political upheaval in a century.

The Sweden Democrats have been led since 2005 by a clean-cut and bespectacled man, Jimmie Akesson. He’s gentrified a party that traces its roots back to the country’s neo-Nazi, white supremacist fringe. Some polls now show the group may become the biggest in Sweden’s parliament after general elections on Sept. 9. Such an outcome would end 100 years of Social Democratic dominance.

The group’s popularity began surging after the 2015 immigration crisis began, which first hit Europe’s southern Mediterranean shores and quickly moved northward as shocking wave after wave of migrants came.

Jimmie Akesson (right). Image source: Getty via Daily Express

Akesson emphasizes something akin to a “Sweden-first” platform which European media often compares to Trump’s “America First”; and the party has long been accused of preaching forced assimilation into Swedish culture to be become a citizen.

Bloomberg’s report surveys opinions at a large political rally held in Akkeson’s hometown of Solvesborg, and some of the statements are sure to be increasingly common sentiment after this week’s coordinated multi-city attack:

At his party’s festival, Akesson revved up the crowd by slamming the establishment’s failures, calling the last two governments the worst in Swedish history. T-shirts calling for a Swexit, or an exit from the EU, were exchanged as bands played nationalist tunes.

Ted Lorentsson, a retiree from the island of Tjorn, said he’s an enthusiastic backer of the Sweden Democrats. “I think they want to improve elderly care, health care, child care,” he said. “Bring back the old Sweden.” But he also acknowledges his view has led to disagreement within his family as his daughter recoils at what she feels is the “Hitler”-like rhetoric.

No doubt, the media and Eurocrats in Brussels will take simple, innocent statements from elderly retirees like “bring back the old Sweden” as nothing short of declaration of a race war, but such views will only solidify after this week.

Another Sweden Democrat supporter, a 60-year old woman who works at a distillery, told Bloomberg, “I think you need to start seeing the whole picture in Sweden and save the original Swedish population,” she said. “I’m not racist, because I’m a realist.”

Sweden’s two biggest parties, the Social Democrats and Moderates, are now feeling the pressure as Swedes increasingly worry about key issues preached by Akesson like immigration, law and order, and health care – seen as under threat by a mass influx of immigrants that the system can’t handle.

Bloomberg explains further:

But even young voters are turning their backs on the establishment. One potential SD supporter is law student Oscar Persson. Though he hasn’t yet decided how he’ll vote, he says it’s time for the mainstream parties to stop treating the Sweden Democrats like a pariah. “This game they are playing now, where the other parties don’t want to talk to them but still want their support, is something I don’t really understand,” he said.

Akesson has managed to entice voters from both sides of the political spectrum with a message of more welfare, lower taxes and savings based on immigration cuts.

With many Swedes now saying immigration has “gone too far” and as this week’s events have once again thrust the issue before both a national and global audience, the next round of polling will mostly like put Sweden’s conservative-right movements on top

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The Turkish Emerging Market Timebomb

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s populist economic policies have finally caught up to him.

The Duran



Authored by Jim O’Neill, originally on Project Syndicate:

As the Turkish lira continues to depreciate against the dollar, fears of a classic emerging-market crisis have come to the fore. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s populist economic policies have finally caught up to him, and sooner or later, he will have to make nice with his country’s traditional Western allies.

Turkey’s falling currency and deteriorating financial conditions lend credence, at least for some people, to the notion that “a crisis is a terrible thing to waste.” I suspect that many Western policymakers, in particular, are not entirely unhappy about Turkey’s plight.

To veteran economic observers, Turkey’s troubles are almost a textbook case of an emerging-market flop. It is August, after all, and back in the 1990s, one could barely go a single year without some kind of financial crisis striking in the dog days of summer.

But more to the point, Turkey has a large, persistent current-account deficit, and a belligerent leader who does not realize – or refuses to acknowledge – that his populist economic policies are unsustainable. Moreover, Turkey has become increasingly dependent on overseas investors (and probably some wealthy domestic investors, too).

Given these slowly gestating factors, markets have long assumed that Turkey was headed for a currency crisis. In fact, such worries were widespread as far back as the fall of 2013, when I was in Istanbul interviewing business and financial leaders for a BBC Radio series on emerging economies. At that time, markets were beginning to fear that monetary-policy normalization and an end to quantitative easing in the United States would have dire consequences globally. The Turkish lira has been flirting with disaster ever since.

Now that the crisis has finally come to pass, it is Turkey’s population that will bear the brunt of it. The country must drastically tighten its domestic monetary policy, curtail foreign borrowing, and prepare for the likelihood of a full-blown economic recession, during which time domestic saving will slowly have to be rebuilt.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership will both complicate matters and give Turkey some leverage. Erdoğan has  constitutional powers, reducing those of the parliament, and undercutting the independence of monetary and fiscal policymaking. And to top it off, he seems to be reveling in an escalating feud with US President Donald Trump’s administration over Turkey’s imprisonment of an American pastor and purchase of a Russian S-400 missile-defense system.

This is a dangerous brew for the leader of an emerging economy to imbibe, particularly when the United States itself has embarked on a Ronald Reagan-style fiscal expansion that has pushed the US Federal Reserve to raise interest rates faster than it would have otherwise. Given the unlikelihood of some external source of funding emerging, Erdoğan will eventually have to back down on some of his unorthodox policies. My guess is that we’ll see a return to a more conventional monetary policy, and possibly a new fiscal-policy framework.

As for Turkey’s leverage in the current crisis, it is worth remembering that the country has a large and youthful population, and thus the potential to grow into a much larger economy in the future. It also enjoys a privileged geographic position at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, which means that many major players have a stake in ensuring its stability. Indeed, many Europeans still hold out hope that Turkey will embrace Western-style capitalism, despite the damage that Erdoğan has done to the country’s European Union accession bid.

Among the regional powers, Russia is sometimes mentioned as a potential savior for Turkey. There is no doubt that Russian President Vladimir Putin would love to use Turkey’s crisis to pull it even further away from its NATO allies. But Erdoğan and his advisers would be deeply mistaken to think that Russia can fill Turkey’s financial void. A Kremlin intervention would do little for Turkey, and would likely exacerbate Russia’s own .

The other two potential patrons are Qatar and, of course, China. But while Qatar, one of Turkey’s closest Gulf allies, could provide financial aid, it does not ultimately have the wherewithal to pull Turkey out of its crisis singlehandedly.

As for China, though it will not want to waste the opportunity to increase its influence vis-à-vis Turkey, it is not the country’s style to step into such a volatile situation, much less assume responsibility for solving the problem. The more likely outcome – as we are seeing in Greece – is that China will unleash its companies to pursue investment opportunities after the dust settles.

That means that Turkey’s economic salvation lies with its conventional Western allies: the US and the EU (particularly France and Germany). On August 13, a White House spokesperson confirmed that the Trump administration is watching the financial-market response to Turkey’s crisis “very closely.” The last thing that Trump wants is a crumbling world economy and a massive dollar rally, which could derail his domestic economic ambitions. So a classic Trump “trade” is probably there for Erdoğan, if he is willing to come to the negotiating table.

Likewise, some of Europe’s biggest and most fragile banks have significant exposure to Turkey. Combine that with the ongoing political crisis over migration, and you have a recipe for deeper destabilization within the EU. I, for one, cannot imagine that European leaders will sit by and do nothing while Turkey implodes on their border.

Despite his escalating rhetoric, Erdoğan may soon find that he has little choice but to abandon his isolationist and antagonistic policies of the last few years. If he does, many investors may look back next year and wish that they had snapped up a few lira when they had the chance.

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Why Scandinavia Isn’t Exceptional

Scandinavia is entirely unexceptional.

The Duran



Authored by Per Bylund via The Mises Institute:

[From the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics.]

The Scandinavian countries, and primary among them Sweden, are commonly referred to as anomalies or inspirations, depending on one’s political point of view. The reason is that the countries do not appear to fit the general pattern: they are enormously successful whereas they “shouldn’t” be. Indeed, Scandinavians enjoy very high living standards despite having very large, progressive welfare states for which they pay the world’s highest taxes.

As a result, a large and growing literature, both propagandist and scholarly, has emerged that tries to identify the reasons for this Scandinavian exceptionalism—especially as pertains to their welfare states. I have myself contributed to this literature1 and have previously reviewed others’ contributions to it in this journal.2 But what has been missing is a summary analysis that is accessible to non-scholars. It was therefore a delight to read Nima Sanandaji’s Scandinavian Unexceptionalism: Culture, Markets, and the Failure of Third-Way Socialism, published by British Institute for Economic Affairs.

Dr. Sanandaji is a political-economy analyst and writer, well known in both Sweden and Europe, and as expected does an excellent job summarizing the state of scholarship. He also uses examples and quotes from articles published in Scandinavian news media to illustrate the narrative. The result is a short and informative but easy to read answer to both how and why the Scandinavian welfare states seem to work so well.

The short book provides the reader with insight into Scandinavian culture, an explanation of the causes of the nations’ exceptional rise from poverty, an overview of their recent political-economic history, the distinct structure and evolution of the Scandinavian welfare state, the origins of their egalitarianism and gender equality, and the effect of immigration. I will briefly touch on three of these areas.

First, Sanandaji makes clear that the rosy story of the Scandinavian welfare state, as it is usually told, is at best incomplete. The Scandinavian countries were among the European continent’s poorest by the end of the 19th century and were largely unaffected by the industrialization that had started centuries earlier in the United Kingdom. A combination of classical liberal reform and the adoption of industrialized production created a century-long “golden age,” as Bergh (2014) denotes the period approximately 1870–1970 in Sweden, of economic growth and rapidly rising standards of living.

This growth was partly also made possible by a distinct Scandinavian culture, which is characterized by the “[h]igh levels of trust, a strong work ethic and social cohesion [that] are the perfect starting point for successful economies” (p. 7). As Sanandaji points out, the market-aligned virtues of Scandinavian culture also explain the limited impact of the welfare state as it was erected and ballooned in the 1930s and beyond. Cultural change takes time, and thus old values lag in the face of political change. So it took time for the Scandinavian virtues to give way to the destructive incentives of the welfare state.

It should also be noted, though Sanandaji fails to make this point clearly, that after the welfare state was established, and during its several decades of expansion, it’s growth rate tended to be lower than that of the overall economy. The increasing burden was therefore, in relative terms, marginal. That is, until the radical 1960s and 1970s when Scandinavian governments, and the Swedish government in particular, adopted very expansionist welfare policies. (This political shift is analyzed in detail in, e.g., Bergh.)3

Sanandaji also presents interesting data with respect to Scandinavian gender equality. His discussion begins with the internationally enviable women’s labor market participation rate in Scandinavian countries, and especially Sweden. The background, however, is that Sweden’s government had adopted a radical agenda for population control formulated by Gunnar and Alva Myrdal (yes, the same Gunnar Myrdal who shared the 1974 economics prize with Hayek). The gist of this reform was to enforce a shared responsibility between parents and “the community” for children’s upbringing. By raising taxes on income while offering government-run daycare services, families were incentivized (if not “forced,” economically speaking) to secure two full-time incomes.

Interestingly, while this indeed rapidly increased women’s participation in the labor market, Sanandaji notes that “few women in the Nordic nations reach the position of business leaders, and even fewer manage to climb to the very top positions of directors and chief executives” (p. 102). Part of the reason is that jobs that women typically choose, including education and healthcare, are monopolized in the vast public sectors. As a result, women at trapped in careers where employers do not compete for their competence and many leadership positions are political.

This development is indirectly illustrated in a terrifying statistic from Sweden’s labor market: “Between 1950 and 2000, the Swedish population grew from seven to almost nine million. But astonishingly the net job creation in the private sector was close to zero” (p. 33).

Finally, Sanandaji addresses the issue of immigration and shows that the Scandinavian nations were exceptionally good at integration, with greater labor participation for immigrants than other Western nations, prior to the radicalization of the welfare state. Thereafter, due to rigid labor regulations and vast welfare benefits, immigrants were more or less kept out of Scandinavian job markets.

The literature identifies two potential explanations. First, the anti-business and job-protection policies practically exclude anyone with a lack of work experience, highly sought-after skills, or those with lacking proficiency in the language or limited network. This keeps immigrants as well as young people unemployed (the very high youth unemployment rates in Scandinavia illustrate this problem). Second, the promises of the universal welfare state tend to attract people who are less interested in working their way to the top and thus have a lacking work ethic.

This explains the recent problems in Scandinavia with respect to immigration, which is essentially an integration and policy problem — not a foreign-people problem.

Overall, Sanandaji’s book provides plenty of insights and a coherent explanation for the rise of the Scandinavian nations and their welfare states. Their impressive standard of living is a free-market story, which is rooted in an economically sound culture. This culture also supported the welfare state, until decades of destructive incentives eroded the nations’ sound values. The welfare state, after its radicalization, was soon crushed under its own weight, and Scandinavia has since undergone vast free-market reforms that again have contributed to economic growth and prosperity.

Considering the full story, Sanandaji summarizes the example of the Northern European welfare states simply and bluntly: “Scandinavia is entirely unexceptional.”

  • 1.Bylund, Per L. 2010. “The Modern Welfare State: Leading the Way on the Road to Serfdom.” In Thomas E. Woods, ed., Back on the Road to Serfdom: The Resurgence of Statism. Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books.
  • 2.2015. “Book Review: Sweden and the Revival of the Capitalist Welfare State by Andreas Bergh,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 18, no. 1: 75–81.
  • 3.Bergh, Andreas. 2014. Sweden and the Revival of the Capitalist Welfare State. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.

Per Bylund is assistant professor of entrepreneurship & Records-Johnston Professor of Free Enterprise in the School of Entrepreneurship at Oklahoma State University. Website:

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