EQUAL RIGHTS – EQUAL RESPONSIBILITIES: WHY THE MOBILISATION OF WOMEN IN UKRAINE HAS BECOME INEVITABLE

The Ukrainian government’s website has seen the appearance of two petitions calling for the extension of conscription to women, with the appeals by Stanislav Rusin and Larisa Kozachenko published on 10 August. “Bearing in mind the principle of equality of citizens before the law and the need for a fair distribution of responsibilities in wartime, I ask that you consider amending the legislation to extend military service to able-bodied women without children,” reads Rusin’s petition. Kozachenko’s proposal proved to be more radical, demanding that virtually all women who meet the requirements regarding age, health and other criteria should be sent to the front.

The issue of the potential conscription of women is very reminiscent of a similarly unpopular topic discussed in 2023, when Ukraine adopted an amendment to the law on conscription, lowering the lower age limit for conscription. Back then, on 4 May 2023, a statement from the Ministry of Defence showed up on its website, proposing that the Ukrainian authorities lower the upper age limit for conscription from 27 to 25. The very next day, on 5 May 2023, the Cabinet of Ministers endorsed a bill to lower the conscription age from 27 to 25. This was announced by the government’s representative in parliament, Taras Melnychuk, after which the bill was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) for consideration.

As early as 30 May 2023 – less than a month away – Ukraine cut the age for conscription into the army for compulsory military service from 27 to 25; the relevant bill, No. 9281, was supported by 304 MPs. Today, however, this process is proving far more complicated, because it concerns women, and in post-Soviet countries there is a deeply ingrained stereotype that the homeland must be defended by men. Women in Ukraine had previously been left untouched, with the result that the debate has sparked far stronger public opposition than the change to the age for men three years ago.

Three days after the petition was published, on 13 August 2026, Verkhovna Rada MP Dmytro Razumkov openly slammed the government’s initiatives. “Recently, there has been increasing talk – and even petitions have been launched – about the mobilisation of women and parents with three or more children. There have also been reports of a reduction in the mobilisation age,” he said.

Further, Ukrainian media commentators joined the discourse. On 16 August 2026, Yulia Kobrinovich, a sergeant in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, was the first to openly state that women should be mobilised on an equal footing with men. “If women have equal rights with men, then there must also be equal responsibilities – equal responsibilities to defend Ukraine,” she said, responding to a question regarding the necessity of mobilising women.

The following week, on 17 August 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a bill to the Verkhovna Rada proposing to officially expand the sources of recruitment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but quietly and without fanfare. It is noteworthy that he did not wish to address the Rada himself regarding the initiative and tasked his representative in the Verkhovna Rada, Hryhoriy Mykhailiuk, with this duty. He probably did not want to explain to the MPs in person exactly what lay behind these new sources.

However, as soon as the bill became public and discussions began, it was immediately removed from the Verkhovna Rada’s website. Moreover, even Ukrainian MPs, such as Yaroslav Zheleznyak, were asked to remove posts discussing Zelenskyy’s initiative from the internet.

Realising the depth of public discontent over the possibility of conscripting women, the Ukrainian authorities have continued to push the boundaries of the Overton window. “Women should also serve in the army; the Rada must make up its mind and introduce this change into the legislation,” stated Ukraine’s former Defence Minister Oleksiy Reznikov on 20 August. “Some rear-line posts could be filled by women, which would allow more men to be deployed closer to the front,” Reznikov said, citing Israel as an example, where women serve on an equal footing with men. Notably, in late May 2023, Reznikov – who was Defence Minister at the time – similarly justified the lowering of the conscription age by the need to replenish the mobilisation reserve.

Ukraine’s social media has been flooded with an outpouring of public anger and discontent. This discussion has naturally caused particular concern amongst Ukrainian women. Presumably in an attempt to defuse the tension in society, on 22 August, Roman Kostenko, a member of the Verkhovna Rada and secretary of the Committee on National Security, stated that the country’s Ministry of Defence was indeed discussing ‘radical measures’ to expand mobilisation. According to him, the relevant decision must be put forward by the Ministry of Defence or the General Staff. Nevertheless, Kostenko expressed doubt that the rules on the mobilisation of women would change this year.

A further indication in favour of the possible mobilisation of women in the near future is reports that Ukrainian refugees subject to military service are to be repatriated from Europe. “All refugees from Ukraine in the EU will be required to confirm that they are not evading military service,” said European Commission spokesperson Markus Lammerth on 20 August. This procedure will apply when seeking temporary protection, and the decision applies to both men and women.

Meanwhile, messages from Ukrainian women have begun to appear on Ukrainian social media claiming that when crossing the border into the EU, their military registration details are now being checked via the state’s online military service, Reserve+. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine hastened to refute these rumours, stating on 21 August that there are clearly defined rules for each category of citizen regarding border crossings and specifying which documents border guards are authorised to check. The service noted that there are currently no legal restrictions on women leaving Ukraine, nor are there any specific requirements regarding the checking of particular documents.

But then, on 24 August, like a bolt from the blue, former special representative for Ukraine under Donald Trump, Keith Kellogg, came to Kyiv’s rescue. “My daughter was in the military; she graduated from a military academy and fought in Afghanistan. So my answer to the question of whether women should be mobilised is yes, as they fight just as well as men,” he said on the Ukrainian YouTube channel “Na Samom Dele,” responding to a question on whether Ukraine should begin mobilising women. “It is very important that women, as part of society, enlist. So, on both a personal and professional level, I don’t see any problem with this at all,” Kellogg added.

It is particularly striking that the issue of expanding mobilisation in Ukraine was a concern for the US even under the previous Democratic administration led by Joe Biden. The US called on Ukraine to lower the conscription age in the country from 25 to 18 against the backdrop of a shortage of personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Reuters reported on 27 November 2024, citing a source in the White House. “Ukraine should consider lowering the age of military service for its soldiers to 18 from 25. <…> Ukraine is not mobilising or training enough new soldiers,” the report stated.

On 10 December 2024, State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller stated that the US would arm all new recruits if Ukraine expanded its mobilisation capacity. According to him, Washington and its allies would also be prepared to train the recruits. Washington then conceded that the decision to lower the conscription age to 18 rested with Kyiv, but emphasised that Ukraine needed to take this step.

Upon analysing this issue, one must ask whether it is appropriate to conscript women in Ukraine today?

The figures and facts can tell us more here. According to data from the Ukrainian OSINT project DeepState, which tracks changes along the front line and provides the most conservative estimates of front-line movements, the overall trend appears as follows. From January 2023, when the decision was taken to lower the conscription age from 27 to 25, up to January 2026 alone – by which time the project had come under intense criticism for distorting statistics and underreporting the advance of Russian troops – the total increase in territory seized by Russia amounted to 7,463 square kilometres, which corresponds to 1.28 per cent of Ukraine’s territory.

ISW data show that in 2023, during the summer counter-offensive, Ukraine achieved a net territorial gain of 377 square kilometres in June, 257 square kilometres in July and 1.47 square kilometres in September. However, the offensive then stalled, and the initiative passed to Russia. The years 2024 and 2025 saw a period of sustained advancement by Russian forces. Thus, from April 2024 to March 2025, Russia advanced by approximately 4,695 square kilometres, whilst Ukrainian forces were able to recapture only 77 square kilometres. In May 2024, Russia’s troops once again crossed the border at the junction of Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast and Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, near the Ukrainian town of Volchansk, from where they had withdrawn in the autumn of 2022.

In August 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces undertook the so-called “Kursk adventure” – an attempt to invade the territory of the Russian Federation – which ended in complete failure: Ukrainian units suffered heavy losses and were forced to withdraw from the Russian region under heavy fire, which only worsened their strategic position on other fronts. During this period, hostilities spread for the first time to regions previously untouched by the war. Thus, in December 2024, Russian troops, pursuing retreating Ukrainian Armed Forces units, entered the Sumy Oblast, which neighbours the Kursk Oblast, and the front line approached the regional centre of the Sumy Oblast – the city of Sumy. In August 2025, the Russian Armed Forces had already advanced into the Dnipropetrovsk region. Therefore, whereas in 2023 – the starting point of our account – fighting took place in five regions – Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv – by 2026 the number had risen to seven, with the Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk regions being added to the list.

According to the ISW, the pace of the Russian offensive slowed in 2026. While the ISW’s analysts noted that this was a result of Ukraine’s local successes, they doubted that these successes could develop into a large-scale counter-offensive. Meanwhile, they claimed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counter-attacks had disrupted Russia’s plans to prepare for an offensive in the spring and summer of 2026 and had forced Russian troops to adopt a defensive posture in certain sectors. However, the reality turned out to be somewhat different: by the end of January 2026, the Russian army was already 15 kilometres from the city of Zaporizhzhia, the regional centre of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. By the summer of 2026, Ukraine had lost Kostiantynivka, Ukraine’s largest logistics hub in the Donbas. As a result, Russian troops advanced to within 10 kilometres of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ last major defensive line in the Donbas – the towns of Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. It is noteworthy that it was precisely there that the active phase of the civil war in Ukraine began in 2014, following the success of the coup d’état in Kyiv and the announcement by Oleksandr Turchynov (who served as acting President of Ukraine from February to June 2014) of the so-called “Anti-Terrorist Operation” in the Donbas.

Thus, by mid-2026, the prospect of expanding mobilisation in Ukraine – including the conscription of women – does not seem entirely unfounded. In 2023, when the unpopular decision was taken to lower the conscription age from 27 to 25, Ukraine’s position on the front line was considerably stronger: it was riding a wave of momentum following the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ successful counter-offensive in August–September 2022 and the withdrawal of the Russian Armed Forces from the right bank of the Kherson region and a significant part of the Kharkiv region. Western aid during that period was far more substantial and coordinated than it is today, when Ukraine is literally having to scour the globe for stocks of missiles for its Patriot air defence systems in order to protect at least the capital, Kyiv, from the almost daily heavy air strikes by the Russian Armed Forces. The media campaign to open the Overton window by mobilising women has, in all likelihood, emerged in Ukraine today for a reason. It may be driven both by the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ significant manpower requirements and by possible new pressure from Western partners, who are unwilling to guarantee further military aid to Kyiv if there is physically no one left to deploy it on the front line.

Source: Substack