The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of this site. This site does not give financial, investment or medical advice.
Steven Sahiounie, journalist and political commentator
Journalist Steven Sahiounie conducted an interview with Iraqi engineer and political affairs analyst, Dr. Dhafer Mayouf Al-Taie, to discuss the latest developments in Iraq, particularly the implications of the U.S. military withdrawal, Iraq’s security sovereignty, the balance of regional influence, and the future of military and intelligence cooperation between Baghdad and Washington.
1. Steven Sahiounie (SS): Has Iraq entered a new phase of security sovereignty, or will U.S. influence continue in other forms?
Dhafer Mayouf Al-Taie (DMA): With the withdrawal of U.S. forces, Iraq has entered a new phase in assuming greater responsibility for its own security. Iraqi institutions now have greater space to manage the country’s affairs.
However, achieving full sovereignty is an ongoing process. It should be measured by the state’s ability to secure its borders, enforce the law, control unauthorized weapons, and make decisions that serve the interests of the Iraqi people without external pressure.
I expect U.S. influence to continue, but in different forms, including through diplomatic and economic relations, arms supply, and intelligence and information-sharing cooperation.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi territory does not end the mutual interests or cooperation between the two countries. These relationships are expected to continue through agreements reached between Baghdad and Washington.
2. SS: What are the immediate security implications, and can Iraqi forces fill any potential vacuum?
DMA: I do not expect major security repercussions. Internal security has been primarily in the hands of Iraqi security forces since 2010, and most of these forces have achieved a high level of readiness, having participated extensively in the fight against ISIS.
Some ISIS cells may attempt to test the readiness of Iraqi forces or exploit remote areas to carry out security breaches. However, I do not expect such incidents to pose a serious threat, and they would likely be addressed by the Iraqi security forces.
In my assessment, Iraqi forces are capable of assuming the primary responsibility for holding territory, conducting operations, maintaining continuous surveillance, analyzing intelligence, and making appropriate decisions when necessary.
Even if the probability of a major security challenge remains low, Iraq must nevertheless prepare seriously for every possible scenario.
3. SS: How will the balance of power change? Will Iranian influence increase, or can Baghdad maintain its balance?
DMA: The U.S. withdrawal may give political forces close to Iran a sense that their political weight has increased. Some actors may seek to transform this into domestic political gains.
However, this remains a political possibility rather than a certainty, particularly because Iran is currently heavily preoccupied with the Strait of Hormuz and the possibility of renewed conflict with the United States.
The current Iraqi government has also taken serious steps in this regard. Iran understands that the Iraqi situation remains fragile and that any miscalculated move could produce serious consequences.
In my personal view, Iran is not relying heavily on its Iraqi ally at the present time. Tehran appears to be seeking to prevent the situation from escalating. Maintaining the current situation may be sufficient for Iran, because opening an additional front in Iraq would place significant additional pressure on it.
The Iraqi government is currently seeking to maintain a balanced policy toward external actors. Preserving internal cohesion is extremely important, and this also requires an independent Iraqi decision-making process and rejecting the use of Iraqi territory to harm any country or drag Iraq into confrontation.
The stronger the Iraqi state becomes in providing essential services to its citizens and protecting its internal front, the greater its ability to negotiate with all sides from a position of confidence.
The future of Iraq’s external balance will therefore depend significantly on the country’s internal reforms and the strength of its institutions.
4. SS: What does the U.S. withdrawal mean for the Kurdistan Region, particularly in the face of missiles and drones?
DMA: Kurdish concerns are genuine and must be addressed seriously. They are linked to previous events and to the fact that the Kurdistan Region has limited defensive capabilities.
This situation may push the regional government closer to Baghdad in order to resolve outstanding disputes and potentially accept conditions that it previously considered unacceptable.
Such developments could also provide an opportunity for the federal government to expand its authority and unify security decision-making across the country.
Increasing the readiness of forces in the Kurdistan Region would require funding, training, maintenance, and coordination between different defense systems. These requirements would be difficult to provide or replace quickly, particularly given Iraq’s financial challenges.
5. SS: Could the withdrawal open the door for Turkey and Iran to expand their influence?
DMA: We have already discussed Iran’s potential role in the third question, and similar considerations apply to Turkish influence.
Although the Iraqi government has announced that Turkey has begun withdrawing from some of its military bases, I believe such a process would be gradual. Its pace will depend on developments involving the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Syrian Kurds, Iran, and even the broader situation in Syria.
The direction of events will also depend on Baghdad’s ability to negotiate and establish clear rules governing relations with neighboring countries, particularly Turkey.
Turkey continues to raise the issue of Kirkuk from time to time and seeks to maintain various forms of leverage that could be used in its relations with Iraq to pursue economic and security interests.
In my view, the Iraqi government’s position will become stronger if it addresses border concerns through bilateral agreements while rejecting any military operations that have not been agreed upon with Baghdad.
Iraq can benefit from trade, investment, and various industrial projects, particularly in the transportation sector, with Turkey, Iran, and most countries in the region while maintaining the independence of its political decision-making.
6. SS: What is the future of military and intelligence cooperation with Washington? Can U.S. influence continue without troops?
DMA: Washington can retain security influence without maintaining a permanent military presence in Iraq.
Cooperation could take the form of intelligence sharing, training Iraqi forces outside Iraq, arms supplies, spare parts, technical support, and equipment maintenance.
Reports published regarding the withdrawal agreement indicate that such cooperation is expected to continue, particularly in areas such as training and intelligence coordination. Some elements may also involve understandings that are not necessarily publicly detailed but nevertheless represent commitments between the two sides.
At present, it is in Iraq’s interest to maintain this cooperation while clearly defining its scope and mechanisms.
At the same time, such cooperation should be linked to a defined timetable designed to transfer knowledge and increase Iraq’s independent capabilities in equipment operation, maintenance, and intelligence analysis.
This would prevent Iraq from remaining indefinitely dependent on external assistance, a situation that could create political difficulties for the Iraqi government domestically.
The United States should also avoid placing the Iraqi government in politically difficult situations or portraying it as merely subordinate or implementing another country’s decisions. Repeated references to sanctions could have a similar effect.
Such an approach would not project an image of an equal friendship or partnership, but rather one of a dominant power and a subordinate partner. This could significantly weaken the Iraqi government’s position domestically and provide its critics with additional opportunities to challenge its policies.
Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist.
The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of this site. This site does not give financial, investment or medical advice.
