Connect with us
//pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});

Latest

Russia cuts interest rates whilst maintaining tough monetary policy

As inflation falls, Russia’s Central Bank cuts key rate to 10% but insists its tight monetary policy intended to reduce inflation will continue.

Alexander Mercouris

Published

on

The Russian Central Bank has, as predicted, cut its key rate from 10.5% to 10%.

This is consistent with the continuing rapid fall in inflation.  With inflation zero in the first two weeks of September after being zero in the last week of July and through most of August, its annualised rate is now just 6.6%.  The Central Bank has said that it intends to keep its key rate 3% above the annualised rate of inflation for the foreseeable future, so that with annualised inflation running at 6.7% it had the space to announce this rate cut.

However that is where the good news stops.  The Central Bank has signalled that it intends no more cuts to its key rate this year, meaning that the earliest possible date for a further rate cut will not be before January next year.  The Central Bank also says that it will maintain what it calls its “moderately tight monetary policy” – a policy which is in fact giving Russia the highest real interest rates of any major economy in the world – throughout 2017 and indeed beyond.

Here in its own words is the Central Bank’s guidance from its own press release

“On 16 September 2016, the Bank of Russia Board of Directors decided to reduce the key rate from 10.50 to 10.00% p.a. given the inflation slowdown, in line with the forecast, decrease in inflation expectations and unstable economic activity. However, for the trend towards sustainable decline in inflation to strengthen, according to the Bank of Russia’s estimates, the current value of the key rate needs to be maintained till end-2016 with its further possible cuts in 2017 Q1-Q2. Considering the decision made and persistent moderately tight monetary policy, the annual consumer price growth will stand at 4.5% in September 2017 and will then go down to the 4% target in late 2017. When making its key rate decisions in the coming months, the Bank of Russia will assess inflation risks alongside economy and inflation dynamics’ consistence with the baseline forecast.”

The Central Bank admits the market is expecting cuts in the key rate to take place faster, and it even brags that it intends to cut its key rate more slowly than the market expects. 

Its rationale is that the market still expects inflation at the end of next year to be higher than 4%, which is the Central Bank’s target.  However the Central Bank says it is determined, come what may, to achieve its target, which is why it is going to keep its key rate higher than the market expects

“The Bank of Russia expects that the decision made and maintenance of the key rate at the level it reached will bring down inflation expectations. At present, the structure of market interest rates by maturity and survey findings indicate that, in contrast to the Bank of Russia, market players forecast a faster drop in interest rates. Additionally, their end-2017 inflation forecasts exceed the 4% target of the central bank. In reality, the decrease of nominal rates has a limited capacity, and the economy will maintain moderately tight monetary conditions for quite a long period of time. This is implied by the need to keep positive real interest rates at the level supporting demand for credit that does not raise inflationary pressure and keeps incentives for saving.”

In what is the single most extraordinary paragraph in the entire press release, the Central Bank admits that Russia will only achieve 1% growth next year, but denies that this has anything to do with its “moderately tight monetary policy”

“Persistent revival in production activity is still unstable and patchy across industries and regions. According to Bank of Russia estimates, the moderately tight monetary conditions do not hamper recovery in economy, whereas the main obstacles are caused by structural effects. The labour market tries to adjust to new economic conditions, and the unemployment remains stable and low. Import substitution steps up and non-commodity exports expand for certain items. Industry, including technology-intensive production types, discovers new opportunities for growth. Nonetheless, they fail to ensure an overall robust positive production dynamics. At the same time, certain industries stagnate or show slowdown in output growth, while investment continues to contract. More time is needed for positive trends to develop and get rooted.”

(bold italics added)

This is a fantastic claim, and by making it the Central Bank undermines its own credibility.  Quite simply, it is absurd to say that high real interest rates – currently the highest real interest rates of any major economy in the world – are not going to impact on growth. 

Moreover the Guidelines the Central Bank published in November last year explaining its monetary policy shows that the Central Bank is fully aware of the fact.  As the Central Bank knows the reason output is struggling to rise is because of low rates of consumption and falling investment. 

The Central Bank’s press statement actually refers to the fact that “investment continues to contract” (see above).  This is what the Central Bank said in its Guidelines about the effect of interest rates on levels of consumption, investment and inflation

“All things being equal, a downturn in interest rates stimulates lending, helps increase consumption, and leads to investment growth, but inflationary pressure can also increase. By contrast, high interest rates contribute to growth in savings and constrain lending and investment activity, but reduce inflationary pressure.”

(bold italics added)

Yet the Central Bank would have us believe that the high interest rates it is imposing, which in its Guidelines it admits “all things being equal” cause consumption and investment to fall, are not the reason why in Russia consumption and investment are continuing to fall!

What is little understood – and is scarcely ever said – about the present state of Russia’s economy is that though the underlying rate of inflation is now running at 5-6%, which is below its pre-devaluation level, interest rates are higher than they were before the devaluation, and that despite the recent cuts in the Central Bank’s key rate real interest rates in Russia are actually rising. 

This chart shows movements in the Central Bank’s key rate since 2013, the year in which Nabiullina was appointed Chairman of the Central Bank

russian-interest-rate-chart

In 2013, at the time Nabiullina took over as Chairman of the Central Bank, and before she started raising interest rates in 2014, the Central Bank’s key rate was below 6% in a year when annual inflation was 6.48%.  Today she intends to hold the key rate at 10% despite the government’s forecast that inflation this year will be 5.7-5.9%.

Annual inflation in Russia was in double figures in every single year post 1991 up to the crisis year of 2009 save for 2006, when it briefly dipped to 9.02%.  Inflation was in double figures throughout the period 1998 to 2008, when Russia was regularly achieving annual growth rates of 7% and more.

Inflation fell from double figures to single figures in 2009, and has been in single figures ever since save for the brief period of the inflation spike of 2014 to 2015, which was caused by the one-off factor of the devaluation of the rouble in 2014, which caused inflation to rise back into double figures in 2014 and 2015.

This period of single figure inflation since 2009 is the same period during which Russia’s growth rate has fallen from the annual rate of 7% it was achieving before the 2008 crisis to 4.3% in 2011, 3.5% in 2012, and 1.3% in 2013.

In other words there is a direct correlation between the decline in Russia’s growth rate post 2008, and the fall in inflation which has taken place since then – and the rise in interest rates which has happened to achieve it. 

To see how see this World Bank graph which shows movements of real as opposed to nominal interest rates in Russia since 1991.

Russia experienced negative real interest rates from the 1998 crisis until the 2008 crisis.  During the period of the 2008 crisis real interest rates briefly surged into high positive territory as part of the government’s anti-crisis measures.

They then fell back again into negative territory directly after the 2008 crisis was overcome as the Central Bank and the government looked for ways to support the recovery.  However since 2011, as the Central Bank and the government have become more focused on inflation reduction, they have been rising steadily, turning positive in 2012, and remaining positive ever since, even during the period of the 2014-2015 inflation spike when they might have been expected to go negative.

Since the end of the inflation spike in mid 2015, and despite the round of key rate cuts Nabiullina has announced since January 2015, they have been rising again.

Prior to 2008 high growth was the priority, causing the Central Bank to keep real interest rates negative and to increase the money supply in order to sustain growth and to prevent over-rapid appreciation of the rouble in conditions of rising oil prices.  The result was double digit inflation in every year between 1998 and 2008, apart from the brief dip in 2006. 

Since recovery from the 2008-2009 crisis the priority has been inflation reduction, with monetary policy being tightened steadily in order to choke off inflation.  The result is that inflation fell into single figures after 2009, and apart from the short period of the 2014-2015 inflation spike has remained so ever since, and is now falling further.   

Since Nabiullina became Chairman the Central Bank has taken the policy a whole step further, tightening monetary policy even more, so that it is now significantly tighter than it was even during the post-recovery period of 2011-2013 and before the 2014 devaluation, despite the fact that inflation is now actually below the level it was in that period.

In other words Nabiullina and the Central Bank – and indeed the whole government – are using the 2014-2015 inflation spike to give themselves political cover to carry out a policy of monetary tightening the likes of which post-Soviet Russia has not seen since Putin became President.  This objective is to bring inflation down to 4% by late 2017 in order to achieve the long term results I discussed in my previous article

As for the famous ‘structural factors’ about which we hear so much, the Central Bank’s latest press release shows what they really are: an alibi conjured up by the Central Bank and the government so they can pretend that the sharp fall in the economy’s growth rate caused by their own anti-inflation policy and the high real interest rates they are imposing has nothing to do with them. 

That is unless inflation is the ‘structural factor’ which they see as limiting growth in the long term – something which it might be reasonable to say, but which for some reason no-one ever does.

In truth the wonder is that despite interest rates being so high there is any growth in the Russian economy at all, especially as there is no countervailing fiscal stimulus from the budget to offset Nabiullina’s “moderately tight monetary policy”. 

On the contrary – and though you would never know it from the way some people talk – since the start of the recession budget spending has actually been cut, so that coming out of recession Russia’s federal budget deficit in the first 8 months of this year was just 2.9% of GDP.

There are of course many people who find this policy approach commendable.  Reducing inflation to 4% is a worthy aim, and over time it may – and indeed probably will – achieve the good results people like Nabiullina and Kudrin say it will.  I must however say that I can think of no other Central Bank or government in any other G20 economy which in the same conditions would behave in this way. 

At a time when Russia has suffered a recession any other G20 Central Bank or government finding itself in such a position would surely focus on ending the recession, not on further reducing inflation from what is by Russian standards an already historically low level. 

This would be especially so given that the moderate loosening of monetary policy this would call for would be most unlikely to compromise the anti-inflation policy in any serious way.  At worst it might delay achievement of the 4% by a few months, or perhaps a year.

Russia however is different.  With unemployment very low at 5.7% at a time when the country’s labour force participation rate is at an unprecedentedly high 70%, and with political and macroeconomic conditions stable, the Central Bank and the government obviously feel they have the political and economic space to see the policy through, and it seems they are determined to see it through come what may.   Not for nothing is Nabiullina being called “the most orthodox Central Banker in Europe”. 

As for Putin, as I said in my previous article I have no doubt he supports the policy.  With the political situation in Russia stable and his popularity at stratospheric levels, he is moreover under no real pressure to change it.  If only for that reason I don’t expect the policy to change.

Liked it? Take a second to support The Duran on Patreon!
Advertisement //pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

avatar
  Subscribe  
Notify of

Latest

BARR: No collusion by any Americans

Trump never used his powers to interfere with Mueller, and thus had no “corrupt intent” in the matter.

Alex Christoforou

Published

on

Attorney General Barr found no one in the Trump campaign colluded with “Russia” to meddle in the 2016 US election.

A devastating blow to Democrats and their mainstream media stenographers.

Trump reacted immediately…

Via RT…

With the full report on special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into claims President Donald Trump colluded with Russia about to be released, Attorney General William Barr is giving a press conference about its findings.

Barr maintains the allegation that the Russian government made efforts to interfere in the election through the Internet Research Agency, an alleged Kremlin-control “troll farm”, as well as “hacking efforts” by the Russian intelligence agency GRU.

The bottom line, Barr says, is that Mueller has found Russia tried to interfere in the election, but “no American” helped it.

Barr explained the White House’s interaction with the Mueller report, whether Trump used executive privilege to block any of its contents from release, as well as on how the Justice Department chose which bits of the 400-page paper to redact.

On the matter of obstruction of justice, Barr said he and his deputy Rod Rosenstein have reviewed Mueller’s evidence and “legal theories”, and found that there is no evidence to show Trump tried to disrupt the investigation.

He said Trump never used his powers to interfere with Mueller, and thus had no “corrupt intent” in the matter.

Most of the redactions in the report were made to protect ongoing investigations and personal information of “peripheral third parties”.

Barr said that no-one outside the Justice Department took part in the redacting process or saw the unredacted version, except for the intelligence community, which was given access to parts of it to protect sources.

Trump did not ask to make any changes to Mueller’s report, Barr said.

Trump’s personal counsel was given access to the redacted report before its release.

A number of Trump-affiliated people, as well as Russian nationals, have been indicted, charged or put on trial by Mueller over the course of the past two years, but none for election-related conspiracy. Still, Democrats in Congress as well as numerous establishment media personalities have been insisting that Barr, a Trump pick for AG office, is somehow “spinning” its findings in order to protect and exonerate Trump, and are calling to see the full report as soon as possible.

They have equally condemned Barr’s decision to hold a news conference before the report is release, claiming he is trying to shape the public perception in Trump’s favor.

Liked it? Take a second to support The Duran on Patreon!
Continue Reading

Latest

Moscow’s Strategy: To Win Everywhere, Every Time

The main feature of Moscow’s approach is to find areas of common interest with its interlocutor and to favor the creation of trade or knowledge exchange.

Avatar

Published

on

Authored by Federico Pieraccini via The Strategic Culture Foundation:


Important events have occurred in the Middle East and North Africa in recent weeks that underline how the overall political reconfiguration of the region is in full swing. The Shia axis continues its diplomatic relations and, following Rouhani’s meeting in Baghdad, it was the turn of Adil Abdul-Mahdi to be received in Tehran by the highest government and religious authorities. Among the many statements released, two in particular reveal the high level of cooperation between the two countries, as well as demonstrating how the Shia axis is in full bloom, carrying significant prospects for the region. Abdul-Mahdi also reiterated that Iraq will not allow itself to be used as a platform from which to attack Iran: “Iraqi soil will not be allowed to be used by foreign troops to launch any attacks against Iran. The plan is to export electricity and gas for other countries in the region.”

Considering that these two countries were mortal enemies during Saddam Hussein’s time, their rapprochement is quite a (geo)political miracle, owing much of its success to Russia’s involvement in the region. The 4+1 coalition (Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria plus Hezbollah) and the anti-terrorism center in Baghdad came about as a result of Russia’s desire to coordinate all the allied parties in a single front. Russia’s military support of Syria, Iraq and Hezbollah (together with China’s economic support) has allowed Iran to begin to transform the region such that the Shia axis can effectively counteract the destabilizing chaos unleashed by the trio of the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

One of the gaps to be filled in the Shia axis lies in Lebanon, which has long experienced an internal conflict between the many religious and political currents in the country. The decision by Washington to recognize the Golan Heights as part of Israel pushed the Lebanese president, Michel Aoun, to make an important symbolic visit to Moscow to meet with President Putin.

Once again, the destabilizing efforts of the Saudis, Israelis and Americans are having the unintended effect of strengthening the Shia axis. It seems that this trio fails to understood how such acts as murdering Khashoggi, using civilian planes to hide behind in order to conduct bombing runs in Syria, recognizing the occupied territories like the Golan Heights – how these produce the opposite effects to the ones desired.

The supply of S-300 systems to Syria after the downing of the Russian reconnaissance plane took place as a result of Tel Aviv failing to think ahead and anticipate how Russia may respond.

What is surprising in Moscow’s actions is the versatility of its diplomacy, from the deployment of the S-300s in Syria, or the bombers in Iran, to the prompt meetings with Netanyahu in Moscow and Mohammad bin Salman at the G20. The ability of the Russian Federation to mediate and be present in almost every conflict on the globe restores to the country the international stature that is indispensable in counterbalancing the belligerence of the United States.

The main feature of Moscow’s approach is to find areas of common interest with its interlocutor and to favor the creation of trade or knowledge exchange. Another military and economic example can be found in a third axis; not the Shia or Saudi-Israeli-US one but the Turkish-Qatari one. In Syria, Erdogan started from positions that were exactly opposite to those of Putin and Assad. But with decisive military action and skilled diplomacy, the creation of the Astana format between Iran, Turkey and Russia made Turkey and Qatar publicly take the defense of Islamist takfiris and criminals in Idlib. Qatar for its part has a two-way connection with Turkey, but it is also in open conflict with the Saudi-Israeli axis, with the prospect of abandoning OPEC within a few weeks. This situation has allowed Moscow to open a series of negotiations with Doha on the topic of LNG, with these two players controlling most of the LNG on the planet. It is evident that also the Turkish-Qatari axis is strongly conditioned by Moscow and by the potential military agreements between Turkey and Russia (sale of S-400) and economic and energy agreements between Moscow and Doha.

America’s actions in the region risks combining the Qatari-Turkish front with the Shia axis, again thanks to Moscow’s skilful diplomatic work. The recent sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, together with the withdrawal from the JCPOA (the Iranian nuclear agreement), has created concern and bewilderment in the region and among Washington’s allies. The act of recognizing the occupied Golan Heights as belonging to Israel has brought together the Arab world as few events have done in recent times. Added to this, Trump’s open complaints about OPEC’s high pricing of oil has forced Riyadh to start wondering out aloud whether to start selling oil in a currency other than the dollar. This rumination was quickly denied, but it had already been aired. Such a decision would have grave implications for the petrodollar and most of the financial and economic power of the United States.

If the Shia axis, with Russian protection, is strengthened throughout the Middle East, the Saudi-Israel-American triad loses momentum and falls apart, as seen in Libya, with Haftar now one step closer in unifying the country thanks to the support of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France and Russia, with Fayez al-Sarraj now abandoned by the Italians and Americans awaiting his final defeat.

While the globe continues its multipolar transformation, the delicate balancing role played by Russia in the Middle East and North Africa is emphasized. The Venezuelan foreign minister’s recent visit to Syria shows how the front opposed to US imperialist bullying is not confined to the Middle East, with countries in direct or indirect conflict with Washington gathering together under the same protective Sino-Russian umbrella.

Trump’s “America First” policy, coupled with the conviction of American exceptionalism, is driving international relations towards two poles rather than multipolar ones, pushing China, Russia and all other countries opposed to the US to unite in order to collectively resist US diktats.

Liked it? Take a second to support The Duran on Patreon!
Continue Reading

Latest

Nigel Farage stuns political elite, as Brexit Party and UKIP surge in polls (Video)

The Duran Quick Take: Episode 144.

Alex Christoforou

Published

on

The Duran’s Alex Christoforou and Editor-in-Chief Alexander Mercouris take a look at Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party’s stunning rise in the latest UK polls, which show Tory support splintering and collapsing to new lows. Theresa May’s Brexit debacle has all but destroyed the Conservative party, which is now seeing voters turn to UKIP and The Brexit Party.

Corbyn’s Labour Party is not finding much favor from UK voters either, as anger over how Britain’s two main parties conspired to sell out the country to EU globalists, is now being voiced in various polling data ahead of EU Parliament elections.

Remember to Please Subscribe to The Duran’s YouTube Channel.

Follow The Duran Audio Podcast on Soundcloud.

Authored by Mike Shedlock via MishTalk:


The Guardian reports Tories Hit by New Defections and Slump in Opinion Polls as Party Divide Widens.

The bitter fallout from Brexit is threatening to break the Tory party apart, as a Europhile former cabinet minister Stephen Dorrell on Sunday announces he is defecting to the independent MPs’ group Change UK, and a new opinion poll shows Conservative support plummeting to a five-year low as anti-EU parties surge.

The latest defections come as a new Opinium poll for the Observer shows a dramatic fall in Tory support in the past two weeks and a surge for anti-EU parties. The Conservatives have fallen by six percentage points to 29% compared to a fortnight ago. It is their worst position since December 2014. Labour is up one point on 36% while Ukip is up two points on 11%.

Even more alarmingly for the Tories, their prospects for the European elections appear dire. Only 17% of those certain to vote said they would choose the Conservatives in the European poll, while 29% would back Labour, and 25% either Ukip (13%) or Nigel Farage’s new Brexit party (12%).

YouGov Poll

A more recent YouGov Poll looks even worse for the Tories

In the YouGov poll, UKIP and BREX total 29%.

Polls Volatile

Eurointellingence has these thoughts on the polls.

We have noted before that classic opinion polls at a time like this are next to useless. But we found an interesting constituency-level poll, by Electoral Calculus, showing for the first time that Labour would get enough constituency MPs to form a minority government with the support of the SNP. This is a shift from previous such exercises, which predicted a continuation of the status quo with the Tories still in command.

This latest poll, too, is subject to our observation of massively intruding volatility. It says that some of the Tory’s most prominent MPs would be at risk, including Amber Rudd and Iain Duncan-Smith. And we agree with the bottom-line analysis of John Curtice, the pollster, who said the abrupt fall in support for Tories is due entirely to their failure to have delivered Brexit on time.

The Tories are facing two electoral tests in May – local elections on May 2 and European elections on May 23. Early polls are show Nigel Farage’s new Brexit party shooting up, taking votes away from the Tories. If European elections were held, we would expect the Brexit party to come ahead of the Tories. Labour is rock-solid in the polls, but Labour unity is at risk as the pro-referendum supporters want Jeremy Corbyn to put the second referendum on the party’s manifesto.

Tory Labour Talks

The Tory/Labour talks on a compromise have stalled, but are set to continue next week with three working groups: on security, on environmental protection, and on workers’ rights. A separate meeting is scheduled between Philip Hammond and John McDonnell, the chancellor and shadow chancellor. The big outstanding issue is the customs union. Theresa May has not yet moved on this one. We noted David Liddington, the effective deputy prime minister, saying that the minimum outcome of the talks would be an agreed and binding decision-making procedure to flush out all options but one in a series of parliamentary votes.

May’s task is to get at least half of her party on board for a compromise. What makes a deal attractive to the Tories is that May would resign soon afterwards, giving enough time for the Tory conference in October to select a successor before possible elections in early 2020.

This relative alignment of interests is why we would not rule out a deal – either on an agreed joint future relationship, or at least on a method to deliver an outcome.

Customs Union

A customs union, depending on how it is structured, would likely be worse than remaining. The UK would have to abide by all the EU rules and regulations without having any say.

Effectively, it will not be delivering Brexit.

Perhaps May’s deal has a resurrection.

Mike “Mish” Shedlock

Liked it? Take a second to support The Duran on Patreon!
Continue Reading

JOIN OUR YOUTUBE CHANNEL

Your donations make all the difference. Together we can expose fake news lies and deliver truth.

Amount to donate in USD$:

5 100

Validating payment information...
Waiting for PayPal...
Validating payment information...
Waiting for PayPal...
Advertisement

Advertisement

Quick Donate

The Duran
EURO
DONATE
Donate a quick 10 spot!
Advertisement
Advertisement

Advertisement

The Duran Newsletter

Videos

Trending