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Kudrin Returns?

Why did Putin bring Alexey Kudrin back?

Alexander Mercouris

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The announcement that former Russian Finance Minister Alexey Kudrin has been appointed deputy head of Russian President Putin’s Council of Economic Advisers has provoked a stir.

This is not surprising. Few individuals in Russian politics polarise opinion as strongly as Kudrin does.

Kudrin’s admirers are to be found in the business community, amongst liberal economists and amongst people of generally elite backgrounds and liberal views. Amongst people of this sort Kudrin’s reputation is of the highest.

The wider Russian population – to the extent it is aware of him – however views Kudrin very differently, whilst his name is anathema across the very large “patriotic/left wing” section of Russia’s political spectrum

So who is Alexey Kudrin and why does he arouse such strong feelings? Kudrin was Russia’s Finance Minister from 2000 to 2011 as well as the Deputy Prime Minister in overall charge of the economy from 2007 to 2011.

Amongst his liberal admirers Kudrin is the official who is widely credited with engineering the economic boom Russia experienced during Putin’s first two terms as President. He is lauded for his rigidly orthodox free market economic thinking, his tight fiscal management, his refusal to run deficits, and for Russia’s early repayment of its sovereign debt just a few years after its humiliating default in 1998.

Above all he is credited with the creation of Russia’s two national savings funds, the Reserve Fund, which funds the national budget when it is in deficit, and the National Welfare Fund, which acts as Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.

Kudrin’s glowing reputation amongst people of elite and liberal backgrounds both in Russia and abroad is well illustrated by the awards they have showered on him.

He was named “Best Finance Minister of the Year 2005” by The Banker magazine, “Best Finance Minister of a Developing European Country”; in 2006 by the Emerging Markets newspaper (a journal published by the IMF and the World Bank) and “Best Finance Minister of the Year 2010” by Euromoney magazine.

Kudrin’s Russian critics have a very different view of him. They see him as a doctrinaire laissez faire Atlanticist, as the Finance Minister whose dogmatic insistence on cutting spending strangled the economy, causing its productive sectors to wither away as money which should have been used for investment was instead accumulated uselessly, becoming “dead money” in the two Funds.

In addition many Russians have not forgotten or forgiven Kudrin’s monetisation in 2005 of many of their Soviet era social security benefits, turning them from benefits in kind into benefits paid in money.

Given Russia’s historically high inflation and its two periods of hyperinflation in the 1990s this understandably was a very unpopular move and one which provoked widespread protests. Though in the West these protests are largely forgotten, they actually involved more people than the much better known protests which took place during the election season in 2011-2012.

Kudrin is also known to be a supporter of increasing the pension age – another reform that is for equally understandable reasons also very unpopular with many Russians. Beyond these very practical criticisms, much of the hostility to Kudrin within Russia has a distinct ideological hue.

In a country where opinion polls show a clear majority of the population favours a planned economy it is unsurprising that the man who was known as the most prominent economic liberal in the government became unpopular with many people. Russians also tend to conflate support for liberal economic policies with pro-Western political positions. As Russia’s relations with the West have deteriorated this has inevitably exposed economic liberals like Kudrin to charges that they are part of a pro-Western Fifth Column. In Kudrin’s case some of his actions have lent force to these fears.

Lastly but crucially, for many Russians an economic liberal like Kudrin who supports private business and private enterprise is almost by definition an apologist for the system that created the oligarchs – the hated class of plutocrats who emerged in Russia during the corrupt privatisations of the 1990s.

All these factors taken together explain why the individual who in the West was the most highly regarded official of Putin’s government in Russia is one of its least popular. The truth about Kudrin is that both the praise he gets and some – though not all – the criticism is overdone.

Kudrin as Finance Minister did indeed run a tight ship. He did indeed create the two Funds which did indeed help keep the economy stable by financing the budget deficit after the financial crash of 2008.

However the praise for Kudrin’s tight fiscal management ignores the fact that fiscal policy has been no loser since he left the government in 2011. On the contrary the high oil prices in 2012 and 2013 enabled the government to avoid running deficits in those years even though Kudrin before his dismissal had actually planned for them.

Since then the government has managed to run lower deficits during the current recession than those Kudrin ran and planned for during the 2008 crisis. In 2015 the federal deficit was just 2.4% of GDP and though it will probably be higher this year the target is still 3% of GDP.

If Kudrin is a fiscal conservative and a supporter of balanced budgets the record shows his successors also are. In the Russian government and in the Finance Ministry, Kudrin’s fiscal conservatism is not the exception. It is the rule.

This point about Kudrin that is consistently overlooked by his admirers is that whilst he was a member of the government he worked as part of a team. The head of that team was not Kudrin but Putin.

It is Putin not Kudrin who must ultimately take the credit – or blame – for the tough fiscal discipline of the Kudrin years. It is because of Putin’s heavy emphasis on budget discipline that budget spending has continued to be tight since Kudrin left the government in 2011. It was also Putin more than Kudrin who insisted on early repayment of Russia’s debt.

As for the idea of setting up the two Funds, credit – or blame – for that does belong to Kudrin. However it could not have happened without Putin’s support. One must resist the temptation – irresistible to Kudrin’s admirers – of giving Kudrin all the credit for everything that went right under his watch whilst putting all the blame on Putin for everything that went wrong.

If one believes that keeping tight control of budget spending, accumulating reserves and paying off debt is the hallmark of a good manager, then the record shows the good manager in Russia’s case is Putin not Kudrin and that it is Putin not Kudrin who should be given the credit.

In fact Kudrin’s record as an economic manager is decidedly mixed. It is certainly true that Russia’s economy grew rapidly during Putin’s first two terms when Kudrin was Finance Minister and that Kudrin’s success in restoring order to Russia’s previously chaotic budget played a role in this.

However though Kudrin – with Putin’s support – kept a tight lid on government spending he was far too complacent about the borrowing and spending binge Russian companies were cranking up towards in the years immediately prior to the 2008 financial crash.

Several commentators warned at the time that the credit build-up – much of it in foreign currency loans from Western banks – was getting out of control. However the mounting concern appears to have passed Kudrin completely by. Presumably as an economic liberal and as a believer in the virtues of free enterprise he found it difficult to believe the private sector could do wrong.

The result was that the country found itself dangerously exposed in the weeks and months following the financial crash of 2008 as Western banks at the urging of their own central banks scrambled to get cash out of Russia as fast as they could by calling in their loans.

Money poured out of the country putting the very existence of some of the country’s biggest companies at risk. The panic fed on itself as investors then also began to pull out of Russian companies causing Russia’s two stock markets to crash. For a few terrifying weeks it looked as if the entire economy was about to collapse.

In the event the reserves Kudrin and Putin had built up in the previous years proved sufficient to avert disaster, though the single thing that saved the economy… from a much more severe crisis was the sharp recovery in oil prices that took place in the spring of 2009.

Kudrin was obviously not solely to blame for all this. However as the country’s Finance Minister and as the man in overall charge of the economy he must bear the principal blame. At a crucial moment he took his eye off the ball and it was as much a matter of good luck as of good management that the country came through.

By contrast one of the reasons why the Russian economy has proved so resilient in the face of the sanctions and the 2014 oil price collapse is precisely because the lesson of those terrible months in 2008 and 2009 has been learnt. Instead of resuming their wild borrowing and spending spree when the crisis abated Russian companies and businesses instead – at the urging of their government – reined their borrowing and spending in as they moved to hedge and consolidate their positions.

The result was that this time round with the help of a certain amount of support from the government and the Central Bank they have been able to meet their debt obligations without undue strain and without the economy spiralling into crisis.

I would add in passing that the much discussed fall in the Russian growth rate since 2012 is in part a consequence of this process. Reining in borrowing and spending and consolidating positions has inevitably led to a cut in investment causing growth to slow. In other words the frenetic growth of the immediate period prior to the 2008 crash (which touched an annualised rate of 9% in the months preceding the crash) has had to be paid for by a lower growth rate since then.

None of these points are ever made by Kudrin’s admirers, just as when they claim – as they often do – that the Russian economy has been badly managed during Putin’s period as President so that the economy is supposedly insufficiently diversified they somehow manage to forget who was actually in charge of the economy during most of the time that Putin has been President.

This same exercise in selective memory comes up whenever the circumstances of Kudrin’s leaving the government are discussed. Kudrin’s admirers tend to claim that Kudrin left the government because of disagreements between him and Putin over defence spending. Kudrin supposedly was unhappy that defence spending was getting out of control and was becoming unaffordable. Putin supposedly refused to listen and

Kudrin therefore left the government rather than carry out a policy he considered irrational and unrealistic. No part of this is true. The true reason Kudrin was dismissed from the government was not because there was a row between him and Putin over defence spending. Kudrin was dismissed from the government because he made public his strong disagreement with Putin’s decision to appoint Dmitry Medvedev Prime Minister after the so-called “tandem switch” in 2011 when Putin and Medvedev swapped jobs, with Medvedev stepping aside from the Presidency to allow Putin to stand for the Presidency in the 2012 Presidential election and Putin in return nominating Medvedev to be his Prime Minister.

kudrin:medvedev

Alexey Kudrin with then President Dmitry Medvedev

What is strange about the claims Kudrin quit the government over defence spending is that his row with Medvedev which led to his dismissal was carried out in the most public way imaginable on national television for everyone to see. Kudrin started it all by saying on US television that he would not be able to stay in the government if Medvedev was appointed Prime Minister. There was then a public row between Medvedev and Kudrin in Russia shown in full view on national television during which an ashen-faced Kudrin asked for time to speak to Putin only to be sacked by Medvedev on the spot.

The issue of defence spending came up incidentally during the row as Kudrin searched for a reason to justify his objection to Medvedev’s becoming Prime Minister. The reason he hit upon was that he disagreed with Medvedev’s commitment to higher defence spending. He did not however exactly say it was completely unaffordable. Rather he said he wanted to spend more money on education instead.

As to the reasons for Kudrin’s objections to Medvedev’s appointment those to this day remain unclear. There were suggestions Kudrin was disappointed not to have been appointed Prime Minister himself.

There were also suggestions that he had come in for some criticism from within the government for his failure to foresee and pre-empt the 2008 financial crisis (see above) and that his position was already becoming shaky and that this provoked him to lash out.

It seems there was also a plan hatched by someone in the government (probably the Kremlin spin-doctor Vladislav Surkov) for Kudrin to leave the government to head a loyalist liberal pseudo-opposition party. It seems that Kudrin was unenthusiastic about this idea. However the fact it was floated at all shows that at the time of his dismissal the idea of Kudrin leaving the government was already in the air.

The true reason for Kudrin’s row with Medvedev is in fact obvious to anyone who watches the television film of their row: the two men detest each other. Quite why they do is unknown. Possibly it was rivalry for Putin’s favour and resentment by Kudrin that Medvedev – whom he obviously considers his inferior – was stealing a march on him.

Kudrin’s and Medvedev’s mutual dislike does however show one thing. This is that there is no united liberal Atlanticist bloc inside the government. At the time of their row Medvedev and Kudrin were widely credited with being the two most prominent liberal Atlanticists in the government.

Their all too evident mutual dislike however makes it all but inconceivable that they could forge a united front together. Having managed to get himself thrown out of the government in the most public way imaginable Kudrin then committed an action that deeply angered his former colleagues in the government and which has ever since fuelled widespread distrust of him in the country.

During the protests that followed the parliamentary elections in December 2011 Kudrin turned up and spoke at a liberal opposition rally on Sakharov Avenue in Moscow. By doing so he appeared to burn his bridges with the government and seemed to be aligning himself with the pro-Western liberal opposition against Putin.

Kudrin’s speech at the Sakharov Avenue rally in fact demonstrated something else: Kudrin’s complete lack of the most basic political skills needed by a successful politician. His speech at the rally was by common consent a disaster – a boring lecture from a former academic and technocrat that turned everybody off – very far from the rallying cry the situation demanded.

From that moment it was obvious to everyone including Kudrin himself that he could never successfully lead a political party or make himself a significant political force and that he represented no conceivable political threat or challenge either to Putin or to the government.

That realisation almost certainly explains Kudrin’s actions since then. Having realised that he had `no future as an opposition leader he began instead to try to work himself back into Putin’s favour.

The story of Kudrin’s career since then has been one of constant lobbying both by himself and by his supporters to bring him back into the government. Though during this period he regularly made coded criticisms of the government he always stopped short of direct attacks on it. The impression he gave was of someone who wanted the government to succeed but thought it was not being reformist enough. As is often the case with those in Russia who call for more reform he was vague about what was the reform he wanted but he tended to give the impression that he wanted to cut budget spending even more and wanted to raise the pension age.

It seems Kudrin finally persuaded Putin some months ago to bring him back and that the one issue that delayed his return was disagreement about the post he would be given.

In the event the post Kudrin was eventually given – deputy head of Putin’s Council of Economic Advisers – though important is advisory and hardly compares with the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister he held before he was sacked in 2011. If Kudrin held out for a more important position -as is likely – then he clearly didn’t get it. In fact it seems that both Medvedev and Sergey Ivanov (Putin’s Chief of Staff) vetoed any possibility of Kudrin being given executive posts either in government or in the Presidential Administration.

Why then did Putin bring Kudrin back?

There may have been an element… of political calculation behind the decision. Though Kudrin’s new post is hardly one of key importance his reappointment does carry important symbolism. It could be intended as a gesture to the West – where Kudrin is held in high regard – at a time when the anti-Russian policy the US and the EU have been following has been coming under increasing challenge.

More cynically, bringing Kudrin back into the fold might have been intended to keep him quiet and onside in the run-up to the pending parliamentary elections this autumn. More practically, it seems Kudrin is being asked to work on a national economic plan. Almost certainly this will include a recommendation to raise the pension age – a deeply unpopular measure which Putin is known however to have come round to. Possibly Putin is using Kudrin for political cover – looking to Kudrin to recommend an unpopular reform Putin realises is needed whilst setting Kudrin up as the fall guy who will take the flak if or rather when the measure is opposed.

However beyond these tough-minded political calculations personal factors have probably also played an important role. One must put aside the idea of major ideological differences between Putin and Kudrin. To the constant dismay of most of his supporters Putin’s record shows that he is a convinced economic liberal. Putin has never shown the slightest inclination to row back on the market reforms Russia has followed since the USSR’s collapse. If Kudrin is an economic liberal then the record shows Putin is one too.

As for Kudrin he is not quite the doctrinaire liberal or Atlanticist he is sometimes made out to be. He supported Putin’s action against Khodorkovsky and Yukos in 2004. As Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister he supported investment in Russia’s infrastructure. He also voiced support for the government’s policy of creating national champions in specific sectors of the economy.

Though a supporter of privatisation he never made this a fetish of his policy. Kudrin has also been careful not to challenge openly Putin’s foreign policy. Whatever his private thoughts on the matter he has never spoken out publicly against Crimea’s reunification with Russia. He surely knows that both for Putin and for the Russian public this question has become the touchstone of loyalty to the country.

Not only is there therefore enough common ground for Putin and Kudrin to work together in the future but there is a long history of close friendship and collaboration between them. Both Kudrin and Putin worked together in St. Petersburg in the 1990s for the city’s then mayor Anatoly Sobchak. Both Kudrin and Putin were then transferred to the Presidential Administration in Moscow when Sobchak failed to gain re-election in 1996. When Putin became the country’s President in 2000 he appointed Kudrin his Finance Minister and backed him in that post thereafter.

If there is one consistent pattern to Putin’s career it is his fierce loyalty to his friends even when – as in Kudrin’s case – that loyalty has not been fully reciprocated. It is probably Putin’s sense of friendship and loyalty to Kudrin which more than anything else explains his decision to bring him back.

Whether Putin’s feelings of friendship and loyalty to Kudrin will be enough to outweigh Kudrin’s unpopularity in the country and with many of his colleagues is another matter. On balance it is unlikely. However by bringing Kudrin back Putin has brought back into the fold an old friend and collaborator with a history of loyal service.

Should Putin decide to take a more liberal turn in managing the economy after the 2018 election Kudrin is there to help him take it. Whilst perennial rumours that Kudrin will become Prime Minister in place of Medvedev are probably misplaced, it is very much in character of Putin to move to keep his options open, and by bringing Kudrin back he has done just that.

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It’s Official: ‘Britain’s Democracy Now At Risk’

It’s not just campaigners saying it any more: democracy is officially at risk, according to parliament’s own digital, culture, media and sport committee.

The Duran

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Via True Publica, authored by Jessica Garland – Electoral Reform Society:


Britain’s main campaign rules were drawn up in the late 1990s, before social media and online campaigning really existed. This has left the door wide open to disinformation, dodgy donations and foreign interference in elections.

There is a real need to close the loopholes when it comes to the online Wild West.

Yet in this year’s elections, it was legitimate voters who were asked to identify themselves, not those funnelling millions into political campaigns through trusts, or those spreading fake news.

The government trialled mandatory voter ID in five council areas in May. In these five pilot areas alone about 350 people were turned away from polling stations for not having their papers with them — and they didn’t return. In other words, they were denied their vote.

Yet last year, out of more than 45 million votes cast across the country, there were just 28 allegations of personation (pretending to be someone else at the polling station), the type of fraud voter ID is meant to tackle.

Despite the loss of 350 votes, the pilots were branded a success by the government. Yet the 28 allegations of fraud (and just one conviction) are considered such a dire threat that the government is willing to risk disenfranchising many more legitimate voters to try to address it. The numbers simply don’t add up.

Indeed, the fact-checking website FullFact noted that in the Gosport pilot, 0.4 per cent of voters did not vote because of ID issues. That’s a greater percentage than the winning margin in at least 14 constituencies in the last election. Putting up barriers to democratic engagement can have a big impact. In fact, it can swing an election.

In the run-up to the pilots, the Electoral Reform Society and other campaigners warned that the policy risked disenfranchising the most marginalised groups in society.

The Windrush scandal highlights exactly the sort of problems that introducing stricter forms of identity could cause: millions of people lack the required documentation. It’s one of the reasons why organisations such as the Runnymede Trust are concerned about these plans.

The Electoral Commission has now published a report on the ID trials, which concludes that “there is not yet enough evidence to fully address concerns” on this front.

The small number of pilots, and a lack of diversity, meant that sample sizes were too small to conclude anything about how the scheme would affect various demographic groups. Nor can the pilots tell us about the likely impact of voter ID in a general election, where the strain on polling staff would be far greater and a much broader cross-section of electors turns out to vote.

The Electoral Reform Society, alongside 22 organisations, campaigners and academics, has now called on the constitution minister to halt moves to impose this policy. The signatories span a huge cross-section of society, including representatives of groups that could be disproportionately impacted by voter ID, from Age UK to Liberty and from the British Youth Council to the Salvation Army and the LGBT Foundation.

Voters know what our democratic priorities should be: ensuring that elections are free from the influence of big donors. Having a secure electoral register. Providing balanced media coverage. Transparency online.

We may be little wiser as a result of the government’s voter ID trials. Yet we do know where the real dangers lie in our politics.

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Corrupt Robert Mueller’s despicable Paul Manafort trial nears end (Video)

The Duran – News in Review – Episode 79.

Alex Christoforou

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Paul Manafort’s legal team rested its case on Tuesday without calling a single witness. This sets the stage for closing arguments before the judge hands the case to jurors for a verdict.

Manafort’s defense opted to call no witnesses, choosing instead to rely on the team’s cross-examination of government witnesses including a very devious Rick Gates, Manafort’s longtime deputy, and several accountants, bookkeepers and bankers who had financial dealings with Manafort.

Closing arguments are expected on Wednesday. Jurors may begin deliberating shortly after receiving their final instructions from judge Ellis.

Manafort case has nothing to do with Mueller’s ‘Trump-Russia collusion witch-hunt’ as the former DC lobbyist is accused of defrauding banks to secure loans and hiding overseas bank accounts and income from U.S. tax authorities.

U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis III denied a defense motion to acquit Manafort on the charges because prosecutors hadn’t proved their case.

The Duran’s Alex Christoforou and Editor-in-Chief Alexander Mercouris discuss the circus trial of Trump’s former Campaign Manager Paul Manafort, and how crooked cop Robert Mueller is using all his power to lean on Manafort, so as to conjure up something illegal against US President Donald Trump.

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Via Zerohedge

Prosecutors allege he dodged taxes on millions of dollars made from his work for a Ukrainian political party, then lied to obtain bank loans when cash stopped flowing from the project.

The courtroom was sealed for around two hours Tuesday morning for an unknown reason, reopening around 11:30 a.m. with Manafort arriving around 10 minutes later.

The decision to rest their case without calling any witnesses follows a denial by Judge T.S. Ellis III to acquit Manafort after his lawyers tried to argue that the special counsel had failed to prove its case at the federal trial.

The court session began at approximately 11:45 a.m.:

“Good afternoon,” began defense attorney Richard Westling, who corrected himself and said, “Good morning.”

“I’m as surprised as you are,” Judge Ellis responded.

Ellis then heard brief argument from both sides on the defense’s motion for acquittal, focusing primarily on four counts related to Federal Savings Bank.

Federal Savings Bank was aware of the status of Paul Manafort’s finances,” Westling argued. “They came to the loans with an intent of doing business with Mr. Manafort.”

Prosecutor Uzo Asonye fired back, saying that that even if bank chairman Steve Calk overlooked Manafort’s financial woes, it would still be a crime to submit fraudulent documents to obtain the loans.

“Steve Calk is not the bank,” Asonye argued, adding that while Caulk may have “had a different motive” — a job with the Trump administration — “I’m not really sure there’s evidence he knew the documents were false.”

Ellis sided with prosecutors.

The defense makes a significant argument about materiality, but in the end, I think materiality is an issue for the jury,” he said, adding. “That is true for all the other counts… those are all jury issues.”

Once that exchange was over, Manafort’s team was afforded the opportunity to present their case, to which lead attorney Kevin Downing replied “The defense rests.

Ellis then began to question Manafort to ensure he was aware of the ramifications of that decision, to which the former Trump aide confirmed that he did not wish to take the witness stand.

Manafort, in a dark suit and white shirt, stood at the lectern from which his attorneys have questioned witnesses, staring up at the judge. Ellis told Manafort he had a right to testify, though if he chose not to, the judge would tell jurors to draw no inference from that. – WaPo

Ellis asked Manafort four questions – his amplified voice booming through the courtroom:

Had Manafort discussed the decision with his attorney?

“I have, your honor,” Manafort responded, his voice clear.

Was he satisfied with their advice?

“I am, your honor,” Manafort replied.

Had he decided whether he would testify?

“I have decided,” Manafort said.

“Do you wish to testify?” Ellis finally asked.

“No, sir,” Manafort responded.

And with that, Manafort returned to his seat.

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One more step toward COMPLETE de-dollarization

Over the past several months, sitting here in Moscow, it has become increasingly obvious that while the US Dollar is unquestionably the world’s leading and liquid reserve currency, it comes with an ever increasing high price (of sovereignty and FX) if you are not the USA.

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I have opined and written about the trend towards de-dollarization before, but with the latest US –Turkish spat it has hit the wallets, mattresses and markets of a number of countries, be they aligned with Washington or not. One thing they all have in common was that in this recent era of low cost available money, many happily fed at the US dollar trough.

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This serves as a further albeit loud example to many nations for the need to diversify to an extent away from the greenback, or risk being caught up in its volatile, sudden and unpredictably risky increasingly politicized directions.

The Dollar and the geopolitical winds from Washington are today as never before openly being used as policy, which can be called the “carrot and stick”, a distinctly Pavlovian approach. Sadly, few if any can make out where or what the carrot is in this recent US worldview branding.

Tariffs, sanctions, pressured exchange rates, the Federal Reserve loosening or tightening, trade agreements and laws ignored or simply trashed… there is a lot going on which seems to democratically affect America’s allies as well as those on Washington’s politically popular and dramatic “poo-poo” list.

Just now from a press conference in Turkey, I watched Russia’s foreign minister Lavrov say that through the actions shown by the US, the role of the US dollar as a secure global reserve currency for free trade will diminish as more countries switch to national currencies for international trade.

He clearly spoke for many nations when he said; “It will make more and more countries that are not even affected by US sanctions go away from the dollar and rely on more reliable, contractual partners in terms of currency use.” Putting the situation in a nutshell he went on to say “I have already said this about sanctions: they are illegal, they undermine all principles of global trade and principles approved by UN decisions, under which unilateral measures of economic duress are unlawful.”

Turkey, a long-standing NATO ally and a key line of western defense during the long cold war years fully agreed with his Russian counterpart. The Turkish foreign minister Mr. Cavosoglu openly warned that US sanctions or trade embargoes can and are being unilaterally imposed against any country at any time if they do not toe DC’s political line.

He said at the same press conference; “Today, sanctions are imposed on Turkey, and tomorrow they can be used against any other European state. If the United States wants to maintain respect in the international arena, then it is necessary for it to be respectful of the interests of other countries.”

What is happening in Turkey is symptomatic of the developed and emerging markets globally. When trillions of dollars of newly issued lucre was up for grabs, thanks to several developed country central banks, it was comparatively easy for governments and companies just like Turkey’s to borrow funds denominated in dollars and not their national currencies.

Turkey has relied on foreign-currency debt more than most EM’s. Corporate, financial and other debt denominated mostly in dollars, approximates close to 70% of it’s economy. Therefore as the Turkish lira plunges, it is very costly for those companies to repay their dollar-denominated loans, and even now it is patently clear many will not.

The concern rattling around the underbelly of the global markets is what can be reasonably expected for assets and economies that were inflated by cheap debt, the United States included. All this points not so much to a banking crisis as has happened eight years ago, but a systemic financial market crisis.

This is a new one, and I doubt if any QE, QT, NIRPs, or ZIRPs will make much of a difference, despite the rocket-high equity markets the US has been displaying.

One financial trader I spoke to, whom I have known since the early 1980’s (and I thought him ancient then) muttered to me “we’re gettin’ into the ecstasy stage, nothing but the high matters, everything else including the VIX is seen as boring denial, and not the warning tool it is. Better start loading up on gold.”

Meanwhile, de-dollarization is ongoing in Russia and is carefully studied by a host of countries, especially as the Russian government has not yet finished selling off US debt; it still has just a few billion to go. The Russian Finance Minister A. Siluanov said this past Sunday that Russia would continue decreasing holdings of Treasuries in response to sanctions.

The finance minister went on to say that, Russia is also considering distancing itself from using the US dollar for international trade, calling it an unreliable, conditional and hence risky tool for payments.

Between March and May this year, Russia’s US debt holdings were sold down by $81 billion, which is 84% of its total US debt holdings, and while I don’t know the current figure it is certain to be even less.

The latest round of tightening sanctions screws against Russia were imposed by the State Department under a chemical and biological warfare law and should be going into effect on August 22. This in spite of the fact that no proof was ever shown, not under any established national or international law, or with any of several global biochemical conventions, not even in the ever entertaining court of public opinion.

Whatever Russia may continue to do in its relationship with US debt or the dollar, the fact of the matter is that Russia is not a heavyweight in this particular financial arena, and the direct effects of Russia’s responses are negligible. However, the indirect effects are huge as they reflect what many countries (allied or unallied with the US) see as Washington’s overbearing and more than slightly unipolar trade and geopolitical advantage quests, be they Mexico, Canada, the EU, or anyone else on any hemisphere of this globe.

Some of the potential indirect effects over time may be a similar sell-off or even gradual reduction of US debt exposure from China or any one of several dozens of countries deciding to reduce their exposure to US debt by reducing their purchases and waiting for existing Treasuries to mature. In either case, the trend is there and is not going away anytime soon.

When Russia clears its books of US dollarized debt, then who will be next in actively diversifying their US debt risk? Then what might be the fate of the US Dollar, and what value then will be the international infusions to finance America’s continually growing debt, or fuel the funds needed for further market growth? Value and the energy of money has no politics, it ultimately trends towards areas where there is a secure business dynamic. That being said, looks like we are now and will be living through the most interesting of disruptive times.

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